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Preface 
 
This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four essays.  The essay in Chapter 2 is joint 
work with my supervisor, Lars-Erik Borge (Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology), and the essay in Chapter 4 is joint work with Hans Bonesrønning (Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology). The essay in Chapter 2, entitled Efficiency Potential 
and Efficiency Variation in Norwegian Lower Secondary Schools, has been published in 
FinanzArchiv. 
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction and Summary 
 

 1.1 Introduction 
Compared to the average level for the OECD countries, public spending on education in 
Norway is high, and international student assessment surveys rank Norwegian students only 
slightly above the average (OECD 2001; 2004) 1. It is a common opinion that Norwegian 
students get mediocre results relative to the spending level on educational services (Clemet, 
2001; Utdanningsdirektoratet, 2005).  Comparable countries, such as other Nordic countries, 
invest fewer resources per students in compulsory education and are ranked higher in 
international student assessment rankings (OECD, 2007; Lie et al., 2001; Kjærnsli et al., 
2004). These rather discouraging facts represent a major concern and a hot topic in the 
political and academic debate.  
In Norway, as in most countries, the public sector is heavily involved in the provision of 
schooling. As stressed by Hanushek (2002), this makes understanding the efficiency of 
production an important issue. If schooling alternatively were provided by private markets, 
there would generally be less concern about efficiency of production, as market forces in this 
case are trusted to push the producers towards more efficient use of resources. However, with 
government involvement in production, many schools operate in a near-monopoly situations 
and the focus is therefore substantially altered. A key finding in cross-country studies based 
on international knowledge tests is that that the richest countries, which allocate most 
resources to the educational sector, do not receive high achievement in return. This result 
demonstrates the existence of serious inefficiencies in provision, and moreover that there is no 
relationship between resource use in education and student performance. Studies based on 
within-country variation also indicate that increased resource use in education is no guarantee 
for improved results2. Empirical studies concerned with the relationship between resource use 
and student achievement are generally plagued with serious endogeneity problems, and 
recently a large number of papers have applied convincing empirical identification strategies 
                                                 
1 Former Minister of Education Kristin Clemet claims in a newspaper article that Norwegian schools are 
‘quantitatively best’ but only modest qualitatively, compared to other countries in the OECD, (Clemet, 2001). 
Official OECD indicators show that Norway spent 9 476 US dollar per student in lower secondary education, as 
apposed to the OECD average of 6 909 US dollar per student in 2004 (OECD, 2007). Moreover, the average 
reading test score for Norwegian students at the PISA 2000 was 505 compared to the OECD average of 500. 
Finland, who came out best of the OECD countries, had an average score of 546.  
2 A review of the literature on the relationship between resource use and achievement can be found in for 
instance Hanushek (2002) or Wößmann (2005). 
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to overcome these problems and to pin down the causal effect of increased resource use on 
educational performance. Despite advanced and well developed methods, the perception 
among economists, based on prevailing evidence, is still that the direct effect of increased 
resources in education is zero or small at best.   
A suggested explanation to the weak empirical relationship between resource use and 
educational performance is that policy decisions, such as increased direct spending and 
reduced class-size, are made within the context of prevailing institutional settings that do not 
impose strong incentives to increase performance (Hanushek, 2002).  Economic research on 
educational production is mainly focused on sorting out the causal effects of school factors 
that can be manipulated through policy, from other contributory factors to educational 
performance3. Of current interest is the role played by existing organizational and institutional 
settings. Incentives are created by rules and regulations in the educational sector, and may 
exercise an important impact on educational performance and efficiency by imposing rewards 
for high performance and penalties for low performance (e.g. Hanushek and Wößmann, 2007; 
Hanushek, 1994).  However, existing incentives may also have opposite or mixed effects on 
performance. Existing empirical evidence suggests that policies such as increased school 
autonomy and decentralization, competition, high stake testing of students and educational 
accountability systems may raise strong incentives for increased performance (see for instance 
Hoxby, 2000; Hoxby and Rockoff, 2004; Hanushek and Raymond, 2005). 
The most common conceptual framework employed in economic analyses of education takes 
the form of a production function, with students’ test scores as the typical output and 
characteristics of the teaching and learning environment as typical inputs (e.g. Todd and 
Wolpin, 2003). A production function is generally based on an assumption of efficiency, 
meaning that all institutions should be able to transform inputs to outputs at the same rate. 
Hanushek (1986) argues that the empirical application of the conceptual model may collapse 
if inefficiencies exist in the production, which also may explain the failure of identifying any 
effects of resource use. A related literature, summarized by Worthington (2001), considers the 
existence of inefficiencies in the educational production process by taking a conceptually 
different approach using a variety of techniques (econometric or mathematical programming) 
to identify efficient educational institutions and compare them with inefficient institutions. 
                                                 
3 Starting with the report by Coleman et al. (1966), ‘The Coleman Report’, numerous contributions  has 
emphasised the relevance of individual student characteristics, family background, peers etc for individual 
student performance (e.g. Cook and Evans, 2000; Hanushek et al., 2003; Hægeland et al., 2004).  
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Although also criticized for certain methodological shortcomings4, these studies clearly have 
illustrated the existence of substantial variation in efficiency among different educational 
institutions.   
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the variation in educational 
efficiency and the impact of existing institutional settings within the education sector. There 
are few empirical analyses on educational efficiency in Norwegian schools, and the analyses 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3 contribute to the literature by calculating the efficiency 
potential of Norwegian schools and school districts (municipalities) using Data Envelopement 
Analysis (DEA), and by analyzing the determinants of efficiency. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
impact of economic, demographical and political characteristics of the municipalities, while 
the analysis in Chapter 3 extends the analysis by including information on the organizational 
approach taken by the municipalities. The two remaining papers are also based on available 
data from lower secondary schools in Norway, and apply the traditional production function 
approach. The topic of Chapter 4 is the impact of competition from private schools on public 
school outcomes, while Chapter 5 is concerned with the heterogeneity in student achievement 
measures from different evaluation schemes used in Norwegian education. 
1.2 Summary of the Essays 
Chapter 2: Efficiency Potential and Efficiency Variation in Norwegian Lower Secondary 
Schools 
This chapter analyses the efficiency potential in the lower-secondary-school sector in 
Norway. Our aim is to calculate the gain that could be achieved if all municipalities (schools 
districts) operated their school sector according to the best Norwegian practice. The efficiency 
potential is identified by comparing performance and resource use among Norwegian schools. 
The analysis is related to a large literature, starting with Bessent et al. (1982) and summarized 
by Worthington (2001), which uses DEA to calculate efficiency in the educational sector. We 
use student achievement in core subjects as outputs, and the number of teacher hours as 
inputs.  
Compared to the international literature, we make two contributions. The first contribution is 
related to the handling of family background as an indicator of the quality of the students. 
Exploiting a rich data set of more than 100,000 students containing grades and extensive 
                                                 
4 The methodological challenges with parametric and non-parametric efficiency frontier techniques are discussed 
by for example Hjalmarsen et al. (1996). 
5
information on family background, we are able to estimate a measure of student performance 
adjusted for variation in family background. The adjusted grades may be interpreted as the 
average grade in the municipality adjusted for family background. We use the adjusted 
grades, rather than the raw grades, as output variables in the DEA analysis. The advantage of 
this approach is that the inputs in the DEA analysis can be restricted to factors under direct 
control of the educational institution and that differences in family background are taken into 
account in the calculation of the efficiency potential. The second contribution is that we 
provide an extensive analysis of variation in efficiency scores along the lines of Duncombe et 
al. (1997) and Grosskopf et al. (2001).  
The efficiency potential is calculated to 14 percent. This means that if all municipalities 
operated their school sector according to the Norwegian best practice, the average resource 
use could be reduced by 14 percent without reducing student achievement levels. The analysis 
of the determinants of efficiency indicates that a high level of municipal revenue, a high 
degree of fragmentation of the political parties, and a high share of socialists in the local 
council are associated with low educational efficiency. The negative effects of the share of 
socialists and party fragmentation seem to reflect both higher resource use and lower student 
performance. 
Chapter 3: Teacher Hiring Practices and Educational Efficiency 
In recent years, there has been increasing international interest in decentralized decision 
making within the education sector, and actions have been taken to increase school autonomy 
in the belief that relieving schools from central regulation will result in better school 
management and increased efficiency in the educational sector. In a closer examination of the 
selection process of school teachers, this chapter extends the analysis in Chapter 2 by 
evaluating whether educational efficiency may be increased through a more effective 
evaluation and hiring process of teachers. The focus of the analysis is how decentralized 
hiring affects educational efficiency. Decentralized hiring means that the appointment 
decision is made at the school level by the principal whereas centralized hiring means that the 
decision is made by the school district administration. School principals may know better than 
the school administration which qualifications are most needed for a given teaching position, 
and may therefore more effectively evaluate the candidates.  Decentralized hiring may thus 
result in an overall better match between schools, teachers and students and is therefore 
expected to improve educational efficiency.  
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According to the raw data, efficiency is the highest in districts where hiring is decentralized. 
There is no direct information about factors that trigger the decision to decentralize, and the 
causal effect of decentralized hiring may be hard to pin down. If the decision is based on 
unobservable characteristics, naïve estimates of the effect of hiring on efficiency may be 
biased because of non-random selection. In the empirical analysis, this problem is first 
approached by including a large set of controls in a school district level Tobit analysis, which 
does not alter the qualitative result that school districts that decentralize are more efficient. 
However, if the decision to decentralize is based on unobservable school district 
characteristics that are correlated with educational efficiency, the Tobit estimates may still be 
biased.  
Therefore, in a second approach I allow for heterogeneous treatment effects for individual 
schools in a school level analysis exploiting that the impact of decentralized hiring is expected 
to be stronger when schools have excess teacher supply. By including school district fixed 
effects I can estimate the interaction effect between decentralized hiring and teacher supply. 
The empirical results indicate, as expected, that the effect of decentralization is stronger for 
schools facing excess teacher supply than for schools without excess supply. 
Chapter 4: Heterogeneous effects from school competition  
In addition to increasing school autonomy, many countries have introduced reforms to 
increase the competition from charter schools as a mean to improve the performance of public 
schools. The education market seems to be a differentiated product market, where schools 
differ in their characteristics and where parental preferences over school characteristics differ, 
and it is a controversial issue whether school competition will work as intended. One 
conjecture is that the degree and character of competition will vary with the characteristics of 
both suppliers and demanders. In this chapter we evaluate whether the performance of public 
schools in Norway is affected by competition from private schools, and particularly whether 
competition has heterogeneous effects across student subgroups. 
The existing empirical literature on school competition- between public and private schools 
and between public schools – does not provide any sweeping and clear-cut conclusions (e.g. 
Hoxby, 2000; Fiske and Ladd, 2001;Dee 1998). This chapter provides empirical evidence 
from Norway. First, we investigate whether the overall performance of public schools is 
affected by private school competition. Second, we ask whether the competition effects differ 
across student subgroups. If public sector actors’ response to competition is to reallocate 
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resources between student subgroups, we expect that attractive and mobile student subgroups 
gain from competition, while less attractive and less mobile students lose from competition 
with private schools. The endogeneity of competition - measured by the share of students 
attending private schools – is treated by IV estimation. Sorting of parents across 
municipalities is considered by exploiting the location of universities and colleges. Indications 
of non-uniform competition effects are provided: while there is no evidence that students with 
less educated parents gain from competition, the effect for students with highly educated 
parents is positive. The robustness analysis indicates that the effect to some extent depends on 
the outcome variable used.  
Chapter 5: Gender gaps in student achievement: evaluation schemes and teacher 
characteristics 
Such as most empirical analyses of the education market, the analyses presented in this thesis 
exploit student achievement in terms of marks and test scores to measure educational 
production and efficiency. Educational efficiency in Chapter 2 and 3 is measured using 
individual student achievement based on teacher assessment, while the analysis of school 
competition in Chapter 4 also exploits individual student achievement from an anonymously 
evaluated national one-day test. Different testing schemes may have heterogeneous effects 
across student subgroups, and this chapter assesses this heterogeneity by comparing 
individual student achievement across gender from three different evaluation schemes. 
Student achievement in terms of marks and test scores is frequently used as an indicator of 
educational production and performance. Individual outcomes from different evaluation 
schemes are also important in application for higher education as well as for future job 
prospects. It is therefore important to ensure that student achievement is evaluated and 
measured as correctly as possible. This chapter evaluates individual student achievement 
levels from three different evaluation schemes in Norway. First, using difference in difference 
estimation, the analysis reveals substantial gender biases in teacher assessment. Conditional 
on individual test scores from anonymously evaluated central exams, girls receive 
significantly higher marks than boys when assessed by the teacher. Exploiting intertemporal 
variation within schools, teachers are found to assess same-sex students less favourably than 
opposite-sex students in Norwegian. Hence, the observed gender bias is related to teacher 
grading practices. Second, comparing individual student performance from a high stake 
central exam and a low stake national test, girls are found to perform significantly better when 
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stakes are high. Girls’ relative ability to perform when exposed to a high stake one-day test is 
therefore not a likely explanation for the observed gender bias in teacher assessment.  
1.3 Discussion and Future Research Agendas  
This thesis consists of four empirical analyses dealing with different topics within the field of 
economics of education, and contributes to the literature by improving on the measurement of 
educational efficiency by means of Data Envelopement Analysis, and by raising important 
and new questions concerning the organization of the school sector. The education market is 
characterized by large heterogeneity among both suppliers and demanders, making the 
educational production process complicated. The heterogeneity is clearly reflected by the key 
findings of this thesis. First, efficiency is shown to vary substantially both across school 
districts, and across individual schools. Second, the analyses find that efficiency depends on 
teacher hiring practices in the school districts as well as the degree of competition from 
private schools, but the effects are heterogeneous across schools and students respectively. 
Moreover, existing student achievement evaluation schemes are found to produce 
heterogeneous outcomes depending on the gender of the student.  
Numerous challenges and unsolved questions remain in the literature, and the thesis is by no 
means meant to be exhaustive in illuminating all aspects of the production process. Based on 
today’s empirical evidences the key for future improvements and increased efficiency in 
educational production seems to lie in better incentives, to promote better management and to 
staff schools with high quality teachers. Still, the literature provides relatively few guidelines 
on how to develop good educational institutions with funding schemes and incentive systems 
that may ensure efficient use of resources and improve student achievement levels. More 
research on this topic is therefore highly demanded, and the objective for future research 
should be to expand our understanding of the interplay between resource use and the 
organizational and institutional approaches taken within the educational sector. 
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The paper performs an efficiency analysis of lower secondary schools in Norway. The
efficiency potential is calculated as 14%, based on a DEA analysis with grades in core
subjects (adjusted for student characteristics and family background) as outputs. The
analysis of the determinants of efficiency indicates that a high level of municipal rev-
enue, a high degree of party fragmentation, and a high share of socialists in the local
council are associated with low educational efficiency. The negative effects of the share
of socialists and party fragmentation seem to reflect both higher resource use and lower
student performance.
Keywords: educational efficiency, DEA analysis, determinants of efficiency, political and
budgetary institutions
JEL classification: I 21
1. Introduction
The educational sector has received substantial attention in academic and
political debate in recent years. International knowledge tests have pro-
vided new and easily accessible information that facilitates a comparison of
educational performance across countries. A key ﬁnding is that the inter-
national tests indicate a negative correlation between student performance
and resource use, meaning that the richest countries, which allocate the
most resources to the educational sector, do not receive high achievement
in return. Norway, which is a rich country with high resource use and (at
* Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the Congress of the European
Economic Association (Amsterdam), the Norwegian–German Seminar on Public Eco-
nomics (Garmisch-Partenkirchen), the Meeting of the European Public Choice Society
(Durham), the Meeting of the Norwegian Economic Association (Oslo), and seminars
at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (Trondheim) and at the Insti-
tute for Research in Economics and Business Administration (Bergen). Comments and
suggestions from the participants are gratefully acknowledged, in particular from Tor-
bjørn Hægeland, Alfons Weichenrieder, Arnaud Bilek, and Bjarne Strøm; and also from
two referees. We have also beneﬁted from discussions with Sverre A. C. Kittelsen about
the DEA method. The research is funded by the Ministry of Local Government and Re-
gional Development, and is part of a larger project on efﬁciency in the local public sector.
FinanzArchiv 62 (2006), 221--249 doi: 10.1628/001522106X120677
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best) average student performance, is no exception to this tendency. The
mismatch between resource use and performance has triggered a politi-
cal debate regarding resource use, curriculum, and the organization of the
school sector. Measures have been taken to increase the number of hours
in basic subjects, to provide better information on the performance of indi-
vidual schools, and to open public schools to more competition from private
schools.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the efﬁciency potential in the
lower-secondary-school sector in Norway. The efﬁciency potential is not
identiﬁed by comparing Norway with other countries, but rather by com-
paring performance and resource use among Norwegian schools. Our aim
is to calculate the gain that could be achieved if all municipalities operated
their school sector according to the best Norwegian practice. The analysis
is related to a large literature, starting with Bessant et al. (1982) and sum-
marized by Worthington (2001), which applies data envelopment analysis
(DEA) to the educational sector. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst DEA
analysis of lower secondary education in Norway that uses grades or student
achievement as outputs.1
With respect to the existing international literature, we make two contri-
butions. The ﬁrst relates to the handling of family background as an indicator
of the quality of the students. We take advantage of a rich data set of more
than 100,000 students containing grades and extensive information on family
background to estimate a measure of student performance adjusted for vari-
ation in family background. It is these adjusted grades, rather than the raw
grades, that are used as outputs in the DEA analysis. The advantages of this
approach are that the inputs in the DEA analysis can be restricted to factors
under direct control of the educational institution and that differences in
family background are taken into account in the calculation of the efﬁciency
potential. The second contribution is that we provide an extensive analysis
of variation in efﬁciency scores along the lines of Duncombe, Miner, and
Ruggiero (1997) and Grosskopf et al. (2001). We investigate the inﬂuence of
political and budgetary institutions of the municipality, along with traditional
variables like school size.
In Norway primary and lower secondary education is mainly a municipal
responsibility, and the municipalities are the units of observation in this
study. The DEA analysis reveals large variations in efﬁciency across muni-
cipalities, and the average efﬁciency potential is calculated as 14%. The
variation in efﬁciency is analyzed using tobit regression, which indicates that
a high level of revenue, a highdegree of party fragmentation, and a high share
of socialists in the local council are associatedwith low educational efﬁciency.
1 Bonesrønning and Rattsø (1994) analyze Norwegian high schools using grades as output.
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The negative effects of the share of socialists and party fragmentation seem
to reﬂect both higher resource use and lower student performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the
necessary institutional background. The principles of DEA analysis and the
approach taken in this paper are discussed in section 3; section 4 discusses
data andmodel speciﬁcation. Section 5 presents the ﬁndings of theDEAana-
lysis and discusses the robustness of the results. Section 6 is devoted to the
tobit analysis of the determinants of educational efﬁciency. Finally, section 7
offers some concluding remarks.
2. Institutional Background
Most primary and lower secondary schools in Norway are owned and op-
erated by the municipalities. Private schools account for less than 2% of
the students, and until the school year 2003/04 the few private schools in
operation were either religious schools or schools that use alternative educa-
tional methods. In 2003 the parliament passed a new law on private schools,
which allows for nonreligious private schools that use traditional educational
methods. This study is based on data for the school years 2001/02 and 2002/03
and only includes municipal schools.
Norwegian municipalities are multipurpose authorities that, in addition
to education, are responsible for welfare services like child care, primary
health care, and care for the elderly. Other important tasks are culture and
infrastructure.Themain revenue sources are taxes (43%of current revenue),
block grants (21%), earmarked grants (13%), and user charges (16%). In-
terest and other revenue account for the rest. Since earmarked grants and
user charges are practically nonexistent in primary and lower secondary ed-
ucation, the sector is mainly ﬁnanced by taxes and block grants. Compared
to most other countries, the system of ﬁnancing is quite centralized. Around
95% of local taxes are regulated income and wealth taxes where effective
limits on tax rates have been in place for the last 25 years. The opportunity
to inﬂuence current revenues is limited to property tax and user charges.
The municipalities enjoy more discretion on the spending side than on
the revenue side. The allocation of taxes and block grants between different
service sectors is decided locally, subject to national regulations and mini-
mum standards. In the educational sector there is a national curriculum, and
minimum standards are determined by a maximum class size and minimum
number of hours per class in each subject.2 Moreover, until 2004 the teach-
ers’ unions negotiated wage and workload (teaching hours per week) with
2 From the school year 2003/04 the class size regulation was replaced by a more ﬂexible
regulation of group size.
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the national government. Despite these national regulations, there is sub-
stantial variation in resource use per student between schools and between
municipalities (see section 4). The variation between schools is to a large
extent related to school size, and the variation between municipalities is
related to the choice of school structure and thereby average school size.
The settlement pattern, the number of students in the municipality, and the
municipal revenue are important determinants of average school size. Few
students and a decentralized settlement pattern tend to give small schools,
and municipalities with high levels of revenue can afford a decentralized
school structure with many small schools.
3.Data Envelopment Analysis
Over the last decades several methods have been developed to estimate
production frontiers and the degree of efﬁciency for each unit of production.
Today the two dominant approaches are data envelopment analysis (DEA)
and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).3 The two approaches have different
strengths and weaknesses.DEA is a linear programmingmethod that has the
advantage that no restrictive assumptions about technology (the functional
form of the production function) or the distribution of efﬁciency have to
be made, and that it easily handles multiple inputs and outputs. The main
weakness of DEA stems from the fact that it is a nonstatistical method with
no randomerror.As a consequence, it does not produce statistical tests and is
sensitive to measurement error. SFA is an econometric approach that allows
for statistical testing and is less sensitive to measurement error, but requires
the researcher to impose a speciﬁc functional formof the production function
and make strong assumptions about the distributions of the random error
and the efﬁciency term.
There is no consensus in the literature on the choice between DEA and
SFA, and both approaches are widely used in applied work. Hjalmarsson,
Kumbhakar, and Heshmati (1996, p. 304) conclude that “the choice between
different approaches must be based on trade-offs concerning the purpose
of the study, type of data, technology characteristics, etc.” In this paper
we rely on DEA. The DEA method is attractive in our case because the
knowledge of the functional form of the educational production function
is limited and because the data set allows for multiple inputs and outputs.
Moreover, our primary interest is to calculate and explain variations in edu-
cational efﬁciency, not to provide estimates of the educational production
function.
3 De Borger and Kerstens (1996) and Hjalmarsson, Kumbhakar, and Heshmati (1996) pro-
vide comparisons of DEA and SFA.
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The DEA approach was ﬁrst introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes
(1978) in order to calculate relative technical efﬁciency in the case of mul-
tiple inputs or outputs in the production process of nonproﬁt actors, e.g., in
the public sector. Technical efﬁciency is a normative concept and should be
interpreted as the inputs or outputs compared to a standard or a norm, and
the basic concept of the DEA procedure used in this paper is to minimize
the level of inputs for a given amount of outputs.4 This is done by simultan-
eously solving a linear programming problem for each unit (municipalities
in our case). Generally municipalities will value their inputs and outputs
differently and thus call for different sets of weights in the conventional
measure of relative efﬁciency.5 The efﬁciency of a single municipality is cal-
culated relative to a best-practice reference frontier. This frontier is deﬁned
as a linear combination of the inputs and outputs of efﬁcient municipalities
in the sample. The weights and the efﬁciency measure for each municipality
are identiﬁed simultaneously in the DEA procedure. As discussed above,
the method requires no a priori speciﬁcation of the functional form of the
educational production function.
We will now illustrate the DEA procedure by considering a simpliﬁed
educational sector where a single input (number of teachers per student) is
used to produce a single output (student achievement). The simpliﬁcation
allows us to describe the production process in a simple two-dimensional
diagram as in ﬁgure 1. The points A, B, C, and K represent locations of
different municipalities in the input–output space.
The DEA model originally proposed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes
(1978) was input-oriented and allowed only for constant returns to scale.
This approach has since been widely developed; see, e.g., Banker, Charnes,
and Cooper (1984), where a variable-return-to-scale speciﬁcation was ﬁrst
proposed. We start out by considering the case with constant returns to
scale. In ﬁgure 1 the efﬁciency frontier is then represented by the line OO′
passing through the origin and observation B in the diagram.6 Observation B
lies on the reference frontier and is assumed to be fully efﬁcient, while
observations that lie below the line OO′ (e.g., A, C, and K) are inefﬁcient.
Inefﬁciency implies that the observed units could have produced the same
level of outputs with less input by using the best-practice technology deﬁned
by the reference frontier. A municipality is less inefﬁcient the larger the
4 Alternatively the efﬁciency may be calculated by maximizing the outputs for a given level
of inputs. In this paper we focus only on input-oriented technical efﬁciency.
5 Conventionally, relative efﬁciency is calculated as the ratio of weighted outputs to
weighted inputs with a common set of weights.
6 On drawing a line from the origin through each sample observations in ﬁgure 1, the line
passing through observation B has the greatest slope. Observation B is the most produc-
tive of the sample observations. All the other observations lie below this line.
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Figure 1
The Best-Practice Reference Frontier under Constant and Variable Returns
to Scale
distance to the frontier. In ﬁgure 1 the efﬁciency of observation K can be
expressed as the ratio of efﬁcient use of inputs to the actual use of inputs; this
ratio is represented in the ﬁgure as the distance HI divided by the distance
HK. For all observations situated below the efﬁciency frontier, this ratio will
lie between zero and one, while for observation B (the efﬁcient municipality)
it is equal to one.
With variable returns to scale the reference frontier is represented by the
piecewise linear curve passing through observation A, B, and C in ﬁgure 1. In
this case only observation K is situated below the efﬁciency frontier and de-
ﬁned as ineffective. Given the output of municipality K, the efﬁcient amount
of inputs is represented by point J, and the relative efﬁciency (or efﬁciency
score) is thus given by the ratio HJ/HK.
One characteristic of the DEA method is that the number of efﬁcient
units and the calculated efﬁciency potential depend on the number of in-
puts and outputs relative to the sample size. For a given sample size an
increase in the number of inputs and/or outputs will increase the number
of efﬁcient units and reduce the calculated efﬁciency potential. It becomes
important to formulate a proper model speciﬁcation, since an overspeciﬁed
model (with many outputs and inputs) may underestimate the efﬁciency po-
tential, whereas an underspeciﬁed model (with few outputs and inputs) may
overestimate it.
When the DEA method is applied to the educational sector, it is a chal-
lenge to limit the number of variables. It is well documented that socio-
economic variables capturing family backgroundare important determinants
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of student achievement (e.g., Hanushek, 1986), and the potential number of
relevant variables describing the quality of student input is very large. In ap-
plications of DEA to the educational sector this problem is dealt with in two
different ways; seeCoelli, PrasadaRao, and Battese (1998) and Worthington
(2001).The ﬁrst is a two-stageprocedurewhere only factors under direct con-
trol of the educational institution are included as inputs in a ﬁrst-stage DEA
analysis, and where variables capturing family background are included in
a second-stage tobit regression. The problem with this approach is that the
efﬁciency scores from the DEA analysis are biased because differences in
family background are not taken into account.
The second alternative is to include variables capturing family background
as inputs in the DEA analysis to get unbiased efﬁciency scores. However, if it
is necessary to include a large number of socioeconomic input variables, the
efﬁciency scores may be biased because the number of inputs and outputs
becomes large relative to the sample size. The practical solution is to include
a few variables or to construct an index of the socioeconomic environment
(e.g., Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero, 1997). In this case the remaining
question is whether family background is sufﬁciently controlled for.
In this paper we propose a third alternative, where we utilize a rich data
set of more than 100,000 10th-graders containing information on grades, stu-
dent characteristics, and family background. We estimate regressions with
individual grades as dependent variable and variables capturing family back-
ground as explanatory variables. In addition, a full set of dummy variables for
each municipality is included. The estimates of the municipal dummy vari-
ables, which may be interpreted as grades adjusted for family background,
are used as outputs in the DEA analysis. The advantages of this approach
are that the inputs in the DEA analysis can be restricted to factors under
direct control of the educational institution and that a large set of variables
describing family background can be taken into account in the calculation
of the efﬁciency potential. Moreover, it is not necessary to decide ex ante
whether each socioeconomic variable has a positive or a negative effect on
achievement, as is necessary when the variables are included as inputs in the
DEA analysis. A similar approach is used by Grosskopf et al. (2001), where
output is based on value-added residuals from a regression with current test
scores as dependent variable and previous test scores and the socioeconomic
composition of the student body as explanatory variables. However, they do
not use data for individual students and only control for a few socioeconomic
characteristics.
Another potential problem is that the DEA method is sensitive to meas-
urement error and outliers that tend to overestimate the efﬁciency potential.
The reason is that outliers with high output and/or low input use will affect
the position of the frontier and thereby reduce the efﬁciency score of other
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units. Outliers with low output and/or high input will only have a minor ef-
fect, since they only affect the average efﬁciency by making themselves less
efﬁcient.
In the empirical analysis we use adjusted grades as outputs. In small
schools and small municipalities in particular, average grades may vary from
year to year, reﬂecting (unobservable) variation in the quality of the student
population. As a consequence the efﬁciency potential may be overestimated
because the frontier is determined by the units with high-quality students.
In the empirical analysis we try to reduce this problem by using data that
is averaged over two school years. Controlling for student characteristics
and family background, as discussed above, also contributes to reducing the
problem of variation in student quality. In addition we perform jackkniﬁng
to investigate whether the results are sensitive to outliers and measurement
error.
4.Data and Specification of the Educational Production
Function
Most applications of DEA to the educational sector use grades or test scores
as outputs, and in this study we follow that tradition. We take advantage of
a national database with information on grades for individual students for
the school years 2001/02 and 2002/03. The database provides information
on individual assessment grades and exam result for students in the ﬁnal
year (10th grade) of lower secondary education. Written national exams are
arranged in the three core subjects Norwegian, English, and mathematics,
but each student is only examined in one subject. Even at the municipal
level there are many cases where not all three core subjects are covered by
national exams. Assessment grades have a wider coverage and are reported
for 13 different subjects for each student.
Since the purpose of this study is to investigate variations in efﬁciency
across municipalities, educational output is mainly measured by assessment
grades, which are available for all municipalities. The assessment grades (in
the ﬁnal year) are high-stakes tests in that they are used for applications to
the upper secondary level. Students therefore have incentives to put effort
into home and class work. A possible weakness of assessment grades is that
grading practice may vary between municipalities. We think this problem is
smaller for the core subjects (Norwegian, English, and mathematics), where
national exams are arranged, since the results on national exams represent
important feedback to teachers that facilitate correction of divergent grad-
ing practices. In the benchmark model we therefore concentrate on assess-
ment grades in the core subjects as indicators of educational output. Some
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descriptive statistics for the mean assessment grades are given in appendix
table 7. Grades are given on a 1–6 scale where 6 is the best. In Norwegian
the grade varies from 2.9 in the municipality with the lowest grade to 4.8 in
the municipality with the highest grade, with a mean of 3.8. The mean grade
is somewhat lower in mathematics than in Norwegian and English, but the
variation across municipalities is of roughly the same magnitude in the three
subjects.
Althoughwe think assessment grades in core subjects are reasonably good
indicators of educational output,we also formulate production functionswith
additional outputs. First, a possible problem with focusing on core subjects is
that we may underestimate the degree of efﬁciency in municipalities where
schools havedevoted a large amount of effort and resources to other subjects.
To take account of this possibility we formulate a model where the average
grades in other subjects are included as an additional output. Second, vari-
ation in grading practices is a potential problem even when we focus on
core subjects. To take this into account we also formulate a third model
where the results of the written national exam are included as an extra
output.
Table 7 also reports descriptive statistics for the average assessment grade
in other subjects and results from the written national exam. It appears that
the average grade level is higher in other subjects than in core subjects, and
that the variation across municipalities is smaller. For the exam results the
difference goes in the opposite direction: The average grade level on the
written exam is lower than the assessment grades in core subjects, and the
variation across municipalities is larger.
As discussed in section 3, we utilize a rich data set of more than 100,000
10th-graders to construct grades that are adjusted for family background.The
data set contains individual assessment grades and information on socio-
economic background for all 10th-graders in the academic years 2001/02
and 2002/03. This rich data set enables us to adjust the grades for family
background, and the adjustment is done by performing a regression of the
following type:
yijt = xijt + γt + αj + uijt , (1)
where yijt is the assessment grade of student i inmunicipality j in school year t.
The vector x captures student characteristics and family background, γt is
a year-speciﬁc constant term, αj represents municipal ﬁxed effects, and uijt
is an error term. The α’s may be interpreted as the average grade in the
municipality adjusted for family background.
Equation (1) is estimated for each of the three core subjects Norwegian,
English, and mathematics, for the average grade of the remaining subjects,
and for the results of the written national exam. The vector x contains vari-
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ables that are typically used in analyses of student achievement. It includes
a number of individual dummy variables on the student’s gender, quarter
of birth (given that they graduated in the year they turned 16), graduation
earlier or later than expected, and whether they are immigrants or adopted.
Family background is captured by parents’ education and income (separate
for the mother and the father) and dummy variables reﬂecting whether the
parents are married to each other, cohabitants, separated, divorced, or none
of these. We do not have information on whether individual students receive
adapted teaching due to learning disabilities, only on the fraction of students
at each school that receive such teaching. This fraction, labeled the fraction
of students with special needs, is also included in x.
It should be noted that the estimated equation for the results from the
national exam is slightly different from the estimated equations for the as-
sessment grades. First, because the average grade level on the exam differs
between subjects, it is necessary to include controls for whether the stu-
dent has been examined in Norwegian, English, or mathematics. Second, we
have tested for possible peer-group effects by including a variable describ-
ing the average level of education for the parents of the other students in
the school. It turned out that such peer-group effects were present in the
results from the national exam, but not in the equations for the assessment
grades.
The appendix table 8 reports descriptive statistics for the x variables; the
regression results are reported in table 9. The estimated coefﬁcients in table 9
mainly serve to control student achievement for the available variables cap-
turing family background, and to a great extent they conﬁrm the ﬁndings
from other analyses on the effect of family background on student achieve-
ment; see Hægeland, Raaum, and Salvanes (2004) for a recent Norwegian
analysis, and Hanushek (2002) for a survey of international contributions. In
brief, we ﬁnd that parental educational level and income have positive and
highly signiﬁcant effects on student achievement, while immigrants have sig-
niﬁcantly lower achievement levels. Students living with both parents (either
married or cohabiting) get higher grades than students living with only one
of their parents (single, separated, or divorced). The estimated effect of the
share of students receiving adapted teaching at the student’s school is sig-
niﬁcantly negative and indicates that schools with a higher share of students
with special needs have lower achievement level.
The average values of the estimated municipal ﬁxed effects (the α’s) are
close to zero, and are not directly comparable to the original grades, which
are on a 1–6 scale. They are made comparable by adding 3.5 to the α’s.7
7 The municipal ﬁxed effects also need to be transformed (to be greater than zero) in order
to be used as outputs in the DEA analysis. By adding 3.5 this requirement is fulﬁlled.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Adjusted Grades, Teacher Hours per Student, and
the Fraction of Certiﬁed Teachers
Mean Coefﬁcient Min Max
of variation
Adjusted grades
Norwegian 3.55 0.052 2.94 4.34
English 3.53 0.053 3.04 4.19
Mathematics 3.54 0.055 2.99 4.42
Other subjects 3.53 0.042 3.13 4.14
National exam 3.51 0.061 2.73 4.36
Teacher hours per student 96.2 0.279 61.3 226.2
Fraction of certiﬁed teachers 0.95 0.057 0.69 1.00
Notes: The ﬁgures are based on data for 426 municipalities. The reported means are un-
weighted averages.
These adjusted grades are reported in table 1. It appears that the variation in
adjusted grades is slightly less than the variation in the original grades, which
indicates that the adjustment has the expected effect:Municipalitieswith low
grades and poor socioeconomic status are lifted up, whereas municipalities
with high grades and good socioeconomic status are leveled down. We also
observe that the differences in the coefﬁcient of variation across subjects are
reduced compared to the raw grades reported in table 7.
The input measures we use are based on the total number of teacher
hours and the fraction of certiﬁed teachers (meaning that they have certiﬁed
education for the relevant grade level). Table 1 documents a substantial
variation in teacher hours per student across municipalities, from a low of
61 to a high of 226. On average only 5% of the teachers are noncertiﬁed,
but in some municipalities up to about 30% of the teaching staff is non-
certiﬁed.
Table 2 displays the correlations between grades and teacher hours per
pupil and the fraction of certiﬁed teachers. It appears that the ﬁve out-
put measures are positively correlated. The correlations between adjusted
assessment grades are in the range 0.4–0.7. The correlations between the
assessment grades and the results of the written exam are weaker. However,
since the exam result is an aggregate of grades in the three core subjects,
the correlation between the exam result and a single assessment grade may
be misleading. It is more appropriate to consider the correlation between
the exam result and the average assessment grade in the core subjects. This
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Table 2
Correlation Matrix for Adjusted Grades, Teacher Hours per Student, and
Share of Certiﬁed Teachers
Nor- English Mathe- Other National Teacher Share of
wegian matics subjects exam hours per certiﬁed
student teachers
Norwegian 1.000
English 0.603 1.000
Mathematics 0.507 0.421 1.000
Other subjects 0.688 0.619 0.610 1.000
National exam 0.235 0.312 0.403 0.329 1.000
Teacher hours 0.311 0.319 0.287 0.373 0.213 1.000
per student
Share of certiﬁed −0.079 −0.089 0.006 −0.078 0.085 −0.241 1.000
teachers
correlation is about 0.4, which is of the same order as the correlation be-
tween the assessment grades in English and mathematics. The fact that the
correlations between the ﬁve outputs are clearly less than unity can be also
be considered as support for our choice of using the DEA approach rather
estimating an SFA model with a single output.
Teacher hours per student are positively correlated with adjusted assess-
ment grades, whereas the fraction of certiﬁed teachers is only weakly correl-
ated with the ﬁve outputs. The positive correlation between adjusted grades
and teacher hours per student is consistent with the results of Hægeland,
Raaum, and Salvanes (2004). They ﬁnd a positive (but modest) effect of
teacher hours per pupil on assessment grades after family background is
controlled for.
As mentioned above, we use three speciﬁcations of the educational pro-
duction function in the DEA analysis. They have the same speciﬁcation of
inputs, but differ in the speciﬁcationof outputs.As student characteristics and
family background are controlled for in the calculation of adjusted assess-
ment grades, only factors under municipal control are included as inputs. The
two inputs that are included are the numbers of teacher hours given by cer-
tiﬁed and noncertiﬁed teachers, respectively. In the benchmark model (A),
adjusted grades in the core subjects Norwegian, English, and mathematics
are used as outputs. In model B the average grade in other subjects is in-
cluded as an additional output. Model B has the advantage that it has a more
comprehensive output measure, but the disadvantage that grades in other
subjects may be less comparable across municipalities due to varying grading
practices. The third model (C) extends the benchmark model by including
the results of the national exam as an additional output. The advantage of
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model C is that it includes an output measure (exam results) that is not
subject to varying grading practice across municipalities. On the other hand,
it has the disadvantage that the results of the national exam are based on
results from different subjects.
In the DEAanalysis the outputs are speciﬁed as the adjusted gradesmulti-
plied by the number of students, and the inputs as the total number of teacher
hours by certiﬁed and noncertiﬁed teachers, respectively.8,9 In all three spe-
ciﬁcations we allow for variable returns to scale (VRS). Moreover, we focus
on input-oriented efﬁciency scores, because the number of students, which
is an important element of the output measures, is largely beyond municipal
control. The analysis is based on data for 426 (out of 434) municipalities.
5. Educational Efficiency: The Results of the DEA Analysis
Descriptive statistics for the efﬁciency scores from models A, B, and C are
reported in table 3. In model A, where adjusted assessment grades in core
subjects are used as outputs, the mean efﬁciency score is 0.78 when all muni-
cipalities are given equal weight. This means that the average municipality
could reduce inputs by 22% without reducing measured output. The results
are similar to the U.S. studies by Duncombe, Miner, andRuggiero (1997) and
Grosskopf et al. (2001). Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero calculate an aver-
age efﬁciency score of 0.76 in their study of New York State school districts,
whereas Grosskopf et al. (analyzing public schools in Texas) ﬁnd that inputs
could be reduced by roughly 20% without reducing output. Kirjavainen and
Loikkanen (1998) ﬁnd average efﬁciency of 0.82–0.84 in an analysis of senior
secondary schools in Finland.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for the Calculated Efﬁciency Scores
No. of Mean Mean Minimum 1st 3rd
effective (unweighted) (weighted) quartile quartile
units
Model A 19 0.784 0.860 0.424 0.707 0.873
Model B 20 0.787 0.864 0.424 0.708 0.878
Model C 21 0.793 0.869 0.425 0.716 0.879
8 As a consequence the formulation of the DEA models is slightly different from the illus-
tration in ﬁgure 1.
9 The data on the teacher hours only distinguish between primary schools (1st to 7th grade)
and lower secondary schools (8th to 10th grade). In the analysis the numbers of teacher
hours and students refer to the lower secondary level.
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It is the weighted average of the efﬁciency score (with the number of stu-
dents as weights) that reﬂects the national efﬁciency potential. The weighted
average is 0.86, which yields an efﬁciency potential of 14%. The calculated
efﬁciency potential reﬂects substantial variation in efﬁciency score across
municipalities. 19 out of 426 municipalities come out as efﬁcient (with an
efﬁciency score of 1), whereas the lowest efﬁciency score is 0.42. Around
25% of the municipalities come out with an efﬁciency score below 0.71, and
another 25% have an efﬁciency score above 0.87.
Model B, which includes average grades in other subjects as an additional
output, gives more or less the same results as model A. The calculated
efﬁciency potential is slightly reduced, from 14% to 13.6%. The ranking of
the municipalities is also largely unaltered: the rank correlation is as high as
0.997. The robustness of the results indicates that high achievement in core
subjects does not come at the expense of the achievement in other subjects,
and that we do not lose much by focusing on the core subjects.
The results from model C, which includes the result from the written exam
as an additional output, are also very similar to the results from model A.
The difference in mean efﬁciency score is less than 1 percentage point, and
the rank correlation is as high as 0.990. It might be argued that the high
correlation reﬂects that the assessment grades are the dominating outputs
in both models. We have investigated this possibility by comparing model A
with a model where the exam result is the only input. Even in this case,
where the two models have no common output, the rank correlation is as
high as 0.92.
Although the reported quartiles (table 3) offer information about the vari-
ation in efﬁciency acrossmunicipalities, theDEAprocedure doesnot provide
us with any indication whether the calculated efﬁciency scores are signiﬁ-
cantly different between the municipalities. In recent years bootstrapped
methods have been developed to calculate standard errors and conﬁdence
intervals for the efﬁciency scores; see Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000, 2004).
We perform a smoothed bootstrap,10 and the conﬁdence intervals of the em-
pirical distribution are obtained by drawing 2000 bootstrap samples. Upper
and lower bounds for 95% conﬁdence intervals for each municipality are
shown in ﬁgure 2, where the municipalities are sorted according to the efﬁ-
ciency scores from model A. The midpoints of the conﬁdence intervals are
so-called bias-corrected efﬁciency scores that are outputs from the bootstrap
procedure, where the bias reﬂects that the municipalities are now compared
with a true frontier that lies above the usual DEA frontier. With a few
exceptions the conﬁdence intervals are narrow compared to the variation
10 The bandwidth is set according to the rule of thumb proposed by Simar and Wilson
(2004).
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Figure 2
Upper and Lower Bounds for 95% Conﬁdence Intervals for the Bias-
Corrected Efﬁciency Scores (Model A)
in the efﬁciency scores, and there are few overlaps between the intervals
to the left of the ﬁgure and those to the right. Figure 2 can therefore be
taken as evidence that the efﬁciency scores differ signiﬁcantly across muni-
cipalities.
The bootstrap only provides information about the bias in efﬁciencies that
is due to sampling error, and we have also investigated whether the results
from model A are robust to measurement errors and outliers, by performing
jackkniﬁng. Jackkniﬁng means that we leave out each efﬁcient municipality
one at a time. Then we run a new DEA analysis in each case. In our case with
19 effective municipalities, 19 additional DEA analyses are run. When one
efﬁcient unit is left out, the mean efﬁciency score of the remaining units will
generally increase.11 The efﬁciency scores are considered to be robust if the
increase is small. In our case the increase in mean efﬁciency is 1 percentage
point or less in 17 of the 19 cases. In the last two cases the increase is
slightly above 1 percentage point. Moreover, the rank correlation between
11 The mean efﬁciency for the remaining units is unaffected if the unit that is left out is not
a reference for any ineffective unit.
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the original efﬁciency scores and the various jackknifemodels varies between
0.97 and 1.
Table 4 provides more information about grades and teacher hours per
student in the efﬁcientmunicipalities (from modelA), and they are also com-
pared with other municipalities with roughly the same number of students.
The efﬁcient municipalities are divided into three groups; (i) municipalities
with 45–85 students, (ii) municipalities with 190–400 students, and (iii) muni-
cipalitieswith 700–1400 students. The table does not include the four smallest
efﬁcient municipalities and the three largest efﬁcient municipalities, as they
cannot be compared with inefﬁcient municipalities with a similar number of
students.
The four efﬁcient municipalities in the group with 45–85 students (EM1–
EM4) are characterized by both high grades and low resource use per stu-
dent. Their grades are on average 3%–7% above the mean of all other
municipalities in the group, and the number of teacher hours per student is
22% below. In the group with 190–400 students the best-performing muni-
cipalities (EM5–EM8) are also characterizedbyhigh grades and low resource
use. Grades are on average 1%–5% higher than the mean of the group, and
teacher hours per student 22% lower. In the largest group (700–1400 stu-
Table 4
Describing the Efﬁcient Municipalities (Model A)
Teacher
Adjusted assessment grades hours per
studentMathematics Norwegian English
Municipalities with 45–85 students
EM1 (48 students) 3.59 3.61 3.91 85.3
EM2 (53 students) 3.67 3.46 3.64 91.8
EM3 (80 students) 3.78 3.85 3.85 88.2
EM4 (82 students) 3.81 3.89 3.95 98.5
Mean for the rest of the group 3.57 3.58 3.59 117.7
Municipalities with 190–400 students
EM5 (196 students) 3.52 3.53 3.50 64.3
EM6 (201 students) 3.91 3.56 3.64 69.0
EM7 (252 students) 3.91 3.56 3.64 69.0
EM8 (388 students) 3.57 3.74 3.53 61.4
Mean for the rest of the group 3.52 3.53 3.52 85.0
Municipalities with 700–1400 students
EM9 (704 students) 3.40 3.34 3.37 63.2
EM10 (835 students) 3.56 3.54 3.39 62.5
EM11 (905 students) 3.40 3.46 3.51 61.3
EM12 (1375 students) 3.41 3.43 3.63 72.4
Mean for the rest of the group 3.53 3.52 3.53 84.3
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dents) the efﬁcient municipalities (EM9–EM12) do not have higher grades
than the mean of the group, but come out as efﬁcient because they have low
resource use per student.
The characterization of the efﬁcient municipalities is different from Dun-
combe, Miner, and Ruggiero (1997). They ﬁnd that efﬁcient New York State
school districts are characterized by high resource use (expenditures per
student) that pays off in high student performance. In the Norwegian case,
efﬁcient municipalities are rather characterized by low resource use, but it is
not associated with low student performance.
Finally, we have brieﬂy compared the results from our approach with the
approach where the variables describing family background are included
as inputs in the DEA analysis. When all available variables are included
in the DEA analysis, around 80% of the municipalities come out as fully
efﬁcient. We take this as evidence that the approach cannot handle a large
number of socioeconomic variables without producing too many efﬁcient
units. Even when we restrict the socioeconomic controls to gender, parents’
education, immigrants, and students with special needs, around 50% of the
municipalities come out as efﬁcient.
6. Explaining Variation in Educational Efficiency
As noted by Worthington (2001, p. 265), efforts to explain variation in educa-
tional efﬁciency are underdeveloped.Most studiesmerely compare efﬁciency
scores in different groups of the sample. Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero
(1997) and Grosskopf et al. (2001) are two of the few studies that attempt
to explain variation in educational efﬁciency. They focus on monitoring and
competition between school districts. In this section we try to explain vari-
ations in educational efﬁciency along the lines of earlier studies of efﬁciency
in Norwegian municipalities that focus on political and budgetary institu-
tions. The earlier studies include Kalseth and Rattsø (1998), who analyze
administrative spending, Kalseth (2003), who analyzes the care for the el-
derly sector, and Borge, Falch, and Tovmo (2005), who analyze all service
sectors simultaneously.
With regard to political institutions, several studies of Norwegian muni-
cipalities have emphasized the importance of political strength. There is
evidence that political strength contributes to lower user charges (Borge,
2000) and to lower budget deﬁcits (Borge, 2005). One interpretation of these
ﬁndings is that a strong political leadership has an advantage in opposing
pressure from external interest groups to increase spending (which in turn
has to be ﬁnanced by higher user charges and/or higher budget deﬁcits).
Moreover, political strength reduces administrative spending (Kalseth and
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Rattsø, 1998) and increases efﬁciency (Kalseth, 2003; Borge, Falch, and
Tovmo, 2005), which indicates that a strong political leadership also has
an advantage in opposing internal pressure to increase budgetary slack.
A traditional Herﬁndahl index has been the most widely used indicator of
political strength. The index is calculated as
HERF =
P∑
p=1
SH2p , (2)
where SHp is the share of representatives from party p. The index takes the
maximum value 1 when a single party holds all the seats in the local council;
the minimum value 1/P is attained when the seats are equally divided among
the P parties. The Herﬁndahl index is inversely related to the degree of party
fragmentation in the local council and thereby positively related to strength.
We expect the Herﬁndahl index to have a positive effect on efﬁciency.
In Norway the socialist camp is dominated by the Labor Party, while the
nonsocialist camp is more fragmented. As a consequence, there is a positive
correlation between the Herﬁndahl index and the share of socialists in the
local council. Since we cannot rule out that socialist inﬂuence has an effect
on efﬁciency, one could argue that it should be included in the analysis to
get an unbiased estimate of the Herﬁndahl index. A more substantial ar-
gument is that earlier studies document that a large share of socialists is
associated with high administrative spending (Kalseth and Rattsø, 1998),
low efﬁciency in care for the elderly (Kalseth, 2003), and low overall efﬁ-
ciency (Borge, Falch, and Tovmo, 2005). A possible explanation for these
results is that it might be harder for socialists to impose a hard budget con-
straint on service producers because they are more concerned about service
quality
When it comes to budgetary procedures, we distinguish between central-
ized (top down) and decentralized (bottom up) procedures in the initial
phases of the budget process. In a centralized budgetary procedure the head
of the administration (for an administrative centralized procedure) or of
the executive board (for a political centralized procedure) presents an over-
all budget proposal for each sector, and the sectors only work out speciﬁc
details within themselves. In a decentralized or fragmented budgetary pro-
cedure, on the other hand, each sector works out its own budget proposals,
while the head of the administration or the executive board coordinates an
overall budget proposal to be approved by the local council. Tovmo (2006)
ﬁnds that a centralized budgetary procedure contributes to lower budget
deﬁcits, while Borge, Falch, and Tovmo (2005) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect on
overall efﬁciency. The budgetary variable is only available for 306 of the 426
municipalities included in this study.
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The earlier studies (Kalseth and Rattsø, 1998; Kalseth, 2003; Borge, Falch,
and Tovmo, 2005) also indicate that high levels of local government revenue
are associated with low efﬁciency. The underlying argument may be that
the service-producing agencies are able to take advantage of a rich sponsor
to increase budgetary slack. As an indicator of municipal revenue we use
local taxes and block grants per capita deﬂated by an index that captures
varying cost conditions acrossmunicipalities.This revenue indicator iswidely
accepted as the most reliable indicator of differences in economic conditions
across municipalities.
Existing evidence on the effect of school competition or school choice,
either between public and private schools or between public schools,
yields no clear-cut answers. Hoxby (2000) provides evidence that school
choice induces greater school productivity in an analysis of U.S. metro-
politan areas, whereas Fiske and Ladd (2001) ﬁnd that parental choice has
a negative effect on achievement in elementary schools in New Zealand.
Most Norwegian municipalities apply a neighborhood school rule that
limits the competition between public schools. However, some municipali-
ties have introduced school choice. A recent survey, focusing on the intro-
duction of new management tools, indicates that around 13% of the muni-
cipalities have introduced some form of choice between public schools.
We construct a dummy variable for whether school choice is introduced
or not. It is available for 245 of the 426 municipalities included in this
study.
The determinants of educational efﬁciency are analyzed using tobit re-
gressions. This is an appropriate method, since the dependent variable, the
calculated efﬁciency score from the DEA analysis, is censored at 1. The
regression results are presented in table 5, where we use the efﬁciency
scores from the benchmark model A as dependent variable in the ﬁrst
six columns.12 The ﬁrst equation (I) disregards the possible effects of po-
litical and budgetary institutions discussed above, and is primarily a test
of our method of controlling for family background. It includes the level
of education in the municipality (measured as the fraction of the popula-
tion with education above upper secondary level), the share of students
with special needs, and the share of minority students. We follow earlier
studies of educational efﬁciency in including average school size (linearly
and squared). Finally, we control for structural differences between muni-
cipalities by including population size and the share of the population living
in rural areas.
The level of education and the share of minority students come out as
insigniﬁcant, which indicates that our approach of controlling for family
12 Table 10 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the tobit regressions.
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Table 5
The Determinants of Educational Efﬁciency
Variable I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Level of education −0.180
(1.26)
Minority students −0.386
(1.54)
Students with −0.884 −0.794 −0.772 −0.600 −0.780 −0.780 −0.790 −0.846
special needs (5.15) (4.76) (3.64) (2.90) (4.37) (4.31) (4.42) (4.77)
Average school 0.086 0.102 0.109 0.107
size (in 100) (4.39) (4.65) (4.01) (3.94)
School size squared −0.008 −0.011 −0.013 −0.013
(1.75) (2.24) (2.14) (2.13)
Population size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(in 1000) (2.53) (2.35) (1.48) (2.59) (3.91) (4.42) (3.90) (3.75)
Rural 0.025 0.018 0.000 0.024 −0.078 −0.078 −0.080 −0.091
(0.89) (0.68) (0.01) (0.73) (3.05) (2.93) (3.13) (3.61)
Municipal revenue −0.042 −0.036 −0.033 −0.124 −0.124 −0.126 −0.129
(1.50) (1.07) (1.07) (4.54) (2.22) (4.60) (4.77)
Herﬁndahl index 0.323 0.356 0.198 0.201 0.201 0.199 0.190
(4.60) (3.77) (2.49) (2.76) (2.30) (2.73) (2.63)
Share of socialists −0.142 −0.127 −0.091 −0.123 −0.123 −0.125 −0.125
(3.61) (2.46) (1.97) (2.93) (2.74) (2.97) (2.99)
Centralized −0.019
budgetary proc. (1.13)
School choice −0.019
(0.94)
No. of observations 426 426 306 245 426 426 426 426
Log likelihood 308.8 319.5 220.5 204.1 293.1 293.1 290.7 292.5
Notes: Tobit estimates with absolute t-values in parentheses. The dependent variable in
columns I–VI is the efﬁciency scores from model A. The efﬁciency scores from model B
are used as the dependent variable in column VII, and the efﬁciency scores from model C
in column VIII. The t-values reported in column VI are based on bootstrapped standard
errors.
background and student characteristics works well.13 On the other hand, the
share of studentswith special needs comes out as signiﬁcant, and a large share
of students with special needs is associatedwith low efﬁciency.The signiﬁcant
effect of the share of students with special needs might reﬂect the lack of
data on the individual level (see section 4). School size has a signiﬁcantly
positive effect on efﬁciency, while school size squared has a negative effect.
However, the effect of school size does not reﬂect economies of scale, since
variable returns to scale are allowed for in the underlying DEA analysis. It
13 Both variables come out as highly signiﬁcant when they are regressed on the efﬁciency
score from a DEA model where the raw assessment grades are used as outputs instead of
the adjusted assessment grades.
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rather reﬂects that the variation in efﬁciency across municipalities is related
to average school size, and more precisely that the variation is larger among
municipalities with small schools. Population size comes out with a positive
and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient, while the share of the population living in rural
areas is insigniﬁcant.
In column II we include municipal revenue and the political variables
as additional explanatory variables. The two political variables come out
highly signiﬁcant. The positive sign of the Herﬁndahl index means that muni-
cipalities with highly fragmented local councils tend to have low educational
efﬁciency. The share of socialists comes out with a negative sign, indicating
that socialist inﬂuence is associated with low educational efﬁciency. Muni-
cipal revenue comes out with a negative coefﬁcient, but it is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
The dummy variables for budgetary procedure and school choice are
includedas additional regressors in columns III and IVrespectively.14Neither
of the two variables comes out as signiﬁcant. Moreover, the sign and signiﬁ-
cance of the two political variables and municipal revenue are unaffected
when we control for budgetary procedure and school choice.
Our ﬁndings that party fragmentation and the share of socialists in the
local council have a negative and signiﬁcant effect on efﬁciency and that
the choice of budgetary procedure is of little importance are in line with
earlier studies of efﬁciency in Norwegian municipalities. However, in con-
trast to the earlier studies, the analysis does not produce a signiﬁcant effect
of municipal revenue. One might suspect that the reason for this discrep-
ancy is that a high level of revenue is associated with a decentralized school
structure, and that the effect of revenue is captured by school size in regres-
sions I–IV. The suspicion is conﬁrmed by regression V, where we exclude
the school-size variables. Then municipal revenue comes out as highly sig-
niﬁcant and with the expected negative sign. In addition, the settlement
pattern (the share of population in rural areas) becomes signiﬁcant, and the
quantitative effect of population size increases. Our understanding of these
changes is that municipal revenue, population size, and settlement pattern
represent background variables that explain school structure and average
school size. As a consequence, the statistical signiﬁcance and quantitative
effects of these variables are reduced when actual school size is controlled
for directly.
In the ﬁnal three columns in table 5 we investigate the robustness of the
results. The point of departure is column V, where the school-size variables
are excluded. The ﬁrst robustness test, reported in column VI, investigates
14 In order to limit the reduction in sample size, we do not include both variables in the
same regression.
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whether the signiﬁcance of the explanatory variables is robust to bootstrap-
ping of the standard errors. It appears that the t-values basedonbootstrapped
standard errors are very similar to those based on the usual standard errors.
The main exception is municipal revenue, where the t-value is reduced by
half, but the effect of municipal revenue is still signiﬁcant at conventional
levels of signiﬁcance. In the ﬁnal two columns we use the efﬁciency scores
from models B and C respectively. It turns out that the sign and signiﬁcance
of the explanatory variables remain unchanged from column V, and also that
the point estimates are reasonably stable across the speciﬁcations. In fact,
this is no surprise, given the high correlation between the efﬁciency scores
from the two models.
We ﬁnally illustrate the quantitative effect of municipal revenue and the
two political variables using equation V in table 5. An increase in municipal
revenue that amounts to 10% of the mean is expected to reduce educational
efﬁciency by 1.2 percentage points. An increase in party fragmentation by
10 percentage points is predicted to reduce efﬁciency by 2 percentage points.
The predicted effect of an increase in the share of socialists by 10 percentage
points is to reduce efﬁciency by 1.2 percentage points. Compared to the ana-
lysis of overall efﬁciency by Borge, Falch, and Tovmo (2005), the quantitative
effects of municipal revenue and party fragmentation are weaker in our
case.
In table 6 we investigate how party fragmentation, the share of social-
ists, and municipal revenue affect efﬁciency. Does their negative effect on
efﬁciency reﬂect high resource use, high student achievement, or both?
The issue is investigatedby running simple regressionswith average adjusted
grades and number of teacher hours per student as dependent variables, and
with party fragmentation, the share of socialists, and municipal revenue as
explanatory variables. In addition, the share of students with special needs
is included in both equations. The inverse number of students and the share
of the population living in rural areas are included in the teacher-hours-per-
student equation.
The estimation results reveal that municipal revenue contributes to both
high student achievement (assessment grades) and high resource use per
student. However, we know from table 5 that the effect of increased resource
use dominates the effect of higher achievement, i.e., a high level of municipal
revenue contributes to low educational efﬁciency. For the political variables
the effects on resource use and performance work in the same direction.
Ahighdegreeofparty fragmentationanda large shareof socialists contribute
to both increased resource use and lower achievement. The effect of party
fragmentation is signiﬁcant on achievement, but not on resource use. The
share of socialists is highly signiﬁcant in all equations except the equation
for exam results.
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Table 6
The Determinants of Adjusted Grades and Teacher Hours per Student
Adjusted Adjusted Adjusted Number of
assessment assessment exam result teacher
grades in grades in hours per
core subjects other student
subjects
Share of students with special 0.375 0.027 0.089 99.664
needs (1.58) (0.12) (0.29) (3.95)
Municipal revenue 0.149 0.152 0.046 24.287
(4.08) (4.33) (0.98) (5.90)
Herﬁndahl index of (inverse) 0.150 0.151 0.230 −11.783
party fragmentation (1.62) (1.71) (1.94) (1.01)
Share of socialists in the −0.102 −0.126 −0.105 16.258
local council (1.90) (2.44) (1.52) (2.66)
Inverse number of students in 1.948
local council (16.36)
The share of the population 8.655
living in rural areas (2.59)
Observations 426 426 426 426
R2 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.66
Notes: OLS estimates with absolute t-values in parentheses.
7. Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper was to calculate the efﬁciency potential in the
lower-secondary-school sector in Norway and to analyze the efﬁciency vari-
ation acrossmunicipalities. In aDEAanalysis,with grades adjusted for family
backgroundas outputs and teacher hours as inputs, the national efﬁciency po-
tential was calculated to be 14%. The calculated efﬁciency potential is fairly
robust to outliers and the formulationof the educational production function.
Based on a comparison of municipalities with roughly the same number of
students, we ﬁnd that the efﬁcient municipalities from the DEA analysis are
characterized by relatively low resource use per student, and (except for the
largest municipalities) they also have relatively high student achievement.
In a second-stage analysis we ran tobit regressions in order to explain
the variations in efﬁciency scores across municipalities. We ﬁnd that a frag-
mented local council, a high share of socialists, and a high level of municipal
revenue are associated with low efﬁciency. In additional regressions we in-
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vestigate how party fragmentation, the share of socialists, and the level of
municipal revenue affect efﬁciency, i.e., whether the negative effect on ef-
ﬁciency reﬂects high resource use per student, low student performance, or
both. For party fragmentation and the share of socialists we ﬁnd that the
negative effect on efﬁciency reﬂects both higher resource use per student
and lower student performance. Higher municipal revenue contributes both
to high student performance and to high resource use per student, but the
overall effect is to reduce efﬁciency.
8.Appendix
Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Grades in the Final Year
Coefﬁcient
Mean Min Max
of variation
School year 2001/02
Norwegian 3.81 0.060 3.00 4.83
English 3.69 0.072 2.73 4.73
Mathematics 3.44 0.081 2.29 4.45
Other subjects 4.02 0.049 3.33 4.78
Written exam 3.39 0.088 2.53 4.75
School year 2002/03
Norwegian 3.83 0.065 3.00 4.75
English 3.69 0.065 2.83 4.56
Mathematics 3.46 0.078 2.67 4.33
Other subjects 4.04 0.049 3.74 4.76
Written exam 3.39 0.087 2.25 4.33
Notes: The ﬁgures are based on data for 426 municipalities. The reported means are un-
weighted averages.
Table 8
Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Student Level Regressions
School year 2001/02 School year 2002/03
Variable Mean No. of Mean No. of
Min Max Min Max
(s.d.) obs. (s.d.) obs.
Girl 0.472 0 1 51,098 0.4926 0 1 52,928
(0.499) (0.500)
Immigrant 0.086 0 1 51,098 0.0626 0 1 52,928
(0.280) (0.242)
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Table 8
continued
School year 2001/02 School year 2002/03
Variable Mean No. of Mean No. of
Min Max Min Max
(s.d.) obs. (s.d.) obs.
Adopted 0.009 0 1 51,098 0.0090 0 1 52,928
(0.095) (0.094)
Father’s highest education 0.572 0 1 51,098 0.5751 0 1 52,928
is upper secondary (0.495) (0.494)
Father’s highest education 0.179 0 1 51,098 0.1778 0 1 52,928
is lower tertiary (0.383) (0.382)
Father’s highest education 0.093 0 1 51,098 0.0884 0 1 52,928
is upper tertiary (0.290) (0.284)
Mother’s highest education 0.581 0 1 51,098 0.5804 0 1 52,928
is upper secondary (0.493) (0.493)
Mother’s highest education 0.257 0 1 51,098 0.2562 0 1 52,928
is lower tertiary (0.437) (0.437)
Mother highest education 0.033 0 1 51,098 0.0337 0 1 52,928
is upper tertiary (0.178) (0.180)
Mean educational level 7.884 2.4 12 49,756 7.890 3.4 12 50,663
of peers’ parents∗ (0.944) (0.952)
Student born in second 0.261 0 1 51,098 0.2603 0 1 52,928
quarter (0.439) (0.439)
Student born in third 0.256 0 1 51,098 0.2539 0 1 52,928
quarter (0.436) (0.435)
Student born in fourth 0.220 0 1 51,098 0.2257 0 1 52,928
quarter (0.414) (0.418)
Student born earlier than 0.009 0 1 51,098 0.0083 0 1 52,928
its cohort (0.095) (0.090)
Student born later than its 0.017 0 1 51,098 0.0165 0 1 52,928
cohort (0.127) (0.127)
Parents living together as 0.644 0 1 51,098 0.6234 0 1 52,928
married (0.479) (0.485)
Parents are cohabitants 0.043 0 1 51,098 0.0488 0 1 52,928
(0.204) (0.215)
Parents separated 0.032 0 1 51,098 0.0340 0 1 52,928
(0.177) (0.181)
Parents divorced 0.093 0 1 51,098 0.0928 0 1 52,928
(0.290) (0.290)
Single mother 0.193 0 1 51,098 0.1979 0 1 52,928
(0.395) (0.398)
Father’s income 4.205 0 622.4 49,079 4.536 0 167.0 50,632
(in 100,000 NOK) (5.570) (9.883)
Mother’s income 2.313 0 123.2 50,579 2.511 0 39.3 52,387
(in 100, 000 NOK) (1.805) (3.407)
Share of students receiving 0.068 0.435 1 1,102 0.069 0 1 1,079
adapted teaching at the school (0.032) (0.036)
∗ The educational level of peers’ parents is measured on a scale from 0 to 8, where 0 is
no schooling and 8 is education on PhD level. The variable reﬂects the sum of the level
of education for both parents.
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Table 9
The Determinants of Assessment Grades and Exam Results, Individual Level
Norwegian English Mathematics Other National
subjects exam
Girl 0.636 0.471 0.141 0.444 0.297
(89.42) (59.08) (18.22) (74.64) (32.62)
Immigrant −0.157 −0.188 −0.262 −0.158 −0.229
(9.81) (10.21) (15.50) (11.46) (12.27)
Adopted −0.258 −0.311 −0.575 −0.273 −0.420
(7.74) (8.28) (15.41) (10.78) (11.23)
Father’s highest education 0.190 0.218 0.257 0.187 0.213
is upper secondary (21.84) (22.27) (25.26) (25.06) (20.29)
Father’s highest education 0.509 0.579 0.641 0.461 0.559
is lower tertiary (45.98) (45.63) (47.09) (48.00) (41.05)
Father’s highest education 0.614 0.713 0.804 0.541 0.681
is upper tertiary (43.06) (42.65) (45.64) (45.92) (39.82)
Mother’s highest education 0.254 0.276 0.318 0.535 0.613
is lower tertiary (50.93) (24.14) (28.50) (28.74) (22.21)
Mother’s highest education 0.601 0.636 0.702 0.242 0.257
is lower tertiary (27.42) (46.00) (51.23) (52.03) (44.55)
Mother highest education 0.734 0.813 0.918 0.628 0.807
is upper tertiary (38.82) (37.45) (40.64) (42.32) (36.05)
Student born in second −0.042 −0.029 −0.042 −0.027 −0.029
quarter (5.30) (3.16) (4.35) (4.02) (3.05)
Student born in third −0.088 −0.068 −0.090 −0.074 −0.070
quarter (11.50) (7.67) (10.02) (11.83) (8.03)
Student born in fourth −0.146 −0.123 −0.136 −0.118 −0.112
quarter (17.82) (13.20) (13.56) (17.35) (12.02)
Student born earlier than 0.160 0.341 0.291 0.139 0.302
1986–1987 (5.83) (10.34) (8.41) (6.15) (8.69)
Student born later than −0.419 −0.547 −0.496 −0.358 −0.532
1986–1987 (15.61) (18.06) (16.97) (16.78) (16.30)
Parents living together as 0.257 0.230 0.383 0.316 0.246
married (27.64) (22.61) (36.20) (39.05) (23.27)
Parents are cohabitants 0.144 0.138 0.229 0.179 0.146
(9.84) (8.51) (13.63) (14.97) (8.50)
Parents separated 0.056 0.020 0.093 0.059 0.052
(2.81) (0.89) (4.20) (3.65) (2.34)
Parents divorced 0.033 0.007 0.050 0.027 0.024
(2.08) (0.39) (2.77) (2.05) (1.32)
Single mother −0.026 0.027 −0.035 −0.016 −0.010
(1.71) (1.65) (2.08) (1.25) (0.61)
Father’s income 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
(1.77) (1.90) (1.75) (1.65) (1.58)
Mother’s income 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.006
(2.39) (2.84) (2.58) (3.01) (2.16)
Share of students receiving 0.044 −0.385 −0.513 −0.206 −0.371
adapted teaching (0.22) (1.79) (2.31) (1.20) (1.78)
at the school
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Table 9
continued
Norwegian English Mathematics Other National
subjects exam
Written exam in mathematics −0.234
(19.41)
Written exam in Norwegian 0.083
(6.16)
Mean educational level of 0.040
peers’ parents (5.06)
No. of observations 98,647 97,484 98,501 99,311 94,424
R2 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.29 0.20
Notes: OLS estimates with absolute t-values in parentheses. Municipal ﬁxed effects and
year-speciﬁc intercepts (not reported) are included in all equations.
Table 10
Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Tobit Regressions
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
deviation value value
Level of education 0.167 0.049 0.079 0.422
Share of minority students 0.027 0.023 0 0.184
Share of students with special needs 0.073 0.031 0 0.176
Average school size (in 100) 1.546 1.010 0.110 4.826
Share of the population living in 0.486 0.267 0.004 0.997
rural areas
Population size (in 1000) 10.55 30.18 0.35 512.09
Municipal revenue 1.039 0.214 0.880 3.180
Herﬁndahl index of (inverse) party 0.266 0.087 0.140 1
fragmentation
Share of socialists in the local council 0.366 0.141 0 0.846
Centralized budgetary procedure 0.831 0.373 0 1
School choice 0.27 0.333 0 1
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Teacher Hiring Practices and Educational Efficiency 
Linn Renée Naper* 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates how teacher hiring practices affect educational efficiency in Norwegian school 
districts. The hiring decision is made at the school level by the principal or at the school district level. 
According to the data, efficiency is the highest in districts where hiring is decentralized. Hiring 
practices are decided by the school district, and linear estimates of the effect of decentralized hiring on 
efficiency may be biased because of non-random selection. First, I approach this problem by including 
a large set of controls in a school district level analysis, which does not alter the qualitative result. 
Second, I perform a school level analysis with district fixed effects. The results indicate, as expected, 
that the effect of decentralization is stronger for schools facing excess teacher supply than for schools 
without excess supply.  
Keywords: Education, efficiency, DEA, school autonomy, hiring practices.  
JEL classifications: I21, I29 
 
1. Introduction 
School sector performance has received significant attention in recent years and there is a 
constant search for reforms that may improve achievement and efficiency. There has been 
increasing interest in decentralized decision making within the education sector, and actions 
have been taken to increase school autonomy in the belief that relieving schools from central 
regulation will result in better school management and increased educational efficiency.  
This paper analyses how teacher hiring practices affect educational efficiency in Norwegian 
schools districts. A decentralized hiring practice means that the appointment decision is made 
at the school level by the principal, whereas a centralized hiring practice means that the 
decision is made by the school district administration. 
                                                 
* Helpful comments and suggestions from Lars-Erik Borge, Torberg Falch, Bjarne Strøm, Jørn Rattsø,  Hans 
Bonesrønning, Hessel Oosterbeek, Tarek Mostafa and seminar participants at The World meeting of the Public 
Choice Society in Amsterdam 2007 and the Norwegian University of Science and Technology are gratefully 
acknowledged.  
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The design of the hiring process may influence the composition of teachers because the 
judgements of who are the best applicants may differ across decision makers. Teachers are 
considered to be important to educational outcomes, but formal qualifications, such as 
education and experience, are generally not regarded as sufficient indicators of teacher 
effectiveness (Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin et al., 2005). Informal characteristics of teachers, 
including personal chemistry with students and colleagues, student composition, and the 
schools’ working environment, may also be important. Informal qualifications are hard to 
observe in written applications, but are much more easily revealed in an interview situation. If 
appointment decisions are partly based on the informal characteristics of the applicants, 
factors such as local information and knowledge of the school are likely to play an important 
role to find the best teacher for a given position. School principals may know better than the 
school district administration which qualifications are most needed for a given teaching 
position and may therefore more effectively evaluate the applicants. Decentralized hiring 
practices may as a consequence result in an overall better match between schools, teachers, 
and students and are in this case expected to improve educational efficiency. However, with 
no extra precautions, increased decision-making authority for school principals may involve 
reduced school district control within the appointment process. Reduced control may allow 
for a more subjective evaluation of teacher candidates. If school principals make allowance 
for personal or social factors, for example, by employing a familiar teacher or previous 
colleagues, the objectively best candidates may not be hired and the appointment process may 
result in an overall less favourable match between teachers and students. In this case 
decentralization is expected to harm educational efficiency. 
Several institutional features of a school system can be grouped under the heading of 
autonomy or decentralization. The existing literature suggests that increased autonomy within 
the educational sector may have positive effects on educational outcomes. In a cross-country 
analysis, Wößmann (2003) shows that students tend to perform better in countries where 
schools have autonomy in personnel and day-to-day decisions, in particular when schools are 
held accountable for results. However, it is challenging to produce evidence on the impact of 
autonomy because the degree of decentralization, generally, is a national decision and 
therefore does not vary much within countries. Positive effects of autonomy in school 
management are also reported by country-specific studies such as Clark (2005) for the UK 
and Eskeland and Filmer (2007) for Argentina. The theoretical contribution by Bishop and 
Wößmann (2004) indicates that decentralization is more efficient when applied to areas where 
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school-specific information is important and where the prospect for school level opportunistic 
behaviour is limited. The combined effect of increased autonomy and financial incentives is 
analysed empirically by Hoxby and Rockoff (2004). They report positive effects from US 
charter schools where increased autonomy in school management is combined with 
competition for students.1 
Empirical evidence is relatively scarce when it comes to analyses of teacher hiring practices, 
and existing papers have taken different approaches. Some studies focus on how teacher 
composition is related to local hiring practices, while others are concerned with how hiring 
practices affect educational performance (efficiency or student achievement). Ballou (1996) 
presents evidence that public schools do not hire the best applicants for vacant teaching 
positions in an analysis of the recruitment process of prospective teachers in the US. Balter 
and Duncombe (2006) study the hiring process in New York school districts, and find that 
some features of the process, such as recruitment incentives and extra-curricular activities, are 
associated with more qualified teachers. These studies do not provide information on how 
hiring practices affect school performance, and the empirical conclusions and implications of 
these studies strictly depend upon the assumption made regarding the definition of teacher 
quality. 
In a cross-country analysis based on PISA 2000, Robin and Sprietsma (2003) find that school 
autonomy in decisions regarding the recruitment of teachers is positively related to student 
achievement levels. Furthermore, in a review of mainly educational research on ‘effective 
schools’, Zigarelli (1996) presents evidence that principal influence in hiring and firing of 
teachers is one of three variables characterizing ‘effective schools’. This paper also focuses on 
the effect of hiring practices on educational performance and adds to the literature with an 
empirical analysis of variation in hiring practices in Norway. The available data clearly 
provide an advantage over earlier contributions on this topic. 
Information about hiring practices is collected in a large survey on organizational approaches 
in Norwegian local public service provision. The information is at the school district level, 
and indicates whether the school district has decentralized the hiring decision to individual 
schools or not. The dependent variable in the empirical analysis is a measure of educational 
efficiency, measured by data envelopment analysis (DEA). The DEA model is based on the 
same set-up as proposed by Borge and Naper (2006). The effect of hiring practices on 
                                                 
1 The evidence on charter schools is mixed. See, for example, Hanushek et al. (2007) and Bettinger (2005). 
Teacher Hiring Practices and Educational Efficiency
49
efficiency is initially investigated in a school district Tobit model accounting for school 
district heterogeneity by including a rich set of observable school district characteristics. 
There is a predominance of large school districts that decentralize and larger school districts 
are also found to be more efficient. The empirical analysis therefore particularly explores the 
robustness of the estimated effects related to the size of the school district. The empirical 
results suggest that school districts where the principals of individual schools are given the 
responsibility of hiring teachers are more efficient than school districts with traditional 
centralized hiring practices. This effect does not seem to be driven by the variation in school 
district size. 
There is no available information about factors that trigger the decision to decentralize and the 
causal effect of hiring practices may be hard to pin down. If the decision to decentralize is 
based on unobservable school district characteristics that are correlated with educational 
efficiency, the Tobit estimates may be biased. In a second approach, I therefore allow for 
heterogeneous treatment effects for individual schools in a school level analysis exploiting 
that the impact of decentralized hiring is expected to be stronger when schools have excess 
teacher supply. By including school district fixed effects I can estimate the interaction effect 
between decentralized hiring and teacher supply, although not the direct effect of 
decentralized hiring, using within school district variation only. Given that hiring practices 
matter for the overall efficiency of a school district as reported from the Tobit, we should 
indeed expect to find the strongest effects for schools with an actual option between 
candidates. The empirical analysis produces a positive and significant interaction effect, and 
therefore provides support for this hypothesis. 
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 discusses some 
relevant features of the institutional setting in Norway. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 
discusses the empirical specification, Section 5 presents the empirical results, and Section 6 
offers a brief summary and some concluding remarks. 
2. Institutional Setting 
Compulsory school in Norway is 10 years and students enrol at primary school (1st to 7th 
grade) in the year they turn six and finish lower secondary school (8th to 10th grade) the year 
they turn 16. Most primary and lower secondary schools are owned and operated by the 
municipalities. Private schools account for less than 2 per cent of the students. Primary 
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schools are typically smaller than lower secondary schools and most municipalities therefore 
operate more primary schools than lower secondary schools. The lower secondary schools 
either have students only at the lower secondary level or are mixed schools with students at 
both primary and lower secondary levels. Mixed schools typically also receive students from 
several primary schools at the lower secondary level. The municipalities are multi-purpose 
authorities which, in addition to compulsory education, are responsible for welfare services 
such as child care, primary health care, and care for the elderly. Other important tasks are 
culture and infrastructure. 
The financing of municipalities is quite centralized and the main revenue sources are taxes 
(43%), block grants (21%), earmarked grants (13%), and user charges (16%). Around 95 per 
cent of local taxes are regulated income and wealth taxes (where all municipalities apply the 
maximum rates). The opportunity to influence current revenues is limited to property taxes 
and user charges. However, the municipalities enjoy more discretion on the spending side 
than on the revenue side, and the allocation of taxes and block grants between different 
service sectors is decided locally. There are few earmarked grants and user charges in the 
education sector, so education is mainly financed by taxes and block grants. Each 
municipality represents a school district and in the remainder of this paper I will use the term 
‘school district’ when referring to municipalities. 
The education sector is regulated by the Education Act of 19922 and Norway is traditionally 
considered to have a strict centralized system. Official OECD publications list Norway among 
the countries with the least autonomous schools together with countries such as Greece and 
Portugal (OECD, 1998). Nevertheless, since the late 1980s there has been a trend towards 
more decentralization and delegation of decision-making power from the central government 
to school districts, and from schools districts to schools (Lyng and Blichfeldt, 2003). National 
guidelines allow school districts to adopt different ways of exercising their authority and 
organizing the management of schools. School districts have generally chosen either a 
centralized approach where most decisions on school management are taken at the district 
level or a decentralized approach where decision-making power is delegated to individual 
schools. Decentralization means that various financial and personal-administrative tasks are 
delegated to the school principal(s), often by closing down the ‘municipal school office’ 
(Skolekontor). The principal then answers directly to the district’s chief executive officer 
                                                 
2 See www.lovdata.no for information on the laws and guidelines in the Education Act. 
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(Rådmann). Centralized school management also involves the principals, but the final 
decisions are taken at the district level and the ‘municipal school office’ is responsible and 
answers to the chief executive officer. 
The appointment process of teachers is one of the areas where decentralization has become 
widespread. Although hiring of teachers is formally the responsibility of the school districts, 
several districts have chosen to delegate the decision to the school principal(s). The decision 
to decentralize always concerns all schools within the school district, so we can only observe 
variation in decentralization across school districts. Independently of the chosen hiring 
practice, vacant teaching positions are always announced in collaboration with the school 
district. However, in school districts that decentralize, the applicants are asked to send the 
application directly to the school, emphasizing that it is the principal who is responsible in the 
process, including interview rounds, evaluation, and appointment of applicants. The process is 
always closely monitored by the teacher union and representatives from the union must be 
informed prior to every appointment decision. An applicant without a teacher certification can 
only be hired if no applicants satisfy the formal qualification requirements. Hiring of non-
certified teachers is always temporary and the position should be announced again within one 
year. There are, however, no formal instructions on how to select or prioritize between 
certified applicants. The appointment decision may therefore vary depending on whether the 
decision is made by the school district or by the school. 
When it comes to determining teacher wages and workload the school districts have less 
influence on the process. Wages were determined in national bargains between teacher unions 
and the central government until the school year 2000–2001. In 2001 some limited local 
flexibility was introduced, but wages are still mainly determined by teachers’ formal 
education and experience. The national contract therefore effectively prevents school districts 
from attracting teachers by means of wage policy or regulation of the workload. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Hiring practices and educational efficiency  
Information on hiring practices is collected in a large survey on organizational approaches in 
local public service provision3. The questionnaires include questions based on the ‘New 
                                                 
3 The survey is rendered by the Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration (Bergen) and 
Centre for Economic Research (Trondheim).  
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Public Management’ tradition.4 The survey is part of a project on efficiency in local public 
service provision in Norway, and in addition to the educational sector, information was 
collected for child care and care for the elderly. The questionnaire was sent to the chief 
executive officer in all 433 school districts in autumn 2004 and was completed during spring 
2005. Overall the response rate was close to 65 per cent. However, some districts only partly 
responded to the questionnaire and for the question regarding hiring practices the data provide 
information for 58 per cent (250) of the school districts.5 The empirical analysis also includes 
economic, demographic, and political information about schools and school districts provided 
by The Norwegian Social Science Data Service and Statistics Norway. 
The dependent variable used in the empirical analysis is a measure of educational efficiency 
calculated using DEA, which uses the observed input–output bundles to estimate a best 
practice reference production frontier by linear programming. Efficiency is calculated for both 
the school and the school district level in two different calculations. The efficiency score for 
each unit (school or school district) is calculated as the relative distance to the efficiency 
frontier.6 The scores vary between zero and one, and a score equal to one indicates that the 
unit is fully efficient and operates at the efficiency frontier. The DEA model applied in this 
paper includes one input variable and three output variables and is based on the same 
approach as proposed by Borge and Naper (2006). The model allows for variable returns to 
scale, and I have chosen to focus on input-oriented efficiency indicators. 
The input variable included in the DEA model is the average number of teacher hours per 
student for the two academic years 2002–2003 and 2003–2004. The output variables are 
based on individual teacher-assessed marks in three subjects, Mathematics, English, and 
Norwegian, for the same years. Prior to the DEA analysis, the marks are adjusted for 
observable differences in student and family characteristics by regressing individual student 
achievement in each subject on a set of individual student characteristics. Information about 
individual students is provided by Statistics Norway and includes students’ gender, age, and 
immigration status, together with parental marital status, income, and education. The 
regressions include year and unit fixed effects. It is the estimated unit fixed effects, and not 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Christensen and Lægreid (2005) for more information on New Public Management theories.  
5 The survey also includes questions on decentralization of responsibilities within other managerial areas, but in 
this paper I chose to focus on teacher hiring practices. The Norwegian report Haraldsvik and Naper (2007), 
however, shows that the results presented in the present paper are robust to the inclusion of variables measuring 
decentralization along other dimensions.  
6 See Charnes et al. (1978) for more on DEA and also Worthington (2001) for a review on applications of DEA 
to the education sector.  
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the raw marks, that are included as output variables in the DEA model. The school and school 
district fixed effects are interpreted as the average student achievement level, in the school or 
school district, respectively, adjusted for observable student characteristics and family 
background. 
Table 1  
DEA efficiency scores for individual schools and school districts 
 School districts Schools 
No. of units 250 653 
Mean 0.71 0.66 
Minimum 0.42 0.33 
1st quartile 0.62 0.54 
3rd quartile 0.80 0.76 
Share of efficient units (%) 3.2 1.2 
   
Note: Mean efficiency values and indicators of variation for individual schools and school districts. 
Table 1 presents the results from the two DEA analyses. For school districts the mean 
efficiency is 71 per cent, meaning that the average school district in the sample could reduce 
input by 29 per cent without reducing outputs if it operated at the efficiency frontier. By 
looking at the minimum efficiency level and the 1st and 3rd quartile sample values, we observe 
a substantial variation in efficiency across both school districts and individual schools. 
As expected we find that the mean efficiency score and the share of efficient units are lower 
when the DEA model is calculated for individual schools. One characteristic of the DEA 
method is that the number of efficient units and the calculated efficiency potential depend on 
the number of inputs and outputs relative to the sample size. For a given number of variables 
an increase in the sample size will therefore reduce mean efficiency. 
3.2 School district size 
Figures 1a and 1b below illustrate the distribution of hiring practices and educational 
efficiency by school district size. School district size is measured by population size. In 
Figure 1a the share of districts with a decentralized hiring practice is presented for all districts 
together and separately for each population quartile. As illustrated by the left bar in the 
diagram, around 45 per cent, or 113 school districts, report to have chosen a decentralized 
hiring practice. Furthermore, the figure reveals that the variation in hiring practices is related 
to school district size. Close to 75 per cent of the school districts in the 4th quartile of the 
distribution have a decentralized hiring practice, while the share is 24 per cent in the 1st 
quartile. Among the largest districts only decentralized hiring is observed. Decentralization is 
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present in all parts of the distribution, but there is a predominance of large school districts that 
chose to decentralize. 
Figure 1a 
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In Figure 1b, mean efficiency levels (for school districts) are presented separately for school 
districts with a centralized and a decentralized hiring practice. The two left bars in the 
diagram compare mean efficiency for all school districts and show that efficiency on average 
is about 9.5 percentage points higher for those school districts that decentralize than for 
others. A comparison of efficiency scores for individual schools in the two groups of districts 
shows that the difference in mean efficiency is also close to 10 percentage points in favour of 
individual schools in districts that decentralize. 
Next, Figure 1b compares mean efficiency levels for school districts within each population 
quartile and some interesting features of the data are revealed. First, efficiency increases 
gradually with district size. Second, the differences in efficiency across teacher hiring 
practices are larger for smaller school districts than for larger districts. The difference in mean 
efficiency is roughly 6 percentage points for school districts in the lower half of the 
distribution and less than 2 percentage points for school districts in the upper half of the 
distribution. 
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Figure 1b: 
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That school district size is correlated both with the decision to decentralize and with 
educational efficiency introduces an empirical challenge because the estimated effect of hiring 
practices may be confounded with the effect of school district size. In the empirical analysis 
in Section 5 it is therefore very important to include proper controls for school district size.7 
The average difference in efficiency over the four quartiles is close to 5 percentage points. 
Therefore, controlling for observable variation in school districts size, the mean difference in 
efficiency is reduced by roughly 50 per cent. As discussed in the introduction of the paper, I 
will also address the problem with potential non-random selection by allowing for 
heterogeneous treatment effects related to teacher supply. 
3.3 Teacher supply 
An obvious measure of teacher supply is the share of applicants that do not receive a job offer 
at each school, but this information is not available. However, we do have information on the 
share of certified teachers employed at each school. This variable may serve as a proxy for 
teacher supply (Bonesrønning et al., 2005). The intuition for this approach is that the use of 
uncertified teachers implies excess demand because schools are obliged to place priority on 
certified teachers. It is also important for this approach that teachers’ wages are mainly 
determined nationally and therefore schools cannot attract teachers by raising wages. Strictly 
speaking we do not know whether schools that employ only certified teachers have excess 
                                                 
7 In Table A1 of the appendix, the full list of variables used in the empirical analyses is presented, with both 
school district and individual school characteristics. 
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supply or if supply equals demand for these schools. For simplicity I will refer to schools with 
only certified teachers as schools with excess teacher supply in the remainder of this paper.  
In the empirical analysis the focus is on separating excess demand and excess supply. Teacher 
supply is therefore included by using a dummy variable indicating whether schools employ 
only certified teachers in two subsequent years. It is reasonable to use persistence over time 
because yearly turnover among certified teachers in Norway is about 10 per cent. However, 
decentralization is a relatively recent phenomenon and the timing of decentralization most 
likely varies across school districts. Using lagged data may involve using variation in supply 
that occurred prior to the organizational change. Therefore, the measure is limited to the same 
year and the year prior to the survey. 
The data reveal substantial variation in this measure of excess teacher supply, both within 
school districts and across school districts. Only 14 districts have excess teacher supply in all 
schools over the two years. For these districts the number of schools varies from two to five.8 
In Figure 2 the share of schools with excess teacher supply is presented separately for school 
districts with centralized and decentralized hiring practices. The two left bars in the diagram 
show that the share of schools with excess teacher supply is about 35 per cent for districts 
with centralized hiring practices and slightly lower for districts with decentralized hiring 
practices. 
Figure 2 
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8 School districts with only one lower secondary school are excluded from the sample in the district fixed effect 
models estimated in Section 5. 
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When school districts are sorted by population size, this picture changes. Within the 1st 
quartile the share of schools with excess teacher supply is close to 40 per cent for school 
districts with centralized hiring practices and only 20 per cent for districts with decentralized 
hiring practices. The share of schools with excess teacher supply is close to 10 percentage 
points higher for districts with centralized hiring practices when considering the districts in 
the 4th quartile. The exception is the 2nd quartile, where the share of schools with excess 
teacher supply is higher for school districts with decentralized hiring practices. The difference 
in teacher supply between schools in districts with centralized and decentralized hiring 
practices is therefore larger when school district size is controlled for. 
4. Empirical Specification 
Inference on the impact of institutional settings within a country requires variation in 
implementation, either across time or across units. In this paper I exploit the fact that some 
school districts in Norway have chosen to delegate hiring responsibilities to individual 
schools, while others have maintained a traditional centralized hiring practice. The cross-
sectional variation in the variable of interest is a result of local adaptations to the existing 
legal framework. This introduces an econometric challenge because the decision to 
decentralize may not be random. Furthermore, if the factor(s) that triggers the decision is 
unobserved it is hard to pin down the causal effect of hiring practices and naïve estimates may 
suffer from an endogeneity bias. 
I approach the potential endogeneity problem in two ways. First, in equation (1) observable 
school district heterogeneity is controlled for. The efficiency score ie  of school district i is 
regressed on the dummy iD  for decentralized hiring together with a rich set of observable 
school district characteristics represented by the vector iM . The parameter iμ  is an assumed 
white noise error term. 
(1) 1 2i i i ie D Mα δ δ μ= + + +  
The DEA efficiency scores are censored at one and equation (1) is therefore estimated by 
Tobit.9 Assuming that the selection of hiring practices are based on observable school district 
characteristics, the Tobit estimate of the effect of hiring practices on school district efficiency 
is unbiased. 
                                                 
9 This is common practice in the DEA literature (see, for instance, Worthington, 2001). 
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It is documented in Section 3 that school district size is correlated with both the decision to 
decentralize and educational efficiency. Equation (1) should therefore include a control for 
school district size. In the empirical analysis in Section 5 school district size is measured by 
the number of students enrolled in compulsory schools10 and included in log and squared log 
form. The analysis of the determinants of efficiency in Borge and Naper (2006) indicates that 
a high level of revenues, a high degree of party fragmentation, and a high share of socialists in 
the local council is associated with low efficiency. These variables are therefore potential 
important control variables and are included in equation (1). 11 As in Borge and Naper (2006) 
I also include a variable describing the settlement pattern in the school district and the share 
of students with special needs. In addition I include the share of highly educated people12 in 
the school district. This is potentially an important control variable because the educational 
level of the electorate may affect the organizational approach taken by the school district, and 
a high level of education in the school district may reflect higher student performance and 
more efficient schools. 
If the decision to decentralize is based on unobservable school district characteristics that are 
correlated with educational efficiency, the Tobit estimate will be biased. For example, Tobit 
will underestimate the effect of hiring practices if a decentralized practice typically is chosen 
by relatively inefficient school districts to improve their performance. However, if school 
districts that decentralize tend to have well-managed and efficient schools, the effect will be 
overestimated. One way to overcome this problem, and to obtain unbiased estimates, is to use 
an instrumental variable (IV) that is correlated with the decision to decentralize but has no 
direct effect on efficiency. The idea behind IV estimation is to identify the effect using strictly 
exogenous variation. Alternatively, the effect could be identified using within school district 
variation in a district fixed effects (FE) model. The idea behind FE estimation is to identify 
the effect using only within school district variation. The included FEs absorb the effect of all 
unobserved district specific variables that influence the decision to decentralize. 
The question is whether one or both of these methods can be used to identify the effect of 
hiring practices in equation (1). First, educational efficiency is the result of various local 
                                                 
10 The number of students is highly correlated with population size and the empirical results in Section 5 are 
similar if population size is used instead of the number of students.  
11 The socialist share is defined as the share of representatives in the local council from the socialist camp, which 
is dominated by the Labor Party (AP) but also includes representatives from three other parties SV, NKP, and 
RV. 
12 The educational level is measured by the fraction of the population with education beyond the upper secondary 
level. 
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decisions and priorities within the education sector, as well as within other responsibility 
areas of the local authority (child care, health care, infrastructure, etc). It is therefore very 
difficult to find a variable that influences the decision to decentralize and at the same time is 
uncorrelated with efficiency. Besides, regressing the dummy for decentralized hiring on 
available school district characteristics, few variables, except school district size, turn out to 
be correlated with hiring practices. Using an IV is therefore not a feasible alternative. Second, 
FE estimation requires variation either over time or within school district, but the available 
information on hiring practices is only measured in one year and at the school district level. 
Therefore, it is not possible to identify the effect of hiring practices from equation (1) using 
FE estimation. 
I therefore propose a slightly different approach where within school district variation is 
exploited by allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects for individual schools. I exploit the 
fact that decentralized hiring is expected to differ most from centralized hiring when schools 
have excess teacher supply, and define a school level model where the effect of decentralized 
hiring iD  interacts with the dummy jiS  for excess teacher supply for school j in school 
district i. The model is given by equation (2): 
(2) 1 2 3 4 5ji i i ji ji ji i jie D D S S E Mα γ γ γ γ γ μ= + + + + + + , 
where jie  is the efficiency of school j in school district i, jiE  is a vector of individual school 
characteristics, iM  a vector of school district characteristics, and ji i jiμ η ε= +  is a composite 
error term. From this model the effect of decentralized hiring on efficiency is given by: 
(3) 1 2
ji
ji
i
e
S
D
γ γ∂ = +∂ . 
The effect consists of two terms: (i) the direct effect of decentralized hiring on efficiency 1γ  
and (ii) the interaction between excess supply and decentralized hiring 2γ . Individual schools 
in school districts where hiring is decentralized are generally expected to make better matches 
between teachers, schools, and students, ( 1 0γ ; ). Furthermore, this effect is expected to be 
stronger for schools facing excess teacher supply, ( 2 0γ ; ). Therefore, I expect the interaction 
effect 2γ  to be positive. Equation (2) may be estimated using school district FE. The model is 
then reduced to: 
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(4) * *2 3 4 1 5,ji i i ji ji ji ji i i i ie D S S E D Mα γ γ γ ε α α γ γ η= + + + + = + + + . 
In equation (4) the school district specific constant term *iα  captures the effect on efficiency 
of all school district characteristics, including the direct effect 1γ  of decentralized hiring and 
unobserved school district specific factors that affect the decision to decentralize. By 
exploiting within school district variation only, the direct effect 1γ  cannot be identified. 
However, the district FE estimation provides an estimate of the interaction effect 2γ . 
Although the total effect of hiring practices cannot be measured precisely, the estimated 
interaction effect provides useful information about the robustness of the effect found in the 
Tobit estimation. If teacher hiring practices matters for overall efficiency in a school district, 
we should expect to find the strongest effects for schools with an actual option between 
teacher candidates. 
It should be kept in mind that allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects by including the 
supply of teachers may introduce a problem related to unobserved sorting of teachers within 
school districts if the sorting depends on the chosen hiring practice. This may obviously have 
some implications for the analysis, and will be discussed in more detail in the empirical 
results in Section 5. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 School district level analysis 
Table 2 reports the results from estimating various specifications of equation (1) using district 
level data. In column (I) school district efficiency is regressed only on the dummy for 
decentralized hiring. The difference in efficiency between districts with decentralized and 
centralized hiring practices is estimated to be 9.5 percentage points corresponding to the raw 
difference in the data (see Figure 1b). As reported in Figures 1a and 1b, the decision to 
decentralize is positively correlated with both educational efficiency and school district size, 
and the estimated effect of decentralized hiring in column (I) may therefore capture the effect 
on efficiency of school district size. In column (II) I therefore include the (log) number of 
students as a control for school district size. The estimated effect of school district size is 
positive and highly significant. The estimated effect of decentralized hiring is reduced by 
more than 40 per cent (four percentage points) when school district size is included. In 
column (III) the squared log of the number of students is added. The quadratic term has a 
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positive sign and is significant at the 10 per cent level, providing some support for a non-
linear relationship. The estimated effect of hiring practices is only marginally changed 
compared with the effect in column (II). 13 As the support for a non-linear relationship is 
stronger when additional controls are included, I choose to continue with this specification of 
the model. 
Next, in column (IV) I include the share of students with special needs and the share of people 
with higher education in the school district. The information about students with special needs 
is only provided at the aggregate level (for schools and school districts). Special needs 
therefore cannot be included for individual students separately in the achievement regressions 
prior to the DEA analysis. As in Borge and Naper (2006), the estimated effect is negative and 
statistically significant. A high share of students with special needs is associated with lower 
school district efficiency. The level of education in the school district is, as discussed, an 
important control variable if the education orientation of the electorate is reflected by the 
organization of schools. However, the level of education is found to have an insignificant 
effect on the efficiency level and the estimated effect of decentralized hiring is only 
marginally reduced compared with the results in column (III). 
In column (V) I include some additional controls. These are the share of people in the school 
district living in rural areas (settlement pattern), political variables (party fragmentation and 
socialist share), and a measure of local revenues. The reported results concerning these 
variables are comparable with the findings presented by Borge and Naper (2006). The share 
of people living in rural areas has a significant negative effect. Local revenues are included as 
income taxes and block grants per capita deflated by an index of varying cost conditions 
across local authorities. The estimated effect is negative and statistically significant. Hence, 
school districts with a high level of revenues tend to be less efficient. The underlying 
argument for this relationship may be that the schools (service producers) are able to take 
advantage of a rich sponsor to increase budgetary slacks. The positive sign of the Herfindahl 
index of party fragmentation means that school districts with a highly fragmented local 
council tend to have low efficiency. The positive sign of the socialist share indicates that 
socialist influence is associated with low efficiency. However, the effects of political 
variables are only marginally significant. 
                                                 
13 Including higher powers of the log number of students does not change the estimated coefficient.  
62
Table 2 
The effect of decentralized hiring on school district efficiency 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
       
0.095 0.054 0.051 0.047 0.038 0.038 Decentralized hiring practices 
(6.02) (3.68) (3.48) (3.20) (2.79) (2.63) 
 0.068 –0.046 –0.046 –0.213 –0.303 Log of number of students 
 (8.44) (0.67) (0.68) (2.86) (2.53) 
  0.009 0.008 0.019 0.028 Squared log of number of students 
  (1.67) (1.47) (3.43) (2.78) 
   0.177   Share of population with higher 
education    (0.90)   
   –0.749 –0.576 –0.564 Share of students with special needs 
   (3.03) (2.46) (2.37) 
    –0.225 –0.228 Local revenues 
    (5.72) (5.64) 
    –0.077 –0.074 Share of population living in rural 
areas     (2.47) (2.34) 
    –0.074 –0.076 Socialist share 
    (1.57) (1.57) 
    0.136 0.129 Herfindahl index of (inverse) party 
fragmentation     (1.58) (1.47) 
       
Log likelihood 151.64 183.56 186.55 190.03 204.83 195.71 
Observations 250 250 250 250 248 238 
Note: Tobit estimates with absolute t-values in parenthesis. Column (VI): estimates based on a reduced sample 
excluding 10 school districts. 
 
The estimated effect of hiring practices reported in column (V) is around 1 percentage points 
lower compared with the effect in column (IV), and the results suggest that school districts 
with decentralized hiring practices on average are 3.8 percentage points more efficient than 
school districts with traditional centralized hiring practices. The estimated effect is 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, and amounts to approximately 40 per cent of the 
observed raw discrepancy in efficiency. 
A close look at the data reveals that among the school districts in the upper part of the district 
size distribution there are no districts with a centralized hiring practice in the estimation 
sample. These districts are without an obvious comparison group in the estimation sample. 
Although the columns (II)–(V) control for school district size, one might still be concerned 
that the estimated effect of decentralized hiring is driven by the largest districts, where only 
decentralized hiring practices are observed. To investigate whether the estimated effect in 
column (V) is influenced by this lack of common support in the data, I therefore re-estimate 
the model in column (VI) using a reduced sample. The sample is reduced by excluding the 
largest school districts with decentralized hiring practices. In total, 10 school districts are 
excluded from the sample and the last school district excluded has 42 745 inhabitants (2 300 
students). The effect of hiring practices in column (VI), where 10 school districts have been 
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excluded, is only slightly lower compared with the effect in column (V) and is still 
significant. The effect of decentralized hiring does not seem to be driven by the predominance 
of larger school districts that decentralize in the sample. 
The empirical findings in Table 2 provide support for the hypothesis that school districts that 
choose decentralized hiring practices on average are more efficient than school districts with 
centralized hiring practices. Furthermore, the results are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions in Bishop and Wößmann (2004), and empirical contributions by Robin and 
Sprietsma (2003) and Zigarelli (1996). 
5.2 School level analysis 
As already emphasized the Tobit estimates in Table 2 may be biased if the decision to 
decentralize is based on unobservable school district characteristics that are correlated with 
efficiency. This potential problem is addressed by allowing for heterogeneous treatment 
effects in an individual school level analysis as proposed in Section 4. Schools within the 
same school district cannot generally be treated as independent observations, and the model 
should be estimated with cluster-robust standard errors. To take into account that the data is 
both censored and clustered, the preferred estimation strategy is a Tobit model with 
clustering. This is, however, not easily calculated and the alternative strategies are to use 
either OLS with clustered standard errors or Tobit without clustered standard errors. OLS 
estimation in the case of a censored dependent variable generally produces a downward bias 
in the estimates, while estimation without cluster-robust standard errors when the estimation 
data are multilevel typically produces a downward bias in the standard errors. As the share of 
censored observations is relatively small (1.2%) I have chosen to rely on OLS with clustered 
standard errors. Table 3 presents the results from estimating equations (2) and (4) by OLS 
with cluster-robust standard errors. However, a specification of the model based on Tobit is 
also reported in column (III) of Table 3, indicating that the OLS estimation bias is limited. 
First, the model is estimated as described in equation (2) without district FE. The dependent 
variable used in Table 3 is the efficiency scores for individual schools and the same set of 
school district characteristics used above is included. In column (I) I simply reproduce the 
school district estimation reported in column (VI) of Table 2 using school level data. The 
effect of decentralized hiring is 2.1 percentage points and marginally significant. Compared 
with Table 2, the qualitative effect is reduced by almost 40 per cent. The number of students 
and the share of students with special needs are included separately for individual schools and 
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not as school district means. In addition, I include the educational level in each school’s 
catchment area.14 The education orientation in the population may vary within school districts 
as well as across districts, and the variable is included because the education orientation of the 
school users may affect the distribution of teachers across schools as well as how school 
leaders choose to manage their schools. The educational level of the school catchment area 
has a positive but insignificant effect. The remaining control variables in column (I) have 
comparable effects as in Table 2. 
In column (II) I allow for heterogeneous treatment effects by including the dummy variable 
for excess teacher supply presented in Figure 2. The variable is included separately and 
interacted with the dummy for decentralized hiring. The effect of the dummy variable for 
decentralized hiring reported in column (II) should be interpreted as the effect of 
decentralized hiring for schools with excess teacher demand. The estimated effect is close to 
zero and insignificant as expected. The effect of decentralized hiring for schools with excess 
teacher supply is found by adding the estimated interaction between excess supply and 
decentralized hiring practices. The interaction effect is positive and statistically significant at 
the 5 per cent level, and indicates that the effect of decentralized hiring on efficiency is 
stronger when schools can choose between several qualified applicants. 
Column (IV) in Table 3 presents the results from estimating equation (4) where district FE are 
included to exploit within school districts variation only. All school districts with only one 
school automatically drop out of the analysis as there is no within school district variation. 
The number of observations therefore drops slightly compared with column (II). The 
estimated interaction effect comes out larger and highly significant in the FE specification. 
Hence, when unobserved school district characteristics and potential sorting of teachers across 
school districts is controlled for, the effect of decentralized hiring is found to depend 
positively on teacher supply. The estimated interaction effect indicates that the positive effect 
of decentralized hiring is 7.5 percentage points larger for schools with excess teacher supply 
than for schools with excess demand. 
 
                                                 
14 The educational level in school catchment areas is measured by the share of students at each school that have 
parents (mother, father, or both) with education beyond the upper secondary school level.  
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Table 3 
The interaction effect between decentralized hiring practices and teacher supply 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) 
 OLS OLS Tobit FE FE FE FE 
0.021 0.008 0.008     Decentralized hiring 
practices (1.63) (0.50) (0.59)     
 0.043 0.044 0.075 0.081 0.060 0.063 Interaction term: 
decentralized hiring 
practices and excess 
teacher supply  
 (2.11) (2.33) (3.22) (2.96) (2.41) (2.03) 
 –0.003 –0.003 –0.034 –0.042 –0.032 –0.018 Dummy for excess 
teacher supply  (0.18) (0.19) (1.88) (1.85) (1.83) (0.72) 
0.415 –0.413 –0.416 –0.277 –0.326 –0.375 –0.281 Log of number of students 
(5.85) (6.03) (8.99) (3.67) (4.21) (4.70) (3.55) 
0.046 0.046 0.046 0.029 0.033 0.039 0.029 Squared log of number of 
students (6.33) (6.53) (9.17) (3.71) (3.99) (4.39) (3.58) 
–0.102 –0.097 –0.096     Share of population living 
in rural areas (4.15) (3.89) (3.82)     
0.105 0.118 0.116     Herfindahl index of 
(inverse) party 
fragmentation (1.43) (1.61) (1.51)     
–0.000 0.001 0.001     Socialist share 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.04)     
–0.173 –0.171 0.170     Municipal income 
(5.13) (5.47) (4.92)     
0.019 0.035 0.039     Share of population with 
higher education (school 
district) (0.14) (0.29) (0.40)     
0.131 0.123 0.123 0.172 0.111 0.086 0.169 Mean share of population 
with higher education 
(school’s catchment area) (1.42) (1.38) (3.40) (1.78) (1.24) (1.38) (1.69) 
–0.472 –0.450 –0.449 –0.842 –0.764 –0.646 –0.809 The share of students with 
special needs (3.63) (3.48) (3.85) (4.80) (3.80) (2.70) (4.57) 
        
    0.003   Mean age of teachers 
    (1.65)   
    0.173   The share of teachers with 
4 years’ higher education     (2.08)   
    0.129   The share of teachers with 
5 years’ higher education     (1.94)   
    0.521   The share of teachers with 
6 years’ higher education     (5.63)   
        
School district fixed 
effects NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Observations 653 650 650 552 467 396 549 
R-squared 0.42 0.43 – 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.20 
Log likelihood – – 491.49 – – – – 
Note: Estimates with absolute t-values in parenthesis. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and adjusted 
for school district level clustering. The models include a constant term. In column (V) there are fewer 
observations because not all schools can be matched with teacher information. Column (VI) is estimated using 
the reduced sample as in Table 2. In column (VII) the model is estimated using an extended indicator for excess 
teacher supply. 
 
Norwegian teachers are generally linked to only one school and normally cannot be instructed 
to move from one school to another. Teacher transitions within school districts are therefore, 
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with very few exceptions, voluntary and initiated by the teacher. Important determinants for 
within school district mobility of teachers are student composition and student achievement 
(Hanushek et al., 1999). The models presented in columns (I)–(IV) do not consider teacher 
mobility, and it could be argued that this would bias the estimates. If more efficient schools 
attract more qualified teachers it is quite obvious that the estimated dummy for excess teacher 
supply will be biased upwards. However, in relation to hiring practices, it is the interaction 
term between decentralized hiring and excess supply that is the main interest. It is less clear 
that this coefficient would be biased because of teacher mobility. The coefficient would only 
be biased if the sorting of teachers differs substantially between districts with different hiring 
practices.15 It would be upwardly biased if the tendency for efficient schools to attract more 
qualified teachers is stronger in districts with decentralized hiring practices. 
If the interaction effect is estimated with an upward bias in column (IV) we should expect that 
the effect would decrease if teacher quality was controlled for. Teacher quality is generally 
hard to measure perfectly. However, in column (V) I include a set of observable teacher 
characteristics which are likely to be correlated with teacher quality. These are the average 
age of the teaching staff and the average educational length of the teachers. Educational 
length is measured by the share of teachers with a regular four year Teachers’ college degree, 
the share of teachers with additional training after Teachers’ college (five years), and the 
share of teachers with a higher university degree (six years or more). The average age of the 
teaching staff has a positive sign but is only marginally significant. Teachers’ educational 
length is estimated to have a significant and positive effect on educational efficiency. 
Importantly, the estimated interaction effect is slightly higher and still statistically significant 
when observable teacher quality is included. 
5.3 Robustness of the interaction with teacher supply 
Two additional robustness checks of the estimated interaction effect are presented in Table 3. 
First, decentralization is widespread in the largest school districts, and teacher supply is also 
slightly higher than overall in schools within these districts. Although the results in Table 2 
indicate that the effect of hiring practices is not driven by the largest school districts in the 
sample, the estimated interaction with teacher supply may be partly related to schools in the 
largest districts. An important robustness check is therefore to exclude the largest school 
                                                 
15 This can, for example, be the case if school districts with traditional centralized hiring practices are, to a larger 
extent than school districts with decentralized practices, able to affect the allocation of teachers between schools 
by sorting the best teachers to the schools with low-performing students.  
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districts from the sample. I therefore re-estimate the model using the reduced sample as was 
done earlier. The number of schools in the estimation sample is reduced by almost 30 per cent 
as the larger school districts have more schools. The estimated interaction effect is reported in 
column (V) and is slightly lower but still significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Second, decentralization is expected to work better for schools with excess teacher supply, 
and the effect should therefore be stronger the higher the persistence in teacher supply. 
Therefore, there is an argument to include teacher supply further back in time to obtain a more 
long-run measure of persistence. In column (VI) I therefore re-estimate the model using a 
dummy variable for excess teacher supply indicating whether the schools had excess teacher 
supply in the final three years instead of the final two years. The interaction effect is slightly 
lower compared with column (IV), but is still statistically significant. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Numerous papers have analysed the importance of teacher qualifications for student 
performance and educational efficiency. A relatively large literature also focuses on the hiring 
practice of teachers and how to recruit effective teachers in public schools. However, 
relatively few papers have studied how the design of the teacher hiring process affects 
educational efficiency. This paper contributes to the literature by analysing how decentralized 
hiring practices of teachers affect educational efficiency in Norway. Norwegian school 
districts are free to delegate responsibilities of school management decisions to individual 
schools and decentralized hiring practices mean that the hiring decisions are taken at the 
school level by the principal. School principals may know better than the school district 
administration which qualifications are most required for a given teaching position and may 
therefore more easily evaluate the applicants for a given position. Decentralized hiring 
practices are then expected to positively affect efficiency because of an overall better match 
between schools, teachers, and students. 
Because decentralization is a local choice and information about the factor(s) that triggers the 
decision is unavailable, the causal effect of hiring practices on educational efficiency may be 
hard to pin down and naïve estimates may suffer from an endogeneity bias. In the empirical 
analysis I first address this problem by including a rich set of observable school district 
characteristics in a school district analysis. The estimation results clearly show that school 
districts with decentralized hiring practices on average are more efficient than districts with 
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traditional centralized hiring practices. Furthermore, I realize that if the decision to 
decentralize is based on unobservable school districts characteristics that are correlated with 
educational efficiency, the estimates may still be biased. In a second approach I therefore 
allow for heterogeneous treatment effects for individual schools in a school level analysis 
where I exploit the fact that the impact of decentralized hiring practices is expected to be 
stronger when schools have excess teacher supply. Including school district fixed effects I can 
estimate the interaction effect between excess supply and hiring practices, although not the 
direct effect of hiring practices, using only within school district variation. The empirical 
results support the hypothesis that decentralized hiring practices have a stronger impact when 
schools can choose between several qualified applicants. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
 Summary statistic school and school district characteristics* 
Variable  Decentralized Centralized Not in survey 
    
School district level    
Number of school districts 113 137 181 
Population size (in 000s) 21.89 
(2.59) 
5.28 
(1.08) 
7.52 
(1.38) 
Number of students in lower secondary schools 
(school district mean) 
1052 
(2.22) 
335 
(0.80) 
440 
(1.06) 
Efficiency score (DEA) 0.76 (0.16) 
0.67 
(0.18) 
0.69 
(0.18) 
The share of population living in rural area 0.39 (0.67) 
0.54 
(0.48) 
0.51 
(0.53) 
Municipal income (mean 100) 1.02 (0.18) 
1.11 
(0.19) 
1.07 
(0.15) 
The share of representatives from the socialist camp in 
local council (based on the 1999 local election) 
0.36 
(0.34) 
0.37 
(0.42) 
0.36 
(0.39) 
The (inverse) Herfindahl index of party fragmentation 
in the local council (based on the 1999 local election) 
0.24 
(0.41) 
0.29 
(0.40) 
0.26 
(0.40) 
Share of students with special needs 
(school district mean) 
0.06 
(0.52) 
0.07 
(0.43) 
0.07 
(0.43) 
Number of teacher hours per student 78.38 (0.18) 
87.03 
(0.19) 
86.01 
(0.19) 
The share of population with higher education 0.18 (0.31) 
0.15 
(0.24) 
0.17 
(0.30) 
    
School level    
Number of schools 391 262 408 
Number of students 325 (0.34) 
206 
(0.47) 
236 
(0.46) 
The share of students with special needs 0.07 (0.57) 
0.08 
(0.56) 
0.07 
(0.90) 
The share of certified teachers in individual schools 0.98 (0.02) 
0.97 
(0.04) 
0.96 
(0.05) 
Number of teacher hours per student 69.35 (0.15) 
87.79 
(0.19) 
84.79 
(0.25) 
The share of students with highly educated parents 
at the school (school catchment area) 
0.39 
(0.40) 
0.30 
(0.45) 
0.31 
(0.47) 
The average age of the teachers 
 
45.78 
(0.07) 
45.61 
(0.10) 
45.32 
(0.16) 
The share of teachers with 4 years’ 
higher education 
0.38 
(0.34) 
0.40 
(0.43) 
0.41 
(0.70) 
The share of teachers with 5 years’ 
higher education 
0.36 
(0.36) 
0.31 
(0.61) 
0.31 
(0.90) 
The share of teachers with 6 years’ 
higher education 
0.07 
(1.00) 
0.04 
(1.75) 
0.04 
(2.75) 
Efficiency scores (DEA) 0.69 (0.21) 
0.59 
(0.22) 
0.62 
(0.21) 
* Mean values with coefficient of correlation in parenthesis. The DEA efficiency scores are based on data from 
the academic years 2002–2003 and 2003–2004. All demographic and economic characteristics used in the 
empirical analysis are averaged over the same years. 
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Heterogeneous Effects from School Competition 
Hans Bonesrønning* and Linn Renée Naper 
 
Abstract 
We examine whether potential competition effects from private schools differ across student 
subgroups in Norwegian public schools. The endogeneity of competition - measured by the 
share of students attending private schools – is treated by IV estimation. Sorting of parents 
across municipalities is considered by exploiting the location of universities and colleges. 
Indications of non-uniform competition effects are provided: while there is no evidence that 
students with less educated parents gain from competition, the effect for students with highly 
educated parents is positive. The robustness analyses indicate that the latter effect to some 
extent depends on the outcome variable used. 
Keywords: school competition; private schools; student achievement.  
JEL-classifications: I21, H42 
 
1. Introduction 
In many countries school reformers introduce competition from charter schools as a means to 
improve the performance of public schools. However, it is a controversial issue whether 
school competition will work as intended. From a theoretical point of view, the nature of 
competition between schools is not clear-cut: The education market seems to be a 
differentiated product market, where schools differ in their characteristics and where parental 
preferences over school characteristics differ. One conjecture is therefore that the degree and 
character of competition will vary with the characteristics of both suppliers and demanders. 
Not surprisingly then, the existing empirical literature on school competition – between public 
and private schools or between public schools – does not provide any sweeping and clear-cut 
conclusions (see for instance, Hoxby 1994, 2000; Dee 1998; Fiske and Ladd 2001; Levačić 
2004; Bettinger 2005; Sandstrøm and Bergstrøm, 2005; Bayer and McMillan 2005, Gibbons, 
Machin and Silva, 2005; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; Card, Dooley and Payne, 2006). 
                                                 
* An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the 2nd Workshop of the RTN ‘Education Economics and 
Education Policy in Europe’ and at Tinbergen Institute in Amsterdam. We thank the participants for insightful 
comments. Any errors are ours. 
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The present paper adds to the existing literature by providing empirical evidence from 
Norway. First, we investigate whether the overall performance of public schools in Norway is 
affected by competition from private schools. Thereafter, we ask whether the competition 
effects differ across student subgroups. Our hypothesis is that principals and teachers within 
public schools might realize that they can influence parental school choices by reallocating 
resources and/or attention towards the students they think are most likely to opt out. The 
incentives to reallocate resources or attention might vary with the attractiveness of the most 
mobile students (it is not unlikely that mobility and attractiveness is correlated). Thus, if the 
public sector actors’ responses to competition are to reallocate resources between student 
subgroups, we expect the attractive and mobile student subgroups to gain, and the less 
attractive and less mobile students, to lose from competition. 
The private school sector in Norway is small, and has some distinct characteristics. Most 
privately owned schools are religious schools or schools with an alternative pedagogy, 
reflecting the Private School Law of 1970 which offers only these kinds of private schools 
public funding. Private schools are offered (almost) free of charge to the students. The 
municipalities experience a decrease in their budgets when students exit for private schools; 
implying that the financing of private schools very much portrays a voucher system. Private 
schools are not allowed to discriminate between applicants, but the rules that can be applied 
when schools are oversubscribed are vague. 
At first sight Norwegian private schools do not look like close substitutes to public schools, 
and one might conjecture that the private schools are not much of disciplinary devices for the 
actors in public schools. A simple argument is that “religious parents prefer religious 
schools”. End of story. However, for marginal students at least, the school choice is likely to 
involve trade-offs between the school’s programme, student achievement, travelling distances 
and so on. Whether there are any competition effects is an empirical issue. 
We argue that the local markets are defined by municipality borders, and use the share of 
students attending private schools in the municipality as our measure of competition. A major 
econometric challenge is that private schools are not randomly distributed across the 
municipalities. We show that municipalities with private schools differ from municipalities 
without private schools in many observable dimensions. In addition, we suspect that the 
private schools are established for one of the following reasons: i) poor public school quality 
76
(that is hardly observable to the researcher), or ii) high demand for educational quality due to 
unobservable parental preferences. 
This is to say that the measure of competition is potentially endogenous to student 
achievement in public schools. As our point of departure, we follow the Swedish study by 
Sandstrøm and Bergstrøm (2005), and utilize the contracting-out of child care services as an 
instrument 1 . Their argument is that although the establishment of Swedish independent 
schools is determined by national authorities, the local authorities are allowed to give their 
opinion on whether they consider the establishment of an independent school to be harmful to 
existing schools. Also, there are informal ways in which a municipality can aid or hinder the 
establishment of a private school, e.g. by delaying the necessary permits for the use of 
buildings by a school. The establishment of private schools is thus facilitated in municipalities 
where local authorities have positive attitudes towards such schools (indicated by the 
contracting-out of child care). The national and local authorities play the same roles in 
Norway as in Sweden. The exclusion restriction is that the share of children in private child 
care does not exercise any direct influences on student achievement in the 10th grade. 
In addition to the contracting-out of child care we introduce three more identifying variables. 
First, we argue that the share of representatives from the right wing party “Fremskrittspartiet” 
(FRP) in Norwegian local councils may serve as an identifying variable. FRP is a right-wing, 
populist party, that strongly support the establishment of private schools. The party’s support 
for private schools seems to be driven by ideology and not by their electorate’s education-
orientation. Second, we follow a number of US studies that have used a set of denominational 
variables as instruments to deal with the endogeneity problem. The motivation is that many 
private schools in the US are run by Catholic institutions. Since as many as sixty of the 
Norwegian private schools are run by religious institutions, we propose the share of 
representatives from the Christian Democratic Party in the local council as an identifying 
variable. Finally, we exploit that Norway is a scattered populated country. Private schools 
may be hard to establish in municipalities with long travelling distances. A reasonable 
assumption is that the local demand for private schools shifts inwards as the travelling 
distances within the municipality increase, thus generating the necessary correlation between 
the share of students in private schools and travelling distances. The instruments – particularly 
the exclusion restrictions - are discussed more thoroughly in a subsequent section. 
                                                 
1Actually, they propose five indicators of the municipalities’ willingness to contract out their responsibilities, but 
only the contracting-out of child care is significantly associated with the share of students in independent schools. 
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There are more, and related, problems to be solved; first and foremost related to the share of 
highly educated citizens in the municipality. As will be documented later, this variable is 
correlated both with our measure of competition and with student achievement in public 
schools, implying that the estimated competition effects are not robust to specification. The 
latter of these correlations might reflect that parents and/or teachers have sorted themselves 
across municipalities due to unobservable preferences for public school quality, while the 
former correlation might reflect that the sorting is imperfect. That is, some inhabitants may 
have responded to poor public school quality by establishing private schools, and not by 
moving out of the municipality. The share of highly educated citizens in the municipality is 
then endogenous to student achievement in public schools. Introducing this variable in the 
estimated equation will not work to generate an unbiased estimate of the competition effect. 
We suggest using the location of universities and colleges to get around this endogeneity 
problem. In addition, we report the results from equations with and without the share of 
highly educated citizens among the explanatory variables. In the former specification, the 
competition effects most likely are biased downwards, in the latter they are most likely biased 
upwards. 
We find that in no specifications are the competition effects for students with less educated 
parents positive. For students with highly educated parents, the competition effects are always 
positive. In some specifications these latter effects are small and insignificant; in others they 
are quite large and significant. We also show that students with highly educated parents are 
among the students that have the highest propensities of leaving public schools. Taken 
together, these findings lend support to our hypothesis that public schools respond to 
competition by reallocating resources towards the most attractive and mobile students. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 gives a short overview of the 
Norwegian school sector and presents our data. Chapter 3 outlines our empirical strategy and 
discusses econometric challenges. Chapter 4 presents the empirical results. Chapter 5 presents 
robustness checks of the empirical results and section 6 offer some final conclusions.  
2. Private and Public Schools in Norway 
2.1 Institutional details 
Most primary (1.-7. grade) and lower secondary schools (8.-10. grade) in Norway are owned 
by the municipalities. The municipalities decide the number of schools, school location and 
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school budgets, but the workings of the schools are heavily influenced by the national 
government: The multi-purpose municipalities’ revenues are almost fully determined by 
grants and local tax rates set by the Government. Moreover, the public schools operate under 
strict national rules and regulations that strongly influence the number of students per teacher, 
teacher pay and teacher qualifications. The curriculum is decided at the national level, and 
there are national exams in mathematics, reading and writing and English language at the end 
of the 10th grade. A neighbourhood school rule has been applied throughout the country for 
the actual period of time, making many public schools local monopolies2. 
The private school law of 1970 restricted the public financing of private schools to religious 
schools or schools with a distinct pedagogical idea (such as Steiner and Montessori)3. When 
approved by the Ministry, private schools receive public funding amounting to 85% of the 
municipality’s costs for schooling per student. The financing system encourages the 
establishment of small private schools by compensating for diseconomies of scale. The 
private schools thus receive more funding per capita for the first 40 students than they do for 
the next 160 students.  The schools are allowed to charge a small tuition fee, but the sum of 
public funding and tuition fees cannot exceed the costs per student in comparable public 
schools in the municipality. The private schools are financed by the Government, but the 
municipalities experience a decrease (less than the average cost per student) in their grants 
when students exit for private schools. 
The approval of new private schools is made by the Ministry of Education, but the 
municipalities are allowed to give an opinion on whether they consider the establishment of a 
private school to be harmful for existing schools (The Private School Law §25). The 
municipalities have no veto, and the Ministry can choose to follow the will of the 
municipalities or not. 
2.2 Private schools’ location 
The Norwegian primary and lower secondary schools have compiled thorough school level 
statistics since the academic year 1992-1993 only. Table 2.1 shows that the number of private 
schools have more than doubled from 1992-1993 to 2003-2004, from 49 to 116 schools. By 
2003-2004 a little more than 50 percent of the private schools were religious schools, and a 
                                                 
2 In comparison, Sweden introduced a parental choice reform in the early 1990s. 
3 The present study applies data for the school year 2003/2004, which is the last year before a new and more 
liberal private school law was introduced. 
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little more than 50 percent of the students in private schools were enrolled in religious 
schools. 
Table2.1  
The number of privately operated schools from 1992-1993 until 2003-2004 
Academic 
year 
Number of privately operated schools 
(primary and lower secondary). 
Number of privately operated schools with students 
on the lower secondary level (grade 8 to 10) 
1992 – 1993 49 34 
1993 – 1994 55 41 
1994 – 1995 63 48 
1995 – 1996 65 48 
1996 – 1997 67 51 
1997 – 1998 68 52 
1998 – 1999 71 57 
1999 – 2000 81 61 
2000 – 2001 89 65 
2001 – 2002 98 68 
2002 – 2003 106 71 
2003 – 2004 116 83 
   
 
A first view on private school location is offered in Table 2.2. The private schools are 
concentrated in 76 (from a total of 434) municipalities. For municipalities that have private 
schools, the private market share is 4.7 percent on average, varying from below 1 percent of 
the total student population in the municipality up to nearly 19 percent. The private schools 
tend to be located in large municipalities, as indicated by the fact that almost half the student 
population is located in the municipalities with private schools, and 25 percent of the 
municipalities with private schools having more than 30 000 inhabitants. It cannot be read 
from the table that a fairly large number of private schools are located in small municipalities 
in remote areas, but from the raw data we see that 25 percent of the municipalities with 
private school alternatives have a population of less than 7000 inhabitants. 
Table 2.2 also shows that the population compositions differ in potentially important respects 
between municipalities with and without private schools. Municipalities with private schools 
have a more highly educated population than municipalities with only public schools, while 
the dispersion in people’s educational level seems to be somewhat higher in municipalities 
with no private schools. The share of immigrants turns out to be significantly larger in the 
municipalities with private schools than in municipalities without private schools.  
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Finally, note that Table 2.2 shows that municipalities with private schools on average have 
larger shares of private kinder gardens, larger shares of representatives from the right wing 
party FRP in the local councils, and shorter travelling distances between local centres. These 
are very useful features for the econometric analyses. Newmark (1995) argues that 
competition is unlikely to have any noticeable effect when enrolment in private school does 
not vary over time, and moreover, that studies of the potential private competition effect on 
public schools are unlikely to find any significant effect due to low variability in the data. The 
first view on the Norwegian data shows that there has been quite a rapid growth in the number 
of private schools in the years prior to 2003/2004; which is the year we analyze, and that there 
is quite a substantial cross section variation in the share of students in private schools across 
municipalities. 
2.3 Public school performance 
The performance of public schools is measured by student achievement at the end of the 
lower secondary school. We have several possible achievement measures to use. For the 
school year 2003/2004 we have for the 10th graders access to assessment grades (grades set by 
the teachers) in all subjects on the curriculum, external examination results in core subjects 
and results from a national test in reading and writing, mathematics and English, all at the 
individual level.  
The natioanl tests are preferred in the analyses, because they are more objective than the 
teachers’ grades (see Wikstrøm and Wikstrøm (2005) for Swedish evidence about grade 
inflation and school competition), and because they cover larger fractions of the students than 
do the exam results (for a considerably large part of the municipalities only a subset of the 
subjects are covered by the national exam). However, not all students have valid test results. 
Therefore we use the students’ grades to evaluate the robustness of our findings (moreover, 
the grades are compared to the students’ exam results to evaluate the responsiveness of the 
teachers’ grading practices to competition pressures). 
The student level data file contains individual test scores from national achievement tests, 
covering a total of 51 322 10th graders from public schools. 43 113 students have valid test 
results in mathematics, 44 654 in reading and writing and 44 119 in English. The number of 
students that have valid test results in all three subjects is 34 035. Appendix Tables A.1-A.3 
show mean achievement levels in municipalities with different fractions of private school 
enrolments. 
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2.4 Other variables 
The test results are linked to data from Statistics Norway on individuals and families. We 
have information about the students’ sex, date of birth, number of siblings, birth order, and 
their migration status, and further, the parents’ educational level and income (separate for 
mother and father), marital status, number of working hours per week, which sector they work 
in (private/public) and whether they are self-employed or not. 
Data describing school inputs come from The Ministry’s data base for the elementary school 
(GSI). The school level data file contains both public and private schools and provides 
information about the number of students, the share of students with immigration status 
(students receiving separate teaching in Norwegian language) and the share of students that 
receive additional resources due to learning disabilities, the number of teachers, and the 
number of certified teachers. The school level data cover around 1100 primary and lower 
secondary schools. Data describing the municipalities come from the Norwegian Social 
Sciences Data Services (NSD). The municipalities’ characteristics reported in table 2.2 above 
come from this data source. Moreover, we have access to data of travelling distances between 
schools within municipalities. The municipal level data cover all the 434 municipalities in 
Norway.  
3. Empirical Strategy 
We follow Sandstrøm and Bergstrøm (2005) and let the share of students attending private 
schools in each municipality be a gauge of the degree of competition. As in Sweden, very few 
Norwegian students go to schools outside the municipality where they reside, clearly making 
the municipality the relevant market. The measure of the private market share in our analyses 
is based on all students attending compulsory schools (1st to 10th grade) in the respective 
municipalities. We investigate how the variation in private sector enrolment affects the 
educational outcomes in public schools in the following individual level regression model: 
(1) 1 2 3ism m ism sm m ismt p B S Mα β β β ε= + + + +   
Equation (1) is a variant of the well-developed and broadly discussed Education Production 
Function (see for instance Hanushek, 2002) where schools are regarded as firms producing 
educational outcomes in terms of student achievement. The variable ismt  is student i’s test 
score at the public school s in municipality m. The variable mp  is the private market share in 
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the municipality m where student i goes to school. The three vectors B, S and M include 
family background variables, school variables and municipality variables respectively. The α  
and 'sβ  are parameters to be estimated and ismε  is a composite error term. 
As stated above, the share of students in private schools is potentially an endogenous variable 
in equation (1). We construct an instrumental variable by estimating an equation that seeks to 
explain the variation in private market shares across municipalities in the following TOBIT 
specification4: 
 (2) m m mp Dδ ν= +  
The variable mp  is the private market share used in equation (1) which cannot be lower than 
zero and thus is censored at 0; D is a vector of potential determinants for private schools 
establishment and mν  represents a white noise error term. 
To solve the endogeneity problem, the D-vector must contain at least one variable that is 
correlated with the private market share and fulfils the exclusion restriction. As stated above, 
we exploit that local politicians have a legal right to influence the establishment of private 
schools, and seek to characterize local politicians in ways that are not correlated with student 
achievement. Initially, we follow Sandstrøm and Bergstrøm (2005) who claim that the extent 
to which the municipalities contract out their responsibilities indicate their attitude to the 
privatization of public sector activities. Contracting out in other sectors than education is 
likely to be correlated with the amount of contracting out in education. The exclusion 
restriction is that the contracting out of non-school activities has no independent effect on 
student achievement in the municipality. 
This requirement might not be fulfilled if the contracting out practices reflects a demand for 
high quality public sector services that originate from unobserved characteristics of the 
inhabitants. We therefore propose measures of the political composition of the local council 
as additional instruments. For identification it is important that the attitudes towards private 
schools reflect the electorate’s ideological orientation and not their education orientation. Our 
preferred solution to this problem is to exploit the characteristics of the political party 
“Fremskrittspartiet” (FRP). FRP is a right wing party that strongly supports the establishment 
                                                 
4 We are not able to run a direct IV estimation as equation (2) is a Tobit specification while equation (1) has a 
continuous dependent variable, therefore we must use a two stage approach. 
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of private schools. It is unlikely that this support reflects a strong education-orientation among 
the party’s voters. In the election in 2001, 19 percent of their voters had elementary school as 
their highest education, 65 percent had secondary school as their highest education, while 6 
percent had education at the university level. The average education level among FRP’s 
voters is well below the national average (Aardal et al, 2003). Thus, it seems like the critical 
question is whether the party’s support for private schools reflects a poor education-
orientation among the FRP-voters.  There is no easy answer to this question. The evidence 
clearly indicates the party does not represent modernisation losers in sparsely populated areas: 
in local elections the party achieves its best results in affluent and medium-seized 
municipalities, making it less obvious that a large FRP-fraction in the local council is 
equivalent to a poor education-orientation among the community members. There are at least 
two arguments why the party’s positive attitudes towards private schools are not directly 
linked to their electorate’s education orientation: First, many FRP voters hold strong anti-
establishment sentiments. For this reason, they find public schools - that represent the national 
governments in the local community - unattractive.  Second, FRP’s number one priority in 
local policies is more money to the health sector and to care for the elderly. Privatization of 
public schools can be seen as a means towards this end because the schools are then taken out 
of the municipalities’ budgets. We use the share of representatives from FRP in the local 
municipalities as one of our identification variables. The exclusion restriction is that this 
party’s attitude towards private schools is not (much) correlated with their voters’ educational 
motivations after controls are made for observable characteristics of the municipalities’ 
inhabitants. 
We also propose to use the share of representatives from the Christian Democratic Party as an 
identifying variable, but admittedly, we are less convinced that the exclusion restriction holds 
for this variable. A main reason is that religious communities may provide some kinds of 
social capital that may facilitate the human capital formation of young people. Finally, we 
exploit the geographic characteristics of Norway. A large share of the population is spread 
around in the fjords and up in the valleys. Most municipalities have several schools, some are 
located in the administrative centre, while others are established in local centres in the fjords 
or up in the valleys. Thus, travelling distances between the local schools and the municipal 
centre vary quite a lot. We conjecture that these distances effectively affect the market size for 
private schools, and thus the incentives for establishing such schools. The hypothesis is that 
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fewer students go to private schools as travelling distances within the municipality increase5. 
Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2005) provide evidence that parents value proximity highly, and 
that travelling costs make up for much of this priority. 
To check out this conjecture we use a measure on travelling distance per inhabitant. The 
travelling distance is calculated using a model where each municipality is divided into several 
smaller school districts and where the centre of the municipality and the centre of these 
smaller districts are defined by the most densely populated area. The travelling distances is 
then measured as the distance from the centre of the smaller district to the centre of the 
municipality. Travelling distances between local centres capture a relevant feature of the local 
schooling market, but are unlikely to be much correlated with the students’ actual travelling 
time. This is important because students that spend much time travelling have less spare time 
for homework, indicating that actual travelling time might be a determinant of student 
achievement. Also, some people would argue that non-random Tiebout sorting compromise 
the distance measure because the most education-oriented families might have left sparsely 
populated areas. Note then that also many of the urban areas in Norway have relatively long 
travelling distances due to fjords and mountains. One illustration is that the second largest city 
in Norway, Bergen, which is famous for its location by fjords and among high mountains, has 
solved these geographical problems by allocating approximately 31 000 students to about 100 
schools. We apply the assumption that conditioning both on individual student characteristics 
and characteristics of the municipality population, our measure of travelling distances within 
the municipality is not correlated with student achievement. 
The socioeconomic composition of students attending private schools is somewhat different 
from the student body composition of public schools, also when we restrict the comparisons 
to municipalities with private schools. Most notably, immigrants are over-represented and 
also, there are relatively more students who have parents with higher educational levels (these 
numbers are not reported in the tables). We therefore include a selection part into the model 
by using Heckman’s selection correction procedure. 
                                                 
5 However, in Norway we have witnessed that the inhabitants in some remote areas have responded to the 
closing down of small public schools by establishing private schools. 
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The selection part of our model is formalized in the following equation: 
(3) i i iw X φ μ= +  
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, and the dependent variable iw  can be 
interpreted as a student’s preferences for public schooling. The latter variable is observed only 
if these preferences are positive in the sense that the student chooses public schooling instead 
of private schooling. What we observe is the binary variable: 
(4) *
1 0
0 0
i
i
i
if w
w
if w
>⎧= ⎨ ≤⎩
 
Equation (3) is estimated using Maximum Likelihood (Probit). 
As outlined so far, the analysis does not explicitly address potential problems related to 
Tiebout choice, i.e. that parents move home across municipality boundaries. The most 
education-oriented parents might have sorted themselves to municipalities with favourable 
peer group compositions in the public schools. (For the same reasons, the most ambitious 
teachers may have chosen to teach in public schools in these municipalities.) If then, these 
municipalities also have large shares of students in private schools, competition and sorting 
effects will be confounded. We deal with this problem by utilizing that the municipalities that 
have universities, university colleges or colleges run by the Government within their borders 
have the highest shares of population with higher education. This correlation will work to 
identify the effect of the populations’ educational level on individual students’ performance 
insofar the existence of a higher education institution in the municipality does not have any 
direct effects on performance. 
For the present analysis the consequences of omitted variables at the municipal level might be 
equally important as simultaneity biases. Local decisions about school resources, school size, 
and teacher recruitment and so on might affect student achievement. To the extent that these 
variables are correlated with the private school market share, but not included among the 
explanatory variables, the estimated competition effect will be biased. Even though the 
inclusion of such choice variables generates new problems, we include a relatively large 
number of these variables to avoid omitted variable biases.  
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Auxiliary analyses 
In this chapter we present the results from the empirical analysis outlined in chapter 3. We 
start out by identifying the factors that determine private school location. The results come 
from TOBIT estimation of equation (2). 
As can be seen from the table, the private school market share is positively and significantly 
associated with the share of children in private child care, and also with the share of 
representatives from the right wing party (FRP). The former association is significant at the 
10 percent level, the latter at the 5 percent level. The share of representatives from the 
Christian Democratic Party is negatively and significantly associated with the private market 
share at the 10 percent level. We have also included the share of representatives from the 
Socialist parties. This variable is not significantly associated with the private school market 
share. There is evidence, significant at the 5 percent level, showing that relatively more 
students go to private schools in municipalities with short travelling distances from the local 
centres to the municipal centre. 
Thus, all the suggested identifying variables are correlated with the share of students in 
private schools. An important question is how powerful these instruments are. A conventional 
way to compare coefficients is to evaluate them in terms of standard deviations. In the 
exercise reported below we use the standard deviations from the sub sample of municipalities 
that have private schools. The share of representatives from FRP varies between 0 percent and 
40 percent, with a standard deviation of 6 percent. One standard deviation increase in the 
share of representatives from this party increases the share of students in private schools with 
1.5 percent, which is about 40 percent of one standard deviation in the private school market 
share. One standard deviation in the contracting out of child care transforms into a 30 percent 
of a standard deviation increase in the share of students in private schools, while one standard 
deviation increase in traveling distances transforms into 45 percent of one standard deviation 
decrease in the share of students in private schools. Thus, the estimated coefficients for these 
three variables are not only statistical significant, but large enough for these variables to 
explain a substantial part of the variation in the private school share. 
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Table 4.1 
First stage TOBIT regression: explaining the private school market share 
The share of students in independent schools  
0.056 Market share for private kinder gardens (contracting out) 
(0.031)* 
0.255 The share of representatives in local council from the right wing party FRP 
(0.109)** 
-0.150 The share of representatives in local council from the Christian Democratic Part 
(0.089)* 
-0.004 Travelling distance within zone per citizens 
(0.002)** 
-0.152 Herfindahl Index of public school competitiveness in municipality 
(0.058)*** 
0.016 Dummy indicating whether municipality has a University or a University College 
(0.017) 
-0.356 Herfindahl Index of educational level in the municipality 
(0.334) 
-0.567 The share of employees between 20 and 54 in the municipality 
(0.155)*** 
-0.041 The share of immigrants in the municipality 
(0.311) 
0.000 Population size (in 1000) 
(0.000) 
0.001 The school cost per student in the municipality 
(0.001) 
-0.000 Municipal revenue 
(0.001) 
2.006 The inverse number of students 
(7.301) 
-0.040 The share of socialists in the local council 
(0.051) 
Constant 0.323 
 (0.145)** 
Observations 424 
 
Note: All estimation results are reported with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** and 
*** indicating significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % respectively. 
 
It is useful to know whether private schools are established as a response to high demand for 
educational quality and/or as a response to poor public school quality. The equation reported 
in Table 4.1 includes a dummy reflecting whether the school district has a university or one or 
more University Colleges. This variable, which might be an indicator of the inhabitants’ 
education-orientation, is not significantly associated with the dependent variable. In an 
alternative specification (not reported) we have included the share of the population with 
higher education. This variable is a significant predictor of private school location, indicating 
that there is some imperfect Tiebout sorting across municipalities. 
Many authors hypothesize that the demand for private schools depends on the quality of the 
public schools. Sandstrøm and Bergstrøm (2005) have access to the average grades in public 
schools in the municipalities at the time of the introduction of the new private school law in 
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Sweden. Thereby they are able to provide indications that the establishment of independent 
schools in Sweden has been a response to poor public school performance. This result 
indicates that they run the risk of underestimating the positive effects of competition if 
endogeneity is not taken into account. We have no adequate measures for public school 
performance at the time of the establishment of private schools. Instead, we include current 
expenditures per student (which due to its low variability over time correlates strongly with 
historical inputs). This is a relevant quality measure if parents judge schools by inputs. 
Expenditures per student in public schools are not significantly related to the location of 
private schools. We return to the relationship between public school quality and the 
establishment of private schools below.  
Many of the other independent variables in Table 4.1 are motivated by prior empirical studies. 
Glomm, Harris and Lo (2005) provide evidence from Michigan that charter schools locate 
where populations are diverse in terms of race and adult education levels. We include a 
Herfindahl index for years of schooling and the share of students with immigrant background. 
None of these variables appear to have a significant impact on the establishment of private 
schools in Norway. Figlio and Stone (2001) hypothesize that the demand for private schools 
depends on the choice options within the public sector, and add the number of public school 
options to the list of explanatory variables. We use a Herfindahl Index as our measure of 
current public school concentration, and find that there is significant evidence that more 
students go to private schools in municipalities with low public school concentration. This 
result, which is contrary to the findings reported by Figlio and Stone (2001), indicates that the 
mechanism underlying the establishment of private schools in Norway does not seem to be 
the lack of competition between public schools. Finally, note that the private school market 
share seems to be smaller in municipalities where a large fraction of the inhabitants are 
between 20 and 54 years. A similar finding is reported by Barrow (forthcoming), who finds 
that religious schools in Illinois are more likely to locate in areas with a higher share of the 
population over 55 years of age. According to Barrow this correlation might reflect past 
location decisions. 
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Table 4.2 
The selection equation (Probit-estimation) 
 
Dummy for girls -0.176 
 (0.054)*** 
First generation immigrant with no Norwegian background 0.073 
 (0.183) 
Born in Norway by two foreign parents -0.422 
 (0.143)*** 
Born abroad with one Norwegian parent -0.471 
 (0.294) 
Born in Norway with one foreign parent -0.263 
 (0.070)*** 
Born abroad by two Norwegian parents -0.536 
 (0.162)*** 
Father's education is lower tertiary or higher (College or university) -0.452 
 (0.114)*** 
Father's education is upper secondary -0.215 
 (0.103)** 
Mother's education is lower tertiary or higher (College or university) -0.975 
 (0.132)*** 
Mother's education is upper secondary -0.584 
 (0.114)*** 
Father's income (in 10 000 NOK) 0.002 
 (0.001)*** 
Mother's income (in 10 000 NOK) 0.006 
 (0.001)*** 
Living in nuclear family -0.199 
 (0.066)*** 
Birth order 0.178 
 (0.034)*** 
Number of siblings -0.229 
 (0.042)*** 
Mother works in private sector -0.108 
 (0.051)** 
Father works in private sector -0.060 
 (0.038) 
Number of teacher hours per student at the school 0.005 
 (0.005) 
Share of students receiving extra Norwegian tuition at the school -1.615 
 (1.556) 
Share of students receiving special training (disadvantaged students) 8.964 
 (4.225)** 
School size (in 100) 0.985 
 (0.274)*** 
The share of teacher with certified education 13.760 
 (2.456)*** 
Dummy indicating whether municipality has a University or a University College -0.661 
 (0.378)* 
Herfindahl Index of educational level in municipality 23.671 
 (10.568)** 
The share of employees between 20 and 54 municipality 0.816 
 (4.296) 
The share of immigrants in municipality 11.928 
 (6.130)* 
Population size (in 1000) -0.007 
 (0.002)*** 
The school cost per student in municipality -0.022 
 (0.032) 
Municipal Revenue 0.096 
 (0.040)** 
The share of representatives in local council from the right wing party FRP -13.244 
 (3.833)*** 
The share of representatives in local council from the Christian Democratic Part 2.813 
 (3.583) 
The share of socialists in local council -1.540 
 (1.837) 
Constant -22.087 
 (6.983)*** 
Observations 48401 
 
Note: All estimation results are reported with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, adjusted for school level 
clustering, in parenthesis. * and ** indicating significance at 5 % and 1 % respectively.  
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The characteristics of the students who choose to stay in the public schools, and who choose 
to attend private schools, are highlighted in table 4.2, where we report the PROBIT estimation 
results of equation (3)6. These results show that girls are more likely to choose private schools 
than are boys, and that students with highly educated parents are more likely to choose private 
schools than are students with less educated parents. Later on we investigate whether the 
school competition effects differ across these two subgroups of students. Note that several 
other individual student and family characteristics – such as immigrant status, family income, 
family size and family structure, are significant predictors of the choice of private versus 
public schools as well.  
We have also included variables at the municipal level in this equation. It should be noted that 
the probit results differ from the Tobit results reported in Table 4.1 in important respects. 
Examples are that the probit specification shows that students in municipalities with 
Universities or University Colleges are more likely to opt out for private schools, and that the 
diversity of adult education levels seems to trigger private school enrolment (neither is the 
case in the Tobit specification). Diverging results basically reflect that the probit estimation 
makes use individual data that represent a different weighting of the observations 
A potentially important result is that municipalities with a large share of public school 
teachers without certification experience a larger outflow of students to private schools. 
Municipalities with uncertified teachers are in short supply of teachers, and are thus less able 
to choose high quality teachers than are municipalities that experience excess teacher supply. 
The share of uncertified teachers might be an indicator of the average teacher quality in public 
schools, and thus the strongest evidence provided in the present paper that students are more 
likely to opt out of poor public schools. For the selection equation to be useful in a Heckman-
correction procedure, it should contain at least one variable measured at the municipality 
level, and that is not included in the education function or the Tobit equation (1). 
Unfortunately, we have been unable to include any variables that fulfill these requirements 
into the selection equation. Identification thus basically hinges on the functional form. This 
should be kept in mind when we now turn to the estimations of the education production 
function. 
                                                 
6 The sample that is used in this estimation is based all 10th grade students that has valid test results in at least 
one of the three test subjects, the number of observations in table 5.2 is thus larger than in any of the preceding 
estimations based on one subject at the time. Due to missing observation on individual background variables the 
number of observations is also somewhat lower than the total number of public school 10th graders in the data. 
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4.2 The education production function analyses 
The results from estimating equation (1) are presented in tables 4.3-4.57. For each of the three 
subjects we report results from both ordinary least squares and instrumental variables 
estimation. All estimates are presented using robust standard errors allowing for clustering at 
the school level. The ordinary least squares estimations reported in columns (1) provide a 
useful point of departure. Reading across the three tables, the competition effects from private 
schools are positive and insignificant for mathematics, while the comparable estimates for 
reading and writing and English are negative and insignificant.  
Table 4.3  
Competition effects in mathematics 
Dependent variable: Test scores in Mathematics 
Sample: All students Students with highly educated parents 
Students with low 
educated parents 
       
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       
0.654 8.586 1.137 16.014 0.721 5.679 The share of students in private schools 
(3.530) (3.340)** (4.883) (4.569)*** (3.949) (3.709) 
-0.294 -0.649 1.023 0.260 0.737 0.507 Inverse Mills Ratio 
(0.881) (0.883) (1.387) (1.362) (1.239) (1.219) 
-0.279 1.317 -1.352 1.907 0.328 1.308 Herfindahl Index of public school 
competitiveness in municipality (0.708) (0.901) (0.985) (1.288) (0.786) (0.992) 
30.945 28.446 30.844 26.814 36.368 34.493 Constant 
(3.976)*** (4.095)*** (5.578)*** (5.596)*** (4.246)*** (4.428)*** 
Observations 40237 40234 16868 16867 23369 23367 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 
  
Note: All estimation results are reported with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, adjusted for school level 
clustering, in parenthesis. * and ** indicating significance at 5 % and 1 % respectively. 
 
The ordinary least square estimations reported in the tables include the Inverse Mills Ratio 
(originating from equation (3)). This variable has a negative and insignificant coefficient for 
all three subjects. The negative signs of the Inverse Mills Ratios indicate that there are some 
unobserved variables that on one hand affect student achievement positively, and on the other 
hand affect the probability of choosing public schools negatively8. In other words, we find 
some insignificant indications of self-selection into public schools by students with relatively 
poorer education motivation. The correction for self-selection does not affect the estimated 
competition effects much, probably reflecting that the Norwegian private school market is 
small (the specifications without the Inverse Mills Ratio are not reported). 
                                                 
7 All the presented estimates emerge from a model where we include an extensive list of control variables at the 
individual, school and municipality level. In table A4 in the appendix we present the estimation results in 
mathematics where all control variables are included in the model. 
8 The coefficient on the Inverse Mills Ratio will generally take on the same sign as the correlation (rho) between 
the error term in the selection equation and the error term in the achievement equation. 
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In the second columns of tables 4.3-4.5 we present results from IV estimations (we use the 
predicted private school market share from the TOBIT equation reported in table 4.1 for the 
observed private school market shares). The private school market share now exercises a 
positive and significant influence on public school performance in mathematics. A four 
percentage point increase in the private school market share (which is a little more than one 
standard deviation in the market share for the municipalities that have private schools) 
transforms into 3.4 points on the math test, which is 3.4 percent of a standard deviation in the 
test results for mathematics. In their analysis of Swedish lower secondary schools, Sandstrøm 
and Bergstrøm (2005) estimate the competition effect to be more than twice this size. 
However, they use an outcome measure that is a composite of the students’ grades in 16 
subjects. It is thus not obvious that these numbers are comparable. 
The estimated IV-coefficient in table 4.3 is considerably larger than the coefficient originating 
from the OLS estimation, indicating that the competition effect is seriously underestimated 
unless simultaneity is taken into account. The direction of the difference between the OLS- 
and IV-coefficients indicates that private schools are established in municipalities where 
public schools show poor performance in mathematics.  
Table 4.4 
Competition effects in Reading and writing* 
Dependent variable: Test scores in Reading and Writing 
Sample: All students Students with highly educated parents 
Students with low 
educated parents 
       
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       
-2.007 -0.082 -0.314 6.810 -3.022 -2.508 The share of students in private schools 
(4.046) (2.781) (4.039) (3.237)** (4.954) (3.557) 
-0.636 -0.635 0.726 0.387 0.451 0.566 Inverse Mills Ratio 
(0.793) (0.799) (0.908) (0.903) (0.977) (0.971) 
0.567 0.577 0.901 2.260 0.199 -0.204 Herfindahl Index of public school competitiveness 
in municipality (0.626) (0.826) (0.758) (0.967)** (0.769) (1.020) 
31.359 31.215 36.912 34.946 32.694 33.229 Constant 
(3.254)*** (3.325)*** (4.057)*** (4.077)*** (3.921)*** (4.068)*** 
Observations 41535 41532 17280 17279 24255 24253 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
  
* see note Table 4.3. 
 
The IV estimation results reported in the second columns of Tables 4.4 and 4.5 indicate that 
there are no uniform positive competition effects across subjects. In English the estimated 
coefficient is negative and insignificant. For reading and writing the estimated IV-coefficient 
is close to zero and also insignificant. Note also that both for English and for reading and 
writing, the coefficients estimated by the use of IV are larger than the coefficient estimated by 
OLS, implying that the biases in the OLS coefficients are consistent across subjects. 
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The specifications reported in the two first columns in tables 4.3-4.5 include all students, and 
conceal potentially important differences across student subgroups. In the introduction, we 
have conjectured that teachers respond to more competition pressures by concentrating more 
of their efforts on the student subgroups that are most likely to leave public schools for private 
schools. Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2005) provide empirical evidence that parental 
preferences for school quality vary with background characteristics in ways that are consistent 
with this conjecture. Table 4.2 shows that the probability of attending a private school in 
Norway depends both on gender and parental education. Consequently, we split the sample 
along these lines.  
Table 4.5 
 Competition effects in English* 
Dependent variable: Test scores in English 
Sample: All students Students with highly educated parents 
Students with low educated 
parents 
       
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       
-9.098 -3.398 -11.592 -2.297 -8.096 -2.326 The share of students in private schools 
(4.981)* (3.418) (5.724)** (4.476) (5.422) (3.595) 
-1.703 -1.563 -1.014 -0.975 -0.470 -0.344 Inverse Mills Ratio 
(1.384) (1.395) (1.615) (1.640) (1.349) (1.350) 
0.301 -0.211 0.705 0.446 -0.231 -0.551 
(0.826) (0.972) (1.182) (1.407) (0.828) (1.020) 
Herfindahl Index of public school 
competitiveness in municipality 
(4.109)*** (4.348)*** (5.319)*** (5.519)*** (4.273)*** (4.552)*** 
Observations 41023 41020 17252 17251 23771 23769 
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 
  
* see note Table 4.3. 
 
First, the results reported in the right hand parts of Table 4.3 (mathematics) and Table 4.4 
(reading and writing) show that public school students with highly educated parents gain from 
competition with private schools. The estimated effects are highly significant when using 
instrumental variables estimation. The estimated effect in mathematics is more than twice the 
size of the effect in reading and writing. Students with highly educated parents seem to 
experience no positive effect from competition in English. There is no significant evidence 
that students with less educated parents are affected by competition – anywhere. 9 Both for 
mathematics and reading and writing the hypothesis that the competition effects are equal for 
students with highly educated parents and students with less educated parents is rejected at 
conventional levels of significance. Thus, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
                                                 
9 We have also investigated whether the positive competition effects are larger in densely populated 
municipalities: they are, and more evident for mathematics than for reading. These results are not reported in the 
tables. 
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that public schools respond to increased competition by allocating their efforts to the students 
that are most likely to leave the public schools. 
Next, the sample is separated by gender. The results are reported in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 for 
boys and girls respectively. The positive competition effects in mathematics seem to originate 
from boys’ responses. Boys seem more than twice as responsive as girls, and the competition 
effect is significant for boys only. Recall from Table 4.2 that girls, all else equal, are more 
likely to choose private schools. The hypothesis that teachers respond to increased 
competition by concentrating on the student subgroups that are most likely to leave public 
schools are thus not supported by these findings10.  In reading and writing there are some 
weak indications (insignificant at conventional levels) that boys might be more responsive 
than girls also in this subject. In English we find no significant effects. 
Table 4.6 
Competition effects for boys* 
Dependent variable: Test scores in 
Mathematics 
Test scores in 
English 
Test scores in 
Reading and writing 
Sample: Boys 
    
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       
-1.800 11.748 -10.364 -1.285 -2.216 1.838 The share of students in private schools 
(4.576) (3.850)*** (6.095)* (4.029) (5.156) (3.726) 
0.931 0.489 -0.752 -0.685 -0.457 -0.531 Inverse Mills Ratio 
(1.170) (1.153) (1.621) (1.635) (0.975) (0.985) 
-0.976 1.249 -1.047 -1.160 -0.229 0.140 Herfindahl Index of public school 
competitiveness in municipality (0.857) (1.080) (0.994) (1.198) (0.846) (1.132) 
26.256 22.419 33.314 32.637 28.883 28.095 Constant 
(4.661)*** (4.884)*** (4.657)*** (4.932)*** (4.217)*** (4.439)*** 
Observations 20587 20585 20768 20766 21252 21250 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15 
 
* see note Table 4.3. 
 
All the specifications reported above include a large number of control variables at the 
individual level, the school level and the municipal level. In the present context, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index that is used to measure competition between public schools 
within municipalities warrant some comments. This index is calculated as the sum of each 
public school’s squared market share (share of total number of students in public schools in 
the municipality). An index of 1 means that all students attend the same public school and that 
there are no competition between public schools in the municipality, while an index of 0.5 
means that the students in public schools are equally distributed into two competing public 
schools. The closer the index is to zero the stronger is the public school dispersion in the 
                                                 
10 However, these findings are consistent with a small number of empirical analyses showing that schools matter 
more for boys than for girls. 
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municipality. This is potentially an important control variable because the private school 
market share is significantly larger in municipalities associated with low public school 
concentration (see table 4.1). Hoxby (2000) and Hanushek and Rivkin (2003) find in their 
studies that more competition among public schools (less market concentration) is associated 
with higher educational outcomes and higher teacher quality. Omitting the measure of public 
school competition from the estimated equations might thus generate an upward bias in the 
estimated competition effects from private schools. 
We are not able to report any clear evidence of how the potential competition between public 
schools affects public schools performance. The estimated effects are close to zero and 
insignificant for all three subjects except for the sub sample of students with highly educated 
parents, where we find a significant and positive effect in reading and writing. In this case the 
estimated coefficient of competition between public schools is about one third of the private 
competition coefficient. We would expect that the competition between public schools is 
weaker than between public and private schools due to institutional differences (neighborhood 
public schools). However, the value of this exercise is limited by the fact that public school 
concentration is likely to be endogenous to public school performance. We do not deal with 
this potential simultaneity problem in this paper. 
Table 4.7 
Competition effects for girls* 
Dependent variable: Test scores in 
Mathematics 
Test scores in 
English 
Test scores in 
Reading and writing 
Sample: Girls 
       
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       
3.104 4.974 -7.657 -5.725 -1.776 -2.163 The share of students in private schools 
(4.249) (3.916) (5.122) (3.842) (4.178) (3.098) 
-1.400 -1.617 -2.329 -2.101 -0.454 -0.362 Inverse Mills Ratio 
(1.096) (1.101) (1.493) (1.495) (0.825) (0.820) 
0.520 1.402 1.694 0.751 1.426 1.055 Herfindahl Index of public school competitiveness in 
municipality (0.852) (1.100) (0.967)* (1.154) (0.706)** (0.926) 
35.932 34.717 46.352 47.596 36.790 37.339 Constant 
(4.732)*** (4.854)*** (5.113)*** (5.312)*** (3.721)*** (3.786)*** 
Observations 19650 19649 20255 20254 20283 20282 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.15 
 
* see note Table 4.3. 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
The positive effects of competition from private schools, as reported above, depend on the 
chosen specifications. Two of our choices are of particular importance.  The first important 
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choice is to use the results from the national tests as our measure of student performance. As 
stated above, we also have access to the teachers’ grades and the students’ exam results. 
When the same models as presented in chapter 4 are estimated using the teachers’ grades as 
the measure on student achievement, our previous findings are confirmed to some extent only. 
The analyses indicate small and insignificant effects from private competition in all subjects 
when all students are included in the estimated equations. Estimating the equation for the 
same student subgroups as above, we find a positive and significant effect from private 
competition for boys in mathematics, but no significant effects for any of the other sub 
groups. The estimated competition effect for boys’ grades in math is only half the size of the 
effect found using national test results for the same boys. The difference in competition 
effects between the highlighted subgroups of students are not affected by the choice of 
outcome measures.  
We argue that the results based on the teachers’ grades are less credible. The evidence 
supporting this claim comes from equations where the teachers’ grades in math are regressed 
against the students’ exam results in math (using the sub sample of students that have taken 
the math exam) while including all the independent variables from the education production 
function equation. The estimation is reported in table 5.1 and provides weak evidence that the 
teachers’ grading practices are more lenient in municipalities with a large share of students in 
private schools. On the other hand, the grading practices are significantly more restrictive in 
municipalities characterized by a large share of highly educated inhabitants and where the 
share of certified teachers is large. Thus, this exercise provides clear evidence that the 
teachers’ grading practices reflect environmental characteristics in systematic ways, making 
the grades less credible measures of student performance. 
Our second important choice is to exclude the share of the municipal population with higher 
education from the estimated equations. To see the implications, we have estimated our model 
using the endogenous share of municipal population with higher education both in the first 
stage regressions and in the education production functions. These regressions; which are 
reported in table 5.2 below for mathematics, show that the estimated competition effects are 
sensitive to the inclusion of this variable11. We see that the share of highly educated people 
constitutes a positive and highly significant effect in mathematics and reading and writing. 
Due to the strong correlation with the private market share, the estimated private competition 
                                                 
11 Estimation results for English and reading and writing are presented in the Appendix in tables A5 and A6 
respectively. 
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effects weaken substantially. The share of highly educated people does not have any 
noticeable effect on student achievement in English, and consequently we only observe small 
changes in the private competition effects for this subject. The inclusion of the share of the 
municipal population with higher education does not affect the difference in responses from 
students with highly educated parents and students with less educated parents. The latter 
findings are not reported in the tables. 
Table 5.1 
Testing for Grade Inflation from competition in mathematics* 
Dependent variable: Assessment grades in Mathematics 
   
 OLS OLS 
   
External examination score in Mathematics 0.840 0.809 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
 9.032 The share of students in private schools 
 (4.139)** 
 1.271 Inverse Mills Ratio 
 (1.315) 
 -1.628 Herfindahl Index of public school competitiveness in 
municipality  (0.861)* 
 -0.004 Number of teacher hours per student at the school 
 (0.006) 
 -0.494 Share of students receiving extra Norwegian tuition at 
the school  (0.237)** 
 1.141 Share of students receiving special training 
(disadvantaged students)  (2.759) 
 -0.106 School size (in 100) 
 (0.145) 
 -6.173 The share of teacher with certified education 
 (2.772)** 
 -4.185 The share of population with higher education 
 (2.364)* 
 -0.866 The share of employees between 20 and 54 
municipality  (3.930) 
 2.972 The share of immigrants in municipality 
 (5.181) 
 -0.001 Population size (in 1000) 
 (0.002) 
 0.051 The school cost per student in municipality 
 (0.019)*** 
 0.015 Municipal Revenue 
 (0.019) 
8.024 11.322 Constant 
(0.279)*** (4.259)*** 
Observations 19751 18444 
R-squared 0.71 0.72 
 
* see note Table 4.3 
An important question is how the strong relationship between public school students’ 
performance and the share of highly educated people in the municipality should be 
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interpreted. Above we have argued that the strong correlation between public school student 
performance and the municipal educational level might reflect that people with a strong 
engagement for schooling have sorted themselves into certain municipalities, and moreover 
that a high level of educated people is attractive for people that are generally concerned about 
schooling. In the analyses reported above, steps are taken to deal with this problem. 
There are other interpretations to consider. It is well documented that parental education is 
one of the most important determinants of student achievement, but we claim that it is 
unlikely that the educational level in the municipality has a strong direct effect on student 
achievement after controlling for parental education at the individual level. If there is a peer-
group effect present, it should be more precisely captured at the school, or class level. 
Table 5.2 
Robustness checks using the endogenous share of population with higher education* 
Dependent variable: Test scores in Mathematics 
Sample: All students Students with highly educated parents 
Students with low educated 
parents 
       
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       
-3.680 -1.251 -5.446 2.787 -3.720 -5.074 The share of students in 
private schools (3.576) (3.858) (5.062) (5.518) (3.830) (4.142) 
-0.508 -0.464 0.601 0.408 0.674 0.912 Inverse Mills Ratio 
(0.923) (0.935) (1.405) (1.418) (1.318) (1.342) 
0.210 0.026 -0.456 0.125 0.600 -0.227 Herfindahl Index of public 
school competitiveness in 
municipality (0.696) (0.940) (0.950) (1.323) (0.778) (1.040) 
10.690 10.740 14.316 12.867 12.292 13.615 The share of population with 
higher education (2.055)*** (2.403)*** (2.594)*** (3.158)*** (2.409)*** (2.719)*** 
20.780 20.733 28.624 30.161 21.885 20.600 Herfindahl Index of 
educational level in 
municipality (6.715)*** (6.922)*** (9.116)*** (9.433)*** (7.821)*** (7.969)*** 
0.556 0.038 1.923 3.771 -0.496 -3.229 The share of employees 
between 20 and 54 
municipality (2.886) (3.606) (4.068) (5.041) (3.139) (3.911) 
6.915 6.772 11.230 10.491 3.669 3.949 The share of immigrants in 
municipality (4.605) (4.596) (5.983)* (5.949)* (4.929) (4.934) 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 Population size (in 1000) 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.037 0.035 0.036 0.029 0.043 0.042 The school cost per student in 
municipality (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.022)* (0.022) (0.017)** (0.017)** 
-0.021 -0.020 -0.033 -0.027 -0.025 -0.027 Municipal Revenue 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) 
32.842 32.952 34.501 33.223 37.371 38.746 Constant 
(3.792)*** (4.017)*** (5.163)*** (5.560)*** (4.122)*** (4.356)*** 
Observations 40237 40234 16868 16867 23369 23367 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 
 
* see note Table 4.3. 
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Unfortunately, our data does not allow for linking students to specific classrooms12, but we 
have tried out a specification of our model including the average educational level among 
parents at the school level13. Using this specification of the model does not change our main 
results and moreover, after controlling for individual background characteristics we find no 
effect on student achievement from the average parental educational level in schools. Other 
possible explanations for the large municipality effects we find in tables 5.2 and 5.3 might be 
that municipalities with highly educated population more easily attract competent teachers, or 
that the school owners might actively increase their effort as a response to educational 
oriented inhabitants who (beyond the demands from parents) communicate high expectation 
and demand more from the local schools in terms of quality and results. These interpretations 
raise potentially important questions both about teacher allocations across municipalities and 
voice mechanisms. Unfortunately, no data that can be used to shed light on these issues has 
been available for the present study. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
A heated policy discussion about the pros and cons of school competition takes place in many 
countries. The present study contributes to this discussion by investigating whether the 
performance of Norwegian public schools is affected by competition from “Norwegian type” 
private schools. A robust finding is that public school students with less educated parents do 
not realize any positive effects from this kind of school competition. For students with highly 
educated parents it is harder to pin down the exact effects. Specifications that include the 
share of population with higher education in the municipality show a positive, but small and 
insignificant, effect of competition for this student subgroup. Specifications that exclude the 
share of population with higher education show a positive, quite large, and highly significant 
effect of competition for this subgroup. We suspect that neither of these specifications 
provides a correct estimate of the competition effect, but instead, these estimations define the 
range for the competition effects. Importantly, and that is our most basic finding, the 
difference in competition effects across the two subgroups of students is very robust to 
alternative specifications. 
                                                 
12 It is off course possible for the schools that only have on class on each grade, but this represents only a 
fraction of the student population.  
13 This variable is measured as the average parental educational level for each individual’s peers at the school.  
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We argue that the heterogeneous competition effects across student subgroups should be 
interpreted together with the evidence that students with highly educated parents are much 
more likely to choose private schools than are students with less educated parents. Our 
findings might thus indicate that public school actors respond to competition by reallocating 
resources or attention from less attractive students who are likely to stay in public schools to 
attractive students who are more likely to leave public schools. It is realized that the “black 
box” approach to public schools makes this a speculative interpretation. One of the interesting 
issues left for further research is whether ability tracking is applied to a larger extent by public 
schools that are located in the most competitive environments. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Mathematics 
Share of students attending 
private schools in the 
municipality  
Number of students in the 
municipalities 
Mean test score 
No students 21 534 49.44 
Between zero and 2 % 3  410 49.48 
Between 2 % and 6 % 16 329 51.24 
Between 6 % and 10 % 1  996 49.92 
Above  10 %   525 49.70 
 
 
Table A2 
Reading and writing 
Share of students attending 
private schools in the 
municipality  
Number of students in the 
municipalities 
Mean test score 
No students 22 435 49.59 
Between zero and 2 % 3  427 49.76 
Between 2 % and 6 % 17 133 51.20 
Between 6 % and 10 % 1  930 50.20 
Above  10 %   442 49.74 
 
 
Table A3 
English 
Share of students attending 
private schools in the 
municipality  
Number of students in the 
municipalities 
Mean test score 
No students 21 753 49.69 
Between zero and 2 % 3  410 49.33 
Between 2 % and 6 % 17 077 50.86 
Between 6 % and 10 % 2  007 49.96 
Above  10 %   514 48.63 
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Table A4 
Competition effects in mathematics: full list of control variables* 
Dependent variable: Test scores in Mathematics 
Sample: All students Students with highly educated parents 
Students with low educated 
parents 
       
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       
0.654 8.586 1.137 16.014 0.721 5.679 The share of students in private schools 
(3.530) (3.340)** (4.883) (4.569)*** (3.949) (3.709) 
-0.294 -0.649 1.023 0.260 0.737 0.507 Inverse Mills Ratio 
(0.881) (0.883) (1.387) (1.362) (1.239) (1.219) 
-0.279 1.317 -1.352 1.907 0.328 1.308 Herfindahl Index of public school competitiveness in 
municipality (0.708) (0.901) (0.985) (1.288) (0.786) (0.992) 
-0.173 -0.176 -0.367 -0.377 -0.056 -0.056 Dummy for girls 
(0.109) (0.110) (0.162)** (0.162)** (0.131) (0.132) 
-3.170 -3.194 -4.924 -4.963 -2.871 -2.884 First generation immigrant with no Norwegian background 
(0.404)*** (0.403)*** (0.769)*** (0.768)*** (0.445)*** (0.445)*** 
-1.011 -0.993 -1.869 -1.841 -1.210 -1.189 Born in Norway by two foreign parents 
(0.394)** (0.396)** (0.671)*** (0.671)*** (0.456)*** (0.456)*** 
-1.497 -1.562 -1.372 -1.419 -2.219 -2.310 Born abroad with one Norwegian parent 
(0.718)** (0.715)** (0.983) (0.979) (1.174)* (1.168)** 
-0.884 -0.907 -1.223 -1.261 -0.418 -0.432 Born in Norway with one foreign parent 
(0.213)*** (0.212)*** (0.300)*** (0.299)*** (0.311) (0.310) 
-3.882 -3.872 -4.266 -4.259 -2.684 -2.675 Born abroad by two Norwegian parents 
(0.491)*** (0.491)*** (0.668)*** (0.667)*** (0.662)*** (0.662)*** 
5.822 5.796     Father's education is lower tertiary or higher (College or 
university) (0.218)*** (0.217)***     
2.081 2.071     Father's education is upper secondary 
(0.151)*** (0.151)***     
5.732 5.723     Mother's education is lower tertiary or higher (College or 
university) (0.205)*** (0.206)***     
2.379 2.378     Mother's education is upper secondary 
(0.165)*** (0.165)***     
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.033 0.033 Father's income (in 10 000 NOK) 
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
0.037 0.037 0.056 0.056 0.057 0.057 Mother's income (in 10 000 NOK) 
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
2.885 2.882 3.356 3.342 2.781 2.782 Living in nuclear family 
(0.103)*** (0.103)*** (0.186)*** (0.185)*** (0.130)*** (0.130)*** 
0.532 0.527 0.663 0.652 0.483 0.481 Birth order 
(0.076)*** (0.076)*** (0.116)*** (0.116)*** (0.099)*** (0.099)*** 
-0.081 -0.074 0.097 0.109 -0.101 -0.096 Number of siblings 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.117) (0.117) (0.094) (0.094) 
0.570 0.558 0.257 0.219 0.419 0.415 Mother works in private sector 
(0.100)*** (0.100)*** (0.166) (0.166) (0.129)*** (0.129)*** 
0.229 0.224 -0.418 -0.436 0.055 0.058 Father works in private sector 
(0.125)* (0.124)* (0.171)** (0.170)** (0.147) (0.147) 
0.004 0.005 0.011 0.012 -0.002 -0.001 Number of teacher hours per student at the school 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
-0.257 -0.121 -1.231 -0.888 -0.012 0.062 Share of students receiving extra Norwegian tuition at the 
school (1.065) (1.083) (1.806) (1.809) (0.933) (0.945) 
-4.157 -4.283 -2.459 -2.863 -5.685 -5.743 Share of students receiving special training (disadvantaged 
students) (2.782) (2.763) (3.577) (3.538) (3.047)* (3.025)* 
-0.019 -0.052 0.137 0.067 -0.032 -0.053 School size (in 100) 
(0.089) (0.089) (0.123) (0.121) (0.097) (0.098) 
2.973 2.361 7.975 6.757 2.126 1.711 The share of teacher with certified education 
(2.571) (2.572) (3.849)** (3.735)* (2.679) (2.697) 
-0.241 -0.290 -0.343 -0.360 -0.097 -0.147 Dummy indicating whether municipality has a University 
or a University College (0.245) (0.243) (0.318) (0.307) (0.269) (0.270) 
2.463 9.442 0.164 14.883 3.460 7.769 Herfindahl Index of educational level in municipality 
(6.044) (6.555) (9.056) (9.449) (6.782) (7.407) 
4.274 8.364 8.030 15.148 3.094 5.964 The share of employees between 20 and 54 municipality 
(2.819) (3.159)*** (3.989)** (4.296)*** (3.108) (3.534)* 
7.044 5.806 10.335 8.314 4.451 3.651 The share of immigrants in municipality 
(4.643) (4.606) (6.106)* (5.984) (4.993) (4.981) 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 Population size (in 1000) 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.023 0.024 0.012 0.011 0.031 0.032 The school cost per student in municipality 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.022) (0.017)* (0.017)* 
0.013 0.010 0.026 0.017 0.004 0.004 Municipal Revenue 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) 
30.945 28.446 30.844 26.814 36.368 34.493 Constant 
(3.976)*** (4.095)*** (5.578)*** (5.596)*** (4.246)*** (4.428)*** 
Observations 40237 40234 16868 16867 23369 23367 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 
  
* see note Table 4.3. 
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Table A5 
Robustness checks using the endogenous share of population with higher education* 
Dependent variable: Test scores in Reading and Writing 
Sample: All students Students with highly educated parents 
Students with low educated 
parents 
       
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       
-5.318 -8.444 -5.630 -4.939 -6.850 -12.304 The share of students in 
private schools (3.968) (3.234)*** (4.001) (3.735) (4.795) (3.979)*** 
-0.734 -0.363 0.659 0.834 0.255 0.831 Inverse Mills Ratio 
(0.826) (0.821) (0.947) (0.952) (1.144) (1.132) 
0.975 -0.430 1.560 0.730 0.558 -1.447 Herfindahl Index of public 
school competitiveness in 
municipality (0.613) (0.853) (0.714)** (0.954) (0.755) (1.065) 
7.122 9.286 11.137 12.149 8.758 11.977 The share of population with 
higher education (1.709)*** (1.988)*** (1.960)*** (2.338)*** (2.279)*** (2.543)*** 
2.595 -0.135 12.442 11.221 6.901 2.778 Herfindahl Index of 
educational level in 
municipality (6.442) (6.446) (7.755) (7.795) (7.697) (7.704) 
5.968 1.205 3.509 0.778 5.979 -0.922 The share of employees 
between 20 and 54 
municipality (2.733)** (3.325) (3.301) (3.809) (3.145)* (4.042) 
6.363 6.815 7.439 7.552 7.094 7.809 The share of immigrants in 
municipality (3.576)* (3.594)* (3.945)* (3.965)* (4.558) (4.586)* 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 Population size (in 1000) 
(0.001)* (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.051 0.051 0.037 0.035 0.062 0.062 The school cost per student in 
municipality (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.018)** (0.018)* (0.018)*** (0.018)*** 
-0.025 -0.028 -0.046 -0.045 -0.020 -0.024 Municipal Revenue 
(0.014)* (0.014)** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017) (0.017) 
32.044 34.514 39.017 40.302 32.994 36.600 Constant 
(3.249)*** (3.384)*** (3.889)*** (4.064)*** (3.908)*** (4.095)*** 
Observations 41535 41532 17280 17279 24255 24253 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 
* see note Table 4.3. 
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Table A6 
Robustness checks using the endogenous share of population with higher education* 
Dependent variable: Test scores in English 
Sample: All students Students with highly educated parents 
Students with low educated 
parents 
       
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       
-8.573 -2.652 -11.877 -3.091 -8.697 -4.506 The share of students in 
private schools (5.231) (3.882) (6.016)** (5.271) (5.503) (4.050) 
-1.372 -1.317 -0.499 -0.522 -0.284 -0.077 Inverse Mills Ratio 
(1.440) (1.457) (1.628) (1.648) (1.500) (1.507) 
0.377 -0.005 0.877 0.451 -0.081 -0.770 Herfindahl Index of public 
school competitiveness in 
municipality (0.817) (1.017) (1.185) (1.429) (0.822) (1.067) 
-1.311 -1.256 0.993 0.804 1.394 2.079 The share of population with 
higher education (2.583) (2.837) (3.089) (3.480) (2.751) (3.007) 
-6.665 -6.618 -2.205 -1.919 0.412 -0.198 Herfindahl Index of 
educational level in 
municipality (8.044) (8.232) (10.633) (11.032) (8.585) (8.715) 
5.238 4.219 5.298 3.890 4.072 2.113 The share of employees 
between 20 and 54 
municipality (3.164)* (3.874) (3.892) (4.908) (3.448) (4.161) 
10.986 10.629 14.632 14.056 10.953 10.775 The share of immigrants in 
municipality (4.825)** (4.758)** (6.096)** (6.008)** (5.160)** (5.093)** 
0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 Population size (in 1000) 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.058 0.053 0.055 0.045 0.065 0.062 The school cost per student in 
municipality (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.025)** (0.024)* (0.018)*** (0.018)*** 
-0.044 -0.041 -0.069 -0.061 -0.037 -0.035 Municipal Revenue 
(0.020)** (0.020)** (0.027)** (0.027)** (0.019)* (0.019)* 
37.085 37.240 45.276 45.618 36.598 37.244 Constant 
(4.085)*** (4.329)*** (5.382)*** (5.759)*** (4.260)*** (4.490)*** 
Observations 41023 41020 17252 17251 23771 23769 
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 
 
* see note Table 4.3. 
 
108
 Chapter 5 
Gender Gaps in Student Achievement: Evaluation Schemes and 
Teacher Characteristics  
109
 110
Gender Gaps in Student Achievement: Evaluation 
Schemes and Teacher Characteristics 
Linn Renée Naper* 
 
Abstract 
This paper compares student achievement measures from three different evaluation schemes in 
Norway. First, using difference-in-difference estimation, the analysis reveals substantial gender biases 
in teacher assessment. Conditional on individual test scores from anonymously evaluated central 
exams, girls receive significantly higher marks than boys when assessed by the teacher. The bias is 
present in both mathematics and languages (Norwegian and English). Exploiting intertemporal 
variation within schools, teachers are found to assess same-sex students less favourably than opposite-
sex students in Norwegian language classes. Hence, the observed gender bias seems to be related to 
teacher grading practices. Second, comparing individual student performance from a high-stake 
central exam and a low-stake national test, girls are found to perform significantly better when stakes 
are high. Girls’ relative ability to perform when exposed to a high-stake one-day test is therefore not a 
likely explanation for the observed gender bias in teacher assessment. 
Keywords: evaluation schemes, teacher assessment, student-teacher gender interactions 
JEL-classifications: I21 
 
1. Introduction 
Student achievement in terms of marks and test scores is frequently used to measure 
educational production and performance, and individual achievement levels on different tests 
are important in applications for higher education as well as for future job prospects. It is 
therefore important for the authorities in charge of public education systems to ensure that 
student achievement is evaluated and measured as objectively and correctly as possible. For 
enrolment in non-compulsory education, colleges in the US mainly rely on the SAT 
undertaken after finishing high school, while many European countries rely on marks set by 
teachers and based on assessment during the school year1.  
                                                 
* Helpful comments from Torberg Falch and Lars-Erik Borge are gratefully acknowledged. 
1 http://www.eurydice.org/portal/page/portal/Eurydice/Overview/OverviewByCountry 
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In addition, several countries have a high-stake central exam where each student has to 
participate2. The present paper compares the outcomes from different testing and evaluation 
schemes using information from Norwegian lower secondary schools. Motivated by the 
general concern about gender discrimination and the observed gender gap in international 
students’ assessment surveys, such as PISA and PIRLS (e.g. OECD, 2004 and IEA, 2004), I 
focus on estimating gender bias effects in teacher assessment. Moreover, exploiting individual 
student achievement levels from three different evaluation schemes and information about 
teachers, I investigate how the estimated gender biases in teacher assessment are related to 
student behaviour and potential gender interactions among students and teachers. 
Student evaluation schemes generally differ along three dimensions. First, evaluation may be 
anonymous or non-anonymous. Second, evaluation may be based on student performance on 
a single day or over a longer period. Third, evaluation may have important implications for 
individual students’ prospects for admission to higher education (high-stake), or it may just 
serve as an instrument for comparison of schools with no implications for the individuals (low 
-stake) 3 . Empirical evidence on the heterogeneity across different types of evaluation 
schemes is important to consider how well the different testing schemes measure educational 
performance. Existing evidence suggests that different methods of assessment are not gender 
neutral (Powney, 1996), and that a higher weighting of course work elements improves the 
relative performance of girls (Stobart et al., 1992). According to Borghans et al. (2006), 
individual effort and achievement may also depend on the reward related to the result. In this 
respect, there is a concern related to the reliability of low-stake tests. Results from various 
surveys (like PISA, PIRLS, and TIMMS) are widely used in the economics of education 
literature, and the empirical evidence indicates that such tests do not measure the same as, for 
example, central high-stake exit exams. Several papers emphasize that girls tend to 
outperform boys when it comes to cognitive tests and evaluations, and according to 
Micklewright and Schnepf (2004), there is a systematic gender achievement gap in favour of 
girls on international student assessment surveys. Educational research also shows that female 
students outperform male students (see Ding et al., 2007 for a contribution from the US). A 
Swedish contribution (Emanuelsson and Fischbein, 1986) shows that girls, given the 
                                                 
2 Several papers, including Bishop (1998), Wößmann (2003) who examines international data sets and Jürges et 
al. (2005) who study variation within Germany, find that the central exit examination is positively related to 
students’ performance. 
3 Test results may also involve economic incentives for the schools and school owners, giving the teachers and 
schools an incentive to raise student performance levels. Some papers have evaluated the reliability of tests used 
in accountability systems. See, for example, Jacob, (2007), Jacob and Levitt (2003) and Kane and Staiger (2002). 
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achievement level in test scores, receive comparatively higher marks than boys when assessed 
by the teacher. 
The observed gender gap is often explained by pointing to the general increase in the female 
teacher share. Based on data from the US and England, Ammermueller and Dolton (2006) and 
Dee (2005a, 2005b), among others, present evidence that students profit from having a same-
sex teacher. Lindahl (2007) reports positive same-sex teacher effects for Swedish lower 
secondary students on national test results, while Holmlund and Sund (2006) find no strong 
support for the hypothesis of a positive same-sex teacher effect in their analysis of teacher 
assessment in Swedish upper secondary schools. Steel (1997) discusses a phenomenon 
referred to as “stereotype threats” as an explanation of how demographic matches (for 
example, with respect to gender, race or ethnicity) between students and teachers may 
influence educational outcomes. The idea is that students’ academic self-confidence, and 
therefore their performance, is limited by possible and perceived stereotypes in the classroom. 
For example, female students with male teachers may be staged academically by the mere 
perceived possibility that male teachers may discriminate against them, although they may not 
necessarily do that. Another potential explanation, often referred to as “role-model” effects, is 
that the presence of a demographically similar teacher may raise students’ academic 
motivation and expectations, and thus positively affect performance. 
Both “stereotype threats” and “role-model” effects are so-called “passive teacher effects” and 
cannot be related to the behaviour of teachers. Moreover, “passive teacher effects” do not add 
to the understanding of systematic differences in performance across testing and evaluation 
schemes 4 . A concern in this respect is related to anonymous versus non-anonymous 
evaluation. The question is whether we can rely on the objectivity of teachers compared with 
an external examiner. With non-anonymous evaluation by the teacher, discrimination of 
certain student subgroups through “active teacher effects” is a possibility. The teacher’s 
expectations of the relative performance of students may be biased by general stereotype 
beliefs, and teacher assessment may unintentionally reflect the expectations of a student’s 
cognitive skills. Teachers may also more actively favour students who are most similar to 
themselves, something that would work in the same direction as a “role-model” effect. Also, 
teachers may respond to established perceptions of discrimination by compensating students 
                                                 
4 One might argue that a “stereotype threat” is stronger when assessed by the teacher than when taking an 
anonymous exam. However, given that the student is actually staged academically by the threat of being 
discriminated, it is not obvious that individual performance should increase on an anonymous test relative to 
day-to-day performance in class. 
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that are most likely (expected) to face discrimination by assessing them relatively highly5. 
This is a kind of “active teacher-effect” that potentially would work in the opposite direction 
to that of “stereotype threat” effects. 
Lavy (2004) tests for the existence of gender stereotyping and discrimination by public high-
school teachers in Israel, using student achievement from a blind and a non-blind test 
available in nine different subjects. Contrary to expectations, he finds that the gender bias is 
against male students, meaning that male students, and not female, face discrimination in each 
of the subjects tested. Moreover, in his paper, Lavy argues that the observed negative male 
“bias” in non-blind scores may result from students not being at the same intrinsic relative 
ability level when taking the two different tests. The blind test is taken later than the non-
blind test and on average, girls may prepare earlier than boys and, therefore, perform 
relatively better on the non-blind test. However, the empirical results presented by Lavy show 
that the discrimination against male students is related to male teachers, and that the gender 
bias is not likely to result from teachers adjusting the scores in response to individual student 
behaviour. Lavy concludes that the bias in test scores in favour of girls is the result of 
teachers’ and not students’ behaviour. A related study by Lindahl (2007) on Swedish lower 
secondary education finds conditional on test scores that same-gender teachers are less 
generous than opposite-gender teachers when assessing students’ performance in 
mathematics, but not in languages (English and Swedish)6. 
The present paper exploits information about individual student achievement in mathematics, 
Norwegian and English from Norwegian lower secondary schools. In the last year of 
compulsory education, students are assessed by their teacher (teacher assessment) and they 
undertake a written central exam. Data are available for four subsequent years and reveal that, 
on average, girls outperform boys in all subjects, both regarding teacher assessment and 
central exam results. The marks from both evaluations schemes matter for upper secondary 
school admission prospects and are regarded as high-stake tests. However, the two 
achievement measures differ in the sense that teacher assessment is non-anonymous and is 
based on student performance during the whole school year, while the central exam is an 
anonymously evaluated one-day test taken at the end of the school year. 
                                                 
5 Male teachers may be more concerned about discrimination towards girls than female teachers, and therefore 
tend to give girls an upward adjustment in assessment to compensate for the likelihood of being discriminated. 
6 In a study by Lindahl (2007) the negative same-gender teacher effect found on teacher assessment offsets the 
reported positive same-gender effect on test scores. 
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First, I compare teacher assessment and central exam results across gender in a difference-in-
difference analysis. The focus is not whether girls obtain higher or lower marks than boys, but 
rather whether the difference between teacher assessment and exam result is significantly 
different across the genders. Thus, a gender bias is observed if teacher assessment is 
significantly different across gender, conditional on the observed exam results. The estimation 
results illustrate that in all three subjects, there are substantial gender biases in teacher 
assessment. The estimated effects are positive and significant, indicating that the bias in 
teacher assessment is in favour of girls. Thus, the difference between teacher assessment and 
exam results is significantly larger positive for girls than for boys. The estimated gender 
effect is smaller in Norwegian than in mathematics and English.  
The empirical results reveal that the two evaluation schemes produce different outcomes 
across gender. Still, we cannot a priori say whether the observed gender bias in teacher 
assessment is a result of differences in evaluation strategy (anonymous vs. non-anonymous) 
or testing strategy (one-day test vs. assessment over time). In the second part of the analysis, I 
therefore apply different strategies to approach this problem. First, if the gender bias is due to 
differences in evaluation strategies, we expect the bias to be correlated with characteristics of 
the teachers. By relating the estimated gender bias to information about the gender of the 
teachers, I can test the hypothesis of a student–teacher gender interaction effect. Although I 
cannot test explicitly whether gender bias effects are due to “active” or “passive” teacher 
effects, passive teacher effects are expected to exercise the same effect on student 
achievement regardless of evaluation strategy. Thus, a significant student–teacher gender 
interaction effect in this setup would indicate that teachers actively adjust teacher assessment 
grades depending on students’ gender. Grading policies may differ systematically between 
schools, and the estimated gender bias and interaction effects may therefore be biased if 
students and/or teachers are systematically sorted between schools. I approach this potential 
problem by including school fixed effects in the empirical analysis. Individual students cannot 
be linked to their classroom teacher and, with school fixed effects, the identification thus rests 
on intertemporal variation in teacher composition within schools. In accordance with the 
results in Lavy (2004) and Lindahl (2007), the empirical results indicate that the estimated 
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gender gap in Norwegian is related to the gender of the teacher and, moreover, that male 
teachers on average tend to assess girls more favourably than female teachers do7. 
Teacher assessment and central exam results are equally weighted in students’ grade point 
average, and differences in rewards are not a likely explanation for the observed gender bias. 
Nevertheless, although the estimated student–teacher gender interaction effect indicates that 
the gender bias is related to the evaluation strategy, at least in Norwegian, I cannot rule out 
that the estimated gender bias is also related to differences in testing strategies (evaluation 
over time vs. one-day testing). A potential hypothesis is that girls and boys handle high-stake, 
one-day tests (such as the central exam) differently, and that this is reflected by the observed 
gender bias in teacher assessment conditional on individual exam results. If girls handle one-
day, high-stake tests worse than boys due to nerves, for example, girls are likely to perform 
better on a one-day test when the stakes are low8. This could potentially explain why girls 
obtain relatively better results when assessed by the teacher, as the evaluation is then not 
based on performance on a single day. Exploiting individual student achievement from an 
anonymously evaluated national low-stake test, I can identify gender bias effects in high-stake 
exam results relative to results from the low-stake national test using the same difference-in-
difference strategy as earlier. Contrary to expectations, the empirical results show that girls 
perform significantly better on the high-stake central exam than they do on the low-stake 
national test. Thus, the estimation results do not support the hypothesis that the gender bias in 
teacher assessment may result from girls’ general ability to perform on high-stake tests. The 
findings indicate that the gender bias in teacher assessment is related to differences in 
evaluation strategies and moreover, provide support for the finding that male teachers assess 
female students more favourably than they assess male students. 
2. Institutional Setting 
Primary and secondary education in Norway is mainly publicly provided. The municipalities 
operate primary and lower secondary schools, and the counties run upper secondary schools. 
There is a legal right to 13 years of schooling. The first 10 years are compulsory (primary and 
lower secondary) and students are assigned schools according to a neighbourhood rule in the 
municipality they reside in. In 2005, 1164 local public schools in Norway provided education 
                                                 
7 More generally, the results can be interpreted as an opposite-sex teacher effect as in Lindahl (2007), meaning 
that teachers assess students of the same sex as themselves relatively tougher than students of the opposite sex. 
8 Gneezy et al. (2003) suggest that women can be less effective than men in competitive environments, even if 
they are able to perform equally well in non-competitive environments. There are however also contradictory 
evidences on this topic, see for instance Paserman (2007). 
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at the lower secondary level, 662 schools were mixed schools with students at all levels (1st to 
10th grade) while the remaining 502 schools only had students at the 8th to 10th level.  
At the lower secondary level (8th to 10th grade), students are evaluated both non-anonymously 
by their teachers (marks given in all curricula-based subjects) and anonymously in central 
exams. Teacher assessment is based on class work throughout the school year. Central exams 
take place at the end of the final year (10th grade). Teacher assessment and central exam 
results are equally important for students’ final grade point average at the end of compulsory 
school, and thus for prospects of admission to upper secondary school. Since the same reward 
is related to the result, both teacher assessment and central exam results are regarded as high-
stake tests. In addition to these two high-stake achievement measures, during spring 2004 a 
third student evaluation scheme was introduced in form of a national test taken during the last 
semester of the 10th year. These tests are introduced as instruments to evaluate and monitor 
schools and provide feedback to teachers, students and school owners throughout the school 
year9. An external evaluation group anonymously evaluates the national tests, but the results 
are not included in students’ final grade point average and have no consequences for entrance 
to upper secondary schools. The national tests are therefore regarded as low-stake tests. 
According to the Educational Act of 199210, the main purpose of evaluation and grading 
during the school year is to encourage students’ learning and progress. About 20 per cent of 
the students are examined in Norwegian and roughly 40 per cent are examined in mathematics 
and English11. In addition to the written exam, students may also take an oral exam. Class 
work and external exams are evaluated using a scale from 1 to 6, where 6 is best. At the end 
of the 10th year, all students receive a compulsory school diploma with teacher assessment in 
all subjects and the written and oral exam results. Students apply for an additional three years 
of upper secondary education based on their final grade point average. 
The Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training prepares the written central exams12, 
while local authorities are responsible for the assignment of examination subjects to schools 
and individual students. The teachers or schools have no influence in this respect. The 
students’ responses are corrected and evaluated by two external examiners according to 
                                                 
9 The national tests have only been completed twice (spring 2004 and 2005) and after change of government in 
2005, the decision was made to revaluate and go through the testing system. 
10 See http://www.lovdata.no/ for the Educational Act and instructions.  
11 Students may be exempted from the external exam because of illness on examination day, disabilities, etc. The 
written exam absence rate is close to 4 per cent each year. 
12 Utdanningsdirektoratet. 
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guidelines provided by the Directorate. Teacher assessment is the responsibility of individual 
teachers, but the law also provides clear guidelines concerning this process. Teacher 
assessment is based on students’ effort and achievement throughout the school year, and 
should express the students’ competence and skills relative to the expected level of the given 
grade. The students’ initial level of skills and qualifications should not influence or be 
reflected in the given marks. In subjects where students also undertake a central exam, teacher 
assessment should be given at least one day before the notification of examination results. 
Thus, teachers always assess their students independently of the exam results. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Information on students and teachers in lower secondary schools is provided by Statistics 
Norway. Information on individual student achievement from teacher assessment, central 
exams and national tests13 from the school years 2001/2002 to 2004/2005 is merged with 
extensive information on individual student background, such as gender and immigration 
status and parents’ income, marital status and education14 . Information about individual 
teachers includes teachers’ gender, teaching experience, marital status and number of 
children. The teacher information is aggregated at the school level using individual work-time 
percentages, and merged with student level data using a school code.  
I focus on within-student variation in achievement depending on evaluation scheme. The 
estimation sample only includes students with both teacher assessment and central exam 
result in a given subject. The data do not indicate whether teachers work in primary or lower 
secondary levels and, to avoid linking primary school teachers to students at lower secondary 
levels, I restrict the analysis to pure lower secondary schools (only 8th to 10th grade). By 
reducing the estimation sample to pure lower secondary schools, I include roughly 76 per cent 
of the total student population. Including only students registered with both teacher 
assessment and central exam result in each subject, the final estimation samples for marks 
over the observed four years is 55 517 student observations in mathematics, 52 113 in English 
and 31,415 in Norwegian. The estimation samples for national tests, where only one year of 
data is included, have 10,117 observations in mathematics, 12 103 in English and 6 493 in 
Norwegian.  
                                                 
13 Note that national test results are only available for students in 2003/2004.  
14 For the two first years there is also information on age (date of birth), number of siblings and birth order, 
parents’ labour market status and sector. Including these covariates does not change the empirical outcomes of 
the analysis in section 5, but in order to exploit the year-to-year variation, I only use individual characteristics 
available in all four years. 
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Figure 1a–d 
Student achievement in Norway: distributions by gender and evaluation type 
 
Figures 1a-1d illustrate the gender distributions of teacher assessment and central exam 
results in Norwegian. The distribution of exam results in 1a is close to normal and with an 
overweight of girls in the upper part. Comparing 1a with 1b, we clearly see that the 
distribution of teacher assessment is somewhat skewed to the right and with more girls in the 
upper part. In 1c and 1d, I present the distribution of individual teacher assessment and exam 
results for girls and boys, respectively. Fifty to sixty per cent of the students are assessed 
equally by their teachers and in the central exam. However, the share of students with poorer 
exam results than their teacher assessment is higher for girls than for boys. This pattern is 
similar for English and mathematics. 
Table 1a compares mean teacher assessment and central exam results across genders for 
mathematics, English and Norwegian. For each subject the table report mean achievement 
level and the test-statistic from a mean comparison test across gender and evaluation schemes. 
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The average achievement is higher for girls than for boys in all cases and all test statistics 
presented in the last column of the table are clearly significant at conventional levels.  
Table 1a 
Mean comparison tests by gender: national test scores and exam results 
Subject Mathematics English Norwegian 
          
 Test 
score 
Exam 
result 
t-value* Test 
score 
Exam 
result 
t- 
value 
Test 
score 
Exam 
result 
t- 
value 
All           
Mean (St 
dev) 
3.28 
(1.11) 
3.28 
(1.11) 0.00 
3.66 
(0.97) 
3.66 
(0.97) 0.00 
3.69 
(0.97) 
3.69 
(0.97) 0.00 
Girls           
Mean (St 
dev) 
3.23 
(1.08) 
3.29 
(1.09) –2.46 
3.83 
(0.99) 
3.81 
(1.00) 0.84 
3.85 
(0.98) 
4.02 
(0.89) –7.51 
Boys          
Mean (St 
dev) 
3.32 
(1.14) 
3.27 
(1.13) 2.30 
3.49 
(1.08) 
3.50 
(1.07) 0.77 
3.54 
(1.02) 
3.38 
(0.94) 6.69 
t-value –3.96 0.79  18.01 16.37  12.82 27.84  
          
 
The gender gaps are largest in Norwegian and smallest in mathematics. The presented t-
values also indicate that the gender gaps are larger for teacher assessment than for central 
exam results. The t-values reported in rows (for mathematics 33.42 overall, and 26.58 and 
20.92 for girls and boys, respectively) show that average student achievement is significantly 
higher when students are assessed by their teacher than on external exams. Note also that the 
achievement gap for girls is quantitatively larger than for boys (0.25 vs. 0.20 in mathematics). 
Table 1b 
Mean comparison tests by gender: marks and exam results 
Subject Mathematics English Norwegian 
          
 Mark Exam result 
t-value* Mark Exam result 
t- 
value Mark 
Exam 
result 
t- 
value 
All          
Mean (St 
dev) 
3.45 
(1.14) 
3.22 
(1.15) 33.42 
3.74 
(1.07) 
3.57 
(1.08) 24.99 
3.82 
(0.98) 
3.62 
(0.98) 25.08 
Girls          
Mean (St 
dev) 
3.51 
(1.12) 
3.26 
(1.13) 26.58 
3.96 
(1.01) 
3.76 
(1.02) 22.19 
4.13 
(0.89) 
3.92 
(0.92) 19.89 
Boys          
Mean (St 
dev) 
3.39 
(1.15) 
3.19 
(1.16) 20.92 
3.52 
(1.08) 
3.39 
(1.09) 14.15 
3.52 
(0.96) 
3.34 
(0.96) 17.41 
t-value 12.44 6.70  48.39 40.90  57.43 55.09  
          
 
Table 1b compares mean national test scores and central exam results for students in the 
school year 2003–2004 and presents the same mean comparison tests as in Table 1a. Because 
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national tests are evaluated using a different grading scale than for teacher assessment and 
exams, I impose the same distribution (mean and standard deviation) on the national tests as 
the exam results. The test statistic from comparing test scores and exam results for all students 
is thus zero. The results from comparing means across gender reveal that girls perform 
relatively better on high-stake central exams while boys perform relatively better on the low-
stake national test15. These differences are significant in mathematics and Norwegian. In 
English, there are no clear differences. Girls outperform boys on the national test in 
Norwegian and English, while boys do slightly better on the national test in mathematics. 
Note also that for this sample of students, there is no significant gender gap in exam results 
for mathematics. 
Table 2 
Teacher characteristics: aggregated at school level 
Teacher characteristic Mean (St dev) 
  
Share of female teachers 0.54 (0.11) 
  
Mean experience of teachers (years) 19.96 (3.50) 
  
Share of teachers with no children 0.18 (0.11) 
  
Share of married teachers 0.64 (0.12) 
  
 
In Table 2, I report the available school level characteristics of teachers. There are slightly 
more female than male teachers employed at the schools16. The mean experience level for 
lower secondary teachers is about 20 years, 64 per cent are married and 18 per cent have no 
children. 
                                                 
15 As the national test scores originally are assessed using another scale than the central exams, it is important to 
emphasize that figures concerning these tests only are interpreted in terms of relative performance and not in 
terms of test score levels. 
16 For mixed schools, the shares are 65 per cent female and 35 per cent male teachers; thus, the male teacher 
share is considerably lower at the primary levels (1st to 7th grade). 
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4. Econometric Specification 
4.1 Estimating the gender bias in teacher assessment 
With access to two different achievement measures for each student, I can estimate the 
difference between teacher assessment and exam results across genders using the following 
linear estimation model17: 
(1) ( )+ xeijt ijt eijt eijt ijt t eijtA G E E gα λ δ γ μ σ= + + + +  
In equation (1) individual achievement eijtA  (e=1: teacher assessment, e=0: central exam 
results) of student i in school j at time t is assumed to be a function of student gender G and 
the type of evaluation E. Evaluation is non-anonymous (E=1) for teacher assessment and 
anonymous (E=0) for central exam results. Each student is observed at one point in time, at 
the end of 10th grade, and fixed years effects tμ  are included to control for the year the 
individual and the school is observed18. The parameter eijtσ  is an assumed white noise error 
term. The model is estimated separately for each subject. 
Using a difference-in-difference strategy as in equation (1), all individual and school fixed 
effects are implicitly assumed away with regard to the parameter γ , as long as these effects 
are homogenous across evaluation schemes (Lavy, 2004). The difference-in-difference 
parameter γ  identifies the mean gender difference in achievement gaps19. A positive and 
significant γ  would indicate that girls, conditional on the individual exam results, receive 
higher marks from their teachers than boys. The parameters λ  and δ  identify the gender 
difference in teacher assessment and the achievement gap for boys, respectively20. With 
reference to the methodology on difference-in-difference estimation, consistency of the 
difference-in-difference parameter occurs if assignment to the treatment is random. In this 
case, this means that the gender bias γ  is consistently estimated as long as girls are not 
systematically sorted into schools where teachers evaluate girls more generously. In other 
                                                 
17 As the grading scale is ordinal ranging from 1 to 6, an ordered multinomial model would be appropriate. 
However, the average gender difference of interest is more easily obtained from a linear model, and for 
simplicity linear estimates are presented. 
18 School policies, organization, the appointed principal, teachers’ grading practice, etc. is likely to affect student 
achievement, and may also affect final grades and examination results differently. With fixed year effects, we do 
not have to bother about changes in such factors over time. 
19  Estimating γ  from (1) is algebraically the same as estimating it from the following equation: 
1, 0 ,
+
e ijt e ijt ijt ijt ijt
A A A Gδ γ σ= =− = Δ = + Δ  
20 The achievement gap for girls is thus defined as +δ γ . 
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words, consistency of γ  is ensured if the assignment of girls to schools is not systematically 
related to teacher grading practice, and not systematically different from sorting of boys. 
If schools are not homogenous with respect to grading practice, the estimated gender bias in 
teacher assessment (the parameter γ ) is likely to be biased. Schools with a high share of 
students from families with low socioeconomic status and subsequent ‘poor reputation’ may, 
for example, systematically exercise a more generous grading practice than other schools. 
Also, schools with a poor reputation may on average attract less qualified teachers. In the 
empirical analysis in section 5, the model is therefore extended with school fixed effects. 
School fixed effects as a control for variation in teacher grading practices and quality across 
schools is particularly important if grading practice and teacher quality are correlated with the 
gender of the students. 
Individual student background characteristics are important determinants for student 
achievement (Hanushek, 2002; Hægeland et al., 2004). Existing literature also indicates that 
individual teacher characteristics, such as experience levels and education, may exercise an 
important impact on student achievement levels (e.g., Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin et al., 2005; 
Clotfelter et al., 2007). If the effects of individual student and school/teacher characteristics 
are not homogenous across evaluation schemes, it is important to control for such factors to 
increase the precision of the estimates. Therefore, the model is also extended by including a 
large set of student and teacher characteristics. In particular, I control for parental education, 
income and marital status and students’ migration status 21 , and observable teacher 
characteristics as presented in Table 2. 
4.2 Explaining the gender bias in teacher assessment 
As discussed in the introduction, we cannot a priori say whether an observed gender bias in 
teacher assessment, for given exam results, is a result of differences in evaluation strategy 
(anonymous vs. non-anonymous) or testing strategy (one-day testing vs. assessment over 
time). Assuming that teachers do not influence students’ ability to handle one-day testing, I 
first attempt to distinguish between these potential explanations by investigating how the 
gender bias interacts with teacher characteristics. By relating the estimated gender bias to 
information about the gender of the teachers, I can test for potential student–teacher gender 
                                                 
21 Data also provide information on ethnic background (country of birth), number of siblings, birth order and 
birth month. However, this information is only available in two of four years. Excluding two years of data, and 
estimating the gender (social background) effects using this additional student level information, does not alter 
the empirical results in section 6.  
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interactions. Second, I test the hypothesis that the ability to perform on one-day, high-stake 
tests differs across genders by comparing individual student achievement from the high-stake 
central exams with performance on a one-day low-stake national test. 
In equation (2), the linear model is extended by introducing a variable F, representing the 
share of female teachers at the school. In order to estimate the interaction between the teacher 
female share and the gender bias effect, the share of female teachers should be included 
separately, interacted with the gender–evaluation interaction ( )eijt ijtE xG , with students’ 
gender ( )ijtG  and the type of evaluation ( )eijtE  as in equation (3) below. 
(2) 
( )
2 3 4 5
+ x
( ) ( ) ( )
eijt ijt eijt eijt ijt
jt jt eijt ijt jt eijt jt ijt eijt
A G E E G
F F x E xG F x E F xG
α λ δ γ
β β β β ε
= + + +
+ + + +  
Estimating equation (2) is algebraically the same as estimating equation (3), where I rewrite 
the model using the difference in individual achievement ijtAΔ  as dependent variable. 
(3) ( )1, 0, 4 3+e ijt e ijt ijt ijt jt jt ijt ijtA A A G F F xGδ γ β β ε= =− = Δ = + + + Δ  
The parameter 4β  provides information about mean female teacher grading practice, and a 
positive sign indicates that teacher assessment is higher the more female teachers at the school 
and vice versa. The parameter of interest 3β  indicates whether the estimated gender bias in 
achievement is related to the gender of the teachers. A positive sign here indicates that female 
teachers favour girls by raising girls’ marks relative to their exam results. The parameter δ  
represents boys’ mean achievement gap and γ  the gender difference in achievement gaps22. 
As for the identification of the gender bias in equation (1), it is also important here to control 
for potential sorting of teachers between schools and for other school-specific characteristics 
that are correlated with both student achievement and student gender. By including fixed 
school effects in equation (3), the identification of 3β  rests on the intertemporal variation in 
teacher composition within schools. Additional student and teacher characteristics are 
included to allow for these factors to affect the gap between teacher assessment and exam 
                                                 
22 The estimated γ  from equation (3) is equivalent with the gender bias effect estimated in equation (1), 
although not quantitatively identical as the female teacher share is included in the equation. 
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results23. Passive teacher effects, as described above, are expected to exercise the same effect 
on student achievement regardless of testing strategy, and therefore should have no effect on 
the difference in achievement for individual students. Hence, an estimated student–teacher 
interaction effect 3β  in this setup indicates that teachers actively adjust teacher assessment 
depending on students’ gender. 
Equation (4) investigates individual student performance on low-stake tests relative to high-
stake tests by replacing the dummy for evaluation strategy in equation (1) with a dummy 
variable S for “test-importance.” The dummy S takes the value of 1 for “low-stake tests” 
(national tests) and 0 for “high-stake tests” (central exam). 
(4) ( )+ xsijt ijt sijt lijt ijt sijtA G S S Gα λ δ γ ε= + + +  
The dependent variable sijtA  in equation (4) is student i’s achievement on the central exam 
(s=1) and national test (s=0) in school j at time t24. The parameter λ  represents the gender 
difference in central exam results and the parameter δ  is the difference between central 
exams and national tests for boys. The parameter γ  is the difference-in-difference parameter 
and reflects the estimated mean gender difference in relative achievement gaps. If girls handle 
high-stake one-day tests worse than boys because of nerves, for example, this parameter is 
expected to be negative. Equation (4) is also extended with fixed school effects and student 
and teacher characteristics, as described above. 
5. Empirical Results 
In this section, I present results from estimating variations of Equation (1), (3) and (4). Each 
equation is presented with and without fixed school effects and additional controls. In all 
tables, I only report the estimation results for gender, evaluation schemes and the gender-
evaluation scheme interactions, while the effects of the student and teacher control variables 
are reported in appendix Table A1.  
                                                 
23 The control variables are included similarly as in equation (1); however, included in equation (3) the estimated 
effects change interpretations as the dependent variable here is the deviation between teacher assessment and 
exam result. 
24 Student achievement on the national test is only observed in year 2003/2004; thus, year dummies are not 
included in this specification of the model. 
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5.1 Gender bias in teacher assessment 
Table 3 presents the results from estimating equation (1) separately for mathematics, English 
and Norwegian. In all three subjects, the estimated coefficient of the interaction between the 
dummy for girls and non-anonymous evaluation (teacher assessment) is positive and 
statistically significant. The effect is smaller in Norwegian than in mathematics and English. 
The positive effects are in line with the results in Lavy (2004) and indicate that, conditional 
on individual exam results, girls are on average rewarded significantly higher by their 
teachers than boys are. Except for a slight reduction in the effect in Norwegian, the qualitative 
results are not altered by including school fixed effects and additional student and teacher 
characteristics. Given that the effect of student and teacher characteristic on student 
achievement is homogenous across different evaluation schemes, this is as expected from the 
difference-in-difference specification of the regression model. 
Table 3 
The gender bias in teacher assessment  
 Mathematics English Norwegian 
 Eq. (1) Eq. (1) Eq. (1) 
       
0.065 0.059 0.373 0.375 0.583 0.600 Dummy for girls (5.72) (5.64) (32.36) (33.28) (44.11) (46.56) 
       
0.202 0.198 0.132 0.131 0.186 0.192 Dummy for teacher  
assessment (19.23) (18.67) (11.99) (11.74) (14.32) (14.48) 
       
0.055 0.058 0.064 0.066 0.020 0.016 Girl x (Teacher 
assessment)-interaction (8.65) (8.79) (8.91) (8.82) (2.21) (1.65) 
       
Student characteristics no yes no yes no yes 
Teacher characteristics no yes no yes no yes 
School fixed effects no yes no yes no yes 
       
Observations 111064 103113 108259 100551 62849 58222 
R-squared 0.01 0.16 0.04 0.15 0.10 0.22 
Note: Estimated coefficient with absolute t-value in parenthesis. The dependent variables are individual student 
achievement from teacher assessment and central exam. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and 
corrected for school level clustering. All regressions include a dummy for year of observation. Estimated effects 
of additional student and teacher control variables are reported in the appendix Table A1. 
In Table 3, we study the variation in the gap between teacher assessment and central exam 
results, and the size of the interaction effects should therefore be evaluated relatively to the 
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standard deviation of the achievement gap distribution25. The estimated effect in mathematics 
is 0.058 grade points and corresponds to roughly 9 per cent of a standard deviation in the 
grade difference in mathematics. In English the estimated effect corresponds to 9 per cent of a 
standard deviation in the grade difference, whereas the effect in Norwegian is quantitatively 
smaller and corresponds to roughly 2 per cent of a standard deviation in the grade difference 
between teacher assessment and exam results. 
Conditional on gender and the interaction between gender and the dummy for teacher 
assessment, the estimated effect of the dummy for teacher assessment in Table 3 is positive 
and highly significant in all subjects. Also, the dummy for girls is positive and significant in 
all specifications, confirming the pattern in the raw data reported in Table 1. Thus, teacher 
assessment is on average higher than central exam results, and girls generally outperform 
boys in all subjects. The effect of the dummy for girls is smaller for mathematics than for 
languages. 
5.2 Gender bias and student–teacher gender interaction 
The findings in Table 3 reflect a systematic difference in teacher assessment across genders. 
The next question is whether the gender biases are caused by differences in the evaluation 
strategies (anonymous vs. non-anonymous), by the differences in testing strategies (one-day 
testing vs. evaluation over time) or both. My first conjecture is that if the gender bias in 
teacher assessment is caused by the differences in evaluation strategies, it should be correlated 
with the characteristics of the teachers. Inspired by the literature on gender stereotypes and 
student–teacher gender interactions (e.g., Steel, 1997; Dee, 2005b; Ammermueller and 
Dolton, 2006), in this section I therefore investigate whether the observed gender bias in 
teacher assessment can be related to the gender distribution of teachers. A student–teacher 
gender interaction in this setup may be interpreted as a kind of teacher-initiated discrimination 
in assessment of students. As evaluation in languages to a larger extent allows for and 
involves subjective evaluation by the teacher, it may be argued that it is more reasonable to 
expect a form of assessment discrimination in languages than in mathematics. 
Table 4 reports the results from estimating equation (3). The dependent variable is the 
difference between individual teacher assessment and central exam results in each subject. 
                                                 
25 The achievement gap distribution is presented graphically in Figure 1. Mean achievement gap with standard 
errors in parenthesis in each subjects are: 0.228 (0.636) grade points in mathematics, 0.162 (0.712) in English 
and 0.195 (0.765) in Norwegian. 
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The model is extended similarly to the basic model in equation (1) by including fixed school 
effects and additional covariates. For each subject, the first column reports the estimated 
effects of the dummy variable for girls, the share of female teachers and the interaction 
between the two. In the second column, the estimated effects are conditioned on additional 
student and teacher characteristics, and school fixed effects. 
Table 4 
The student–teacher gender interaction effect 
 Mathematics English Norwegian 
 Eq. (3) Eq. (3) Eq. (3) 
       
0.058 0.061 0.024 0.039 0.109 0.117 Dummy for girls (1.57) (1.67) (0.65) (1.04) (2.06) (2.14) 
-0.132 0.063 -0.080 0.149 0.045 -0.710 The share of female teachers (1.32) (0.24) (0.81) (0.49) (0.36) (1.21) 
       
-0.005 -0.007 0.076 0.052 -0.163 -0.187 Girl x (Share female teachers) - 
interaction (0.08) (0.11) (1.13) (0.78) (1.72) (1.91) 
       
Student characteristics no yes no yes no yes 
Teacher characteristics no yes no yes no yes 
School fixed effects no yes no yes no yes 
       
Observations 55517 51545 54113 50264 31415 29104 
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Note: Estimated coefficients with absolute t-values in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the deviation in 
student achievement between teacher assessment and central exam. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust 
and corrected for school level clustering. All regressions include a dummy for year of observation. Estimated 
effects of additional student and teacher control variables are reported in the appendix Table A1. 
In all subjects, the estimated mean grading practice of female teachers is insignificant, which 
indicates that student performance levels on average are independent of the gender of the 
teacher. However, the estimated interaction effect between the share of female teachers and 
the dummy variable for girls is negative and statistically significant at the 10 per cent level in 
Norwegian. This result implies that the estimated gender gap in teacher assessment is related 
to the gender of the teacher, and that female teachers on average tend to assess girls more 
strictly than boys. More generally, teachers tend to assess same sex students more strictly than 
opposite sex students in Norwegian. In mathematics, the interaction effect is close to zero and 
statistically insignificant. In English, the qualitative effect is positive, but smaller in absolute 
terms compared with the effect in Norwegian, and not statistically significant.  
The estimated interaction effect in Norwegian has the following quantitative interpretation. 
Conditional on individual exam results, an increase in the share of female teachers at the 
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school from 0 to 1 affects the mean teacher assessment level for girls negatively with an 
additional 0.187 points compared with boys. This extra effect for girls corresponds to 
approximately 24 per cent of a standard deviation in the achievement gap distribution, which 
is a rather large effect. The total effect on teacher assessment of increasing the share of female 
teachers (from 0 to 1) is –0.897. Thus, a 10 per cent increase in the share of female teachers 
will reduce the average teacher assessment level for girls by 0.089 grade points. In a class 
with 30 students and 48 per cent girls, this corresponds to a reduction of approximately 1.3 
grade points. One point (1.0) corresponds to one mark on the grading scale. Hence, on 
average, increasing the share of female teachers at the schools would reduce the observed 
gender achievement gap in Norwegian. The result that girls are assessed relatively harder than 
boys when assessed by female teachers in Norwegian may also partly explain why we only 
find weak evidence in Table 3, where we estimate the average gender bias in Norwegian 
irrespective of the gender distribution of teachers. 
5.3 Gender bias and the ability to perform on high-stake tests 
The support for teacher discrimination in Table 4 indicates that the gender bias is related to 
the differences in evaluation (anonymous vs. non-anonymous), at least in Norwegian. 
However, the bias in teacher assessment may also be related to variation in students’ relative 
ability to perform on high-stake one-day tests (under pressure). A support for the hypothesis 
that girls perform relatively worse when stakes are high would indicate that the gender biases 
in teacher assessment also are related to differences in testing strategies. 
Table 5 reports the results from comparing individual exam results with the results on the 
low-stake national tests as described in equation (4). The effect of the dummy for the low-
stake national test is positive and statistically significant in mathematics and Norwegian, 
indicating that boys’ performance levels on average are better on the low-stake national test 
compared with the high-stake central exam. However, this is not the case for English, where 
performance levels are not significantly different. The difference-in-difference parameter in 
this specification is the effect of the interaction between the dummy for girls and the low-
stake national test. The estimated interaction effects are negative and statistically significant 
in mathematics and Norwegian, indicating that, conditional on central exam results, boys 
outperform girls on the low-stake national one-day tests. Thus, the hypothesis that girls 
perform relatively worse when stakes are high (such as the central exam) is not supported. 
Actually, the negative interaction effects also indicate that girls perform significantly better 
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when stakes are high. The results for English make the picture less clear as the interaction 
effect here is positive, indicating that girls perform better on the low-stake national test in this 
subject. However, this effect is quantitatively much smaller and only marginally significant 
when fixed effects and additional controls are included. 
Table 5 
The performance on high-stake vs. low-stake tests 
 Mathematics English Norwegian 
 Eq. (4) Eq. (4) Eq. (4) 
       
0.018 0.030 0.309 0.317 0.635 0.651 Dummy for girls (0.74) (1.33) (14.23) (14.85) (23.05) (23.72) 
0.052 0.048 -0.015 -0.015 0.162 0.180 Dummy for national test (2.23) (2.06) (0.58) (0.55) (5.90) (6.26) 
       
-0.105 -0.110 0.030 0.027 -0.330 -0.343 Girl x (national test score) –  
interaction (7.70) (7.84) (1.71) (1.49) (15.11) (14.86) 
       
Student characteristics (controls) no yes no yes no yes 
School fixed effects no yes no yes no yes 
       
Observations 20234 18740 24206 22528 12986 12106 
R-squared 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.16 
Note: Estimated coefficient with absolute t-value in parenthesis. The dependent variable is individual student 
achievement on low-stake national test and central exam from year 2003/2004. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity robust and corrected for school level clustering. Estimated effects of additional student and 
teacher control variables are reported in the appendix Table A1. 
Based on the findings in Table 5, there is no support for the hypothesis that girls’ performance 
is relatively worse when exposed to the high-stake central exam. Thus, the empirical results 
do not indicate that gender differences in teacher assessment may be explained by the 
differences in testing strategies. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Student achievement measures are important both for individual students’ admission prospect 
for higher education as well as for future job prospect, and as the preferred output indicators 
in studies of education production and efficiency. Hence, the objectivity and reliability of 
available performance measures are important. 
Exploiting information about individual student achievement from Norwegian 10th grade 
students, this paper finds that, conditional on individual central exam results, girls receive 
significantly higher marks than boys when assessed by the teacher. Teacher assessment and 
central exams mainly differ with respect to the evaluation strategy (non-anonymous vs. 
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anonymous) and with respect to the testing strategy (evaluation based on performance over 
time vs. performance on a single day). These observable differences represent potential 
explanations for the observed gender bias. I apply two different approaches to explain the 
gender bias in teacher assessment. First, I test the hypothesis of a student–teacher gender 
interaction effect by relating the observed gender bias to the gender of teachers. In 
Norwegian, the analysis produces a negative and statistical significant student-gender 
interaction, indicating that girls on average receive significantly higher marks when assessed 
by a male teacher. The result indicates that the observed gender bias in teacher assessment is 
related to teacher behaviour and thus, to differences in evaluation strategies. Second, I test the 
hypothesis that girls perform relatively worse when exposed to a high-stake one-day test 
(resulting from nerves, for example) by comparing individual achievement levels on the high-
stake central exam with achievement on a low-stake one-day national test. I find that girls on 
average perform better when stakes are high. Based on these results, it is therefore not likely 
that the observed gender bias in teacher assessment is caused by the difference in testing 
strategies. 
This paper illustrates that prevailing evaluation schemes in Norwegian education do not 
produce homogenous results across student subgroups. To ensure that student evaluation is 
carried out as objectively and correctly as possible, future research and evaluation is needed. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Complete estimation results with FE and additional controls 
 Complete estimation results from 
Table 3 
Complete estimation results from 
Table 4 
Complete estimation results from 
Table 5 
 Mathematics English Norwegian Mathematics English Norwegian Mathematics English Norwegian 
 FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
0.059 0.375 0.600 0.061 0.039 0.117 0.030 0.317 0.651 Girl 
(5.64) (33.28) (46.56) (1.67) (1.04) (2.14) (1.33) (14.85) (23.72) 
0.198 0.131 0.192 0.063 0.149 –0.710 0.048 –0.015 0.180 Teacher 
assessed marks 
(Non-
anonymous 
evaluation ) 
(18.67) (11.74) (14.48) (0.24) (0.49) (1.21) (2.06) (0.55) (6.26) 
          
0.058 0.066 0.016 –0.007 0.052 –0.187 –0.110 0.027 –0.343 Girl x (Teacher 
assessed 
marks) (8.79) (8.82) (1.65) (0.11) (0.78) (1.91) (7.84) (1.49) (14.86) 
Student 
characteristics 
(controls) 
         
–0.406 –0.207 –0.258 0.049 0.003 –0.077 –0.325 –0.196 –0.363 First 
generation 
immigrant (10.80) (5.79) (6.84) (2.35) (0.11) (2.23) (4.15) (2.40) (3.39) 
–0.202 –0.054 –0.068 0.039 0.055 0.000 –0.176 –0.029 –0.198 Second 
generation 
immigrant  (5.13) (1.14) (1.49) (2.00) (2.19) (0.00) (2.96) (0.34) (2.10) 
0.364 0.187 0.229 –0.000 0.020 0.031 0.318 0.163 0.202 Student living 
with both 
parents (34.16) (20.59) (24.17) (0.02) (2.36) (2.88) (14.25) (8.46) (10.14) 
0.497 0.415 0.362 –0.004 0.041 0.046 0.388 0.373 0.303 Higher 
education 
Father (41.74) (37.35) (29.11) (0.57) (5.32) (4.12) (13.40) (17.28) (11.67) 
0.453 0.385 0.353 0.035 0.043 0.043 0.406 0.326 0.286 Higher 
education 
Mother (32.97) (28.28) (28.73) (5.98) (5.65) (4.21) (14.61) (15.66) (9.56) 
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 Income Father 
(1.21) (3.58) (3.78) (1.13) (1.09) (2.03) (6.34) (2.33) (2.86) 
0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.005 Income 
Mother (2.13) (3.85) (4.41) (0.23) (2.99) (2.36) (5.57) (5.85) (6.55) 
Teacher 
characteristics 
(controls) 
         
0.003 –0.013 –0.021 0.003 –0.001 –0.038    Mean 
experience of 
teachers (0.43) (1.64) (1.53) (0.35) (0.13) (2.11)    
–0.116 –0.044 0.051       Share of 
female 
teachers (0.56) (0.26) (0.12)       
0.261 –0.104 –0.527 0.216 0.268 0.917    Share of 
teachers 
without 
children 
(1.37) (0.50) (1.56) (0.81) (0.99) (2.01)    
0.150 0.288 –0.282 –0.023 0.237 0.348    Share of 
married 
teachers (0.89) (1.81) (0.99) (0.10) (0.99) (0.68)    
School fixed 
effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 2.512 3.025 3.517 –0.030 –0.200 0.860 2.622 3.070 2.930 
 (11.22) (13.44) (9.17) (0.11) (0.56) (1.22) (78.14) (105.17) (88.72) 
          
Observations 103113 100551 58222 51545 50264 29104 18740 22528 12106 
R-squared 0.16 0.15 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.12 0.16 
Note: Estimated coefficient with absolute t-value in parenthesis. The standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust 
and corrected for school level clustering. The lack of significant teacher-effects may be due to low time-variation 
in the data. Excluding the school fixed effects from the regressions makes the estimated effects more precise. 
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